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Abstract 
Despite the general prohibition of using inter-state force imposed by Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter, force has been used under the auspices of self-defence, collective security and 
humanitarian crises. Such use of force has brought challenges to international law regarding its 
existence and efficacy. Although no state has denied the validity of such prohibition, many 
attempts have been made to legitimise use of such force on different grounds, namely exception, 
expansion and explanation.  
Unlike Public international law, Islamic law of Nations (Siyar) does not provide for a general 
prohibition of use of force but recognises circumstances in which such force can be legitimately 
used. The compatibility of these conflicting provisions of legitimate inter-state use of force 
offered by these two systems are significant for the prevention of aggressive use of force. The 
assessment of legitimacy of these conflicting provisions shall reveal where the legitimacy lies 
- is it in Islamic international law or Public international law or both or none of them?  
The results of the legitimacy assessment demonstrate that these two systems could sit in plural 
fashion by complementing each other’s legitimacy-deficits. However, the legitimacy and 
compatibility of Public international law and Islamic international law significantly depend on 
the development of an underlying pluralistic legal framework of international law with a 
healthy dose of legitimacy. Therefore, a comparative analysis of these two systems reveals the 
extent to which a complementary legal framework could be compatible and legitimate.  
The comparative analysis of the legitimacy of use of force in Public international law and 
Islamic international law includes examination of classical and contemporary sources to 
identify the existing legitimacy deficits of the two systems. The analysis follows on an inquiry 
into the the compatibility of these potentially two conflicting legal systems to complement each 
other. In this regard, the research expands on another inquiry into how the existing legitimacy 
deficits of the two systems could be overcome. Generally, this thesis seeks to address three 
fundamental and interrelated research questions, namely -  
(1) To what extent use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law is 
legitimate? 
(2) How the legitimacy deficits of Public international law and Islamic international law 
could be overcome? 
(3) Whether use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law can be 
compatible in modern world to secure higher degree of legitimacy?  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This study seeks to explore the legitimacy and compatibility of use of force in Public 
international law and Islamic international law. Due to frequent recourse to extra-Charter use 
of force by states and regional organisations and asymmetric use of force by non-state actors, 
the current framework has been under scrutiny. In search for legitimacy of use of force, this 
study discovers that legitimacy deficits in the international law arguably exist as far as use of 
force is concerned.1 This study finds a vital link between Public international law and Islamic 
international law which can, not only overcome the legitimacy deficits but also complement 
each other to build up a better system of international law on the use of force with higher degree 
of legitimacy and justice.  
International law has been a thriving field of philosophical inquiry. The central philosophical 
inquiry in relation to the use of force, both at inter-state and intra-state level, has focused on 
various phenomena including the main challenges that international law confronts. Among the 
challenges, the central philosophical question about international law on the use of force is its 
legitimacy.2 This is because as far as countries try to live in relative harmony with their other 
counterparts, they must factor in what is legitimate and what is illegitimate internationally so 
that peace can be maintained.3 As such, issues of legitimacy (for instance, legitimate and 
illegitimate behaviour) are part and parcel of international relations, and one of the tasks of 
                                                          
1 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP 1990) 19; see also Gerry Simpson, The Nature 
of International Law (Dartmouth: Ashgate 2001) xxxi; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy 
of Global Governance Institutions’ in Lukas Meyer (ed), Legitimacy, Justice and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 38; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy in International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some 
Introductory Considerations’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law 
(Springer: Heidelberg 2010) 6. 
1 Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 48. 
2  Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Introduction’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds), Faultlines of 
International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 1. 
3 Allen Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 89. 
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international law – a key tool for the regulation of international affairs – is to draw a line 
between legitimacy and illegitimacy in international life.4 
Does this mean that international law on the use of force is facing a crisis of legitimacy? It is 
apparent that the current tensions and conflicts at work internationally are the result of 
competitive and unresolved claims that, for most of them, are based on disputed interpretation 
and implementation of key international norms.5 It is also apparent that the conflicting values 
of international law and the tensions that exist about the application of these values have the 
potential to undermine the international system in terms of use of force. 6  The disputed 
interpretation and implementation of norms together with tensions of application of necessary 
values to such norms have posed challenges to international law on the use of force.7 As a result, 
the stability and legitimacy of the international system are very much under stress as far as use 
of force is concerned.  
1.2 Relevance of the Study 
The philosophy of international law can be readily envisaged as a branch of Special 
Jurisprudence, one that encompasses both conceptual and normative questions about 
international law.8 Following the inquiry into the conceptual question whether international 
law is genuinely a law as distinct from a form of social morality and convention and having 
been satisfied with its existence and legal status,9 the inquiry restarted into the normative 
question of the legitimacy of international law on the use of force.  
Legitimacy, of international law in general and use of force in particular, has not received 
adequate attention until the heinous attack of 9/11.10 Franck (in 1990) concluded that there 
should not be any question raised about the legitimacy of international law.11 However, this 
                                                          
4  Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Introduction’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds), Faultlines of 
International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 1. 
5 Ibid, 4. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See chapter 2. 
8  Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, ‘Introduction’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 2. 
9 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP 1995) 6. For contra see section 5.1 of 
chapter 5. 
10  Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Introduction’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds), Fault Lines of 
International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 3; See also John Bolton, ‘Address before the 
Federalist Society at the 2003 National Lawyers Convention’ (13 November 2003) <www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20070324_bolton.pdf> accessed on 1 August 2017.  
11 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP 1990) 19. 
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conclusion is obsolete in the current world. This is because, 9/11 and the United States’ 
response to it, particularly the war in Iraq, showed a radicalisation of international politics at 
odds with the very raison d’être of the United Nations. 12  In addition, the revival of the 
legitimacy question of Public international law in connection with the use of force is also 
accounted for the more involvement of the Security Council than in the past in the management 
of international system and the use of democratic and human rights values as benchmarks of 
legitimate and illegitimate behaviours internationally.13 Due to these reasons, legitimacy of 
international system as well as that of the international organisations that comprise an integral 
part has come under fire.14 
On the other hand, Islamic international law has been left with inadequate attention despite its 
potential to complement Public international law.15 As far as use of force is concerned, Islamic 
international law (Siyar) developed through the passage of time and within the guidance of 
Shari‘a. The limits of use of force and legitimate conduct of such use of force against rebels 
have been a significant area of international law on the use of force where Siyar has developed 
much more advanced legal framework. In addition, Islamic international law, as developed 
significantly throughout the formation and development of Islamic territory since 7th Century 
CE, is the most tested legal system which has been subject to different challenges. These 
challenges arose from other legal systems which prefer human agent as the sovereign law 
maker rather than the divine agent. Recent challenges also include the nature of Islamic law as 
opposed to modernity. Therefore, understanding the nature and methodologies of Islamic law, 
as well as the paradigm of international relations in the period when classical Islamic law was 
formulated, is a prerequisite for studying the justifications for war in Islam.16  
Classical Muslim jurists have paid little attention to the Islamic jus ad bellum (justification for 
resorting to war).17 The use of the word ‘jihad’ has been subject to various meanings and 
significances. Moreover, the political turmoil within the Islamic leaders particularly after the 
demise of the Prophet has resulted in the under-development of Islamic legal system. It is until 
the end of 7th and beginning of 8th Century CE when al-Shaybani has developed Siyar, which 
                                                          
12 Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smith, ‘Preface’ (2007) 44 International Politics, Resolving Crises of International 
Legitimacy 153.  
13  Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Introduction’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds), Faultlines of 
International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 2. 
14 Ibid, 3. 
15 Eugen Ehrlich, ‘The Sociology of Law’ (1922) 36 Harvard law Review 130, 144; see also William Twining, 
‘Normative Legal Pluralism:  Global Perspective’ (2010) 20 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 473. 
16 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 75. 
17 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener 1996) 119.  
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is Islamic international law.18 However, the encroachment of politics in the Islamic legal 
system have generated legitimacy-deficits particularly in the law of use of force.  
Because both Public international law and Islamic international law in the use of force are not 
only suffering from legitimacy deficits but also lacking the essential characteristic of 
‘internationalisation’, it is necessary that both systems accept each other, operate more widely 
and from a single legal framework. Furthermore, Islamic international law and its application 
is relevant to a very large extent to Muslim majority states. For example, invoking the notion 
of jihad by both Iraqi and Iranian rulers to recruit military resources during the Iraq-Iran war.19 
The objective of this thesis is to find out the legal framework where both systems operate in a 
complemented fashion at the traditional, cultural, national, regional and international level. 
Although it is difficult for such a framework to be compelling or binding without its acceptance 
and empowerment by the willing and able political power, such difficulties can be mitigated 
(even to a very little extent) and ready for consideration. This can be done by the willing and 
able politicians when a picture of such framework is drawn after testing its potential and 
relevance from various aspects namely, legitimacy and compatibility.  
1.3 The author’s perspective  
The thesis originated from an initial interest in the law of inter-state use of force. While 
reviewing the existing literature I was quite fascinated to see that Sir Ian Brownlie had 
undertaken a PhD research at the University of Oxford in 1960s on ‘International law and the 
use of force by states’. His research was published in 1963. Since then he had supervised PhD 
researches on inter-state use of force namely, ‘Simon Chesterman’ on ‘just war and just peace’ 
in 1990s. Further research has been carried out by Thomas Franck20, Joel Westra21, and Nikolas 
Stürchler 22. All these researches dealt with the challenges of the Charter system from various 
perspectives, namely political, social, and economic. These researches, cumulatively, 
concluded the effectiveness of the Charter system to regulate use of force in consideration to 
the challenges posed before and after the 9/11 terrorist attack.  
                                                          
18 Al-Shaybani, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Majid Khadduri tr, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 
1966) 5. 
19 Ardalan Rezamand, ‘Use of Religious Doctrine and Symbolism in the Iraq-Iran War’ (2010) 9 Journal of the 
Centre for Studies in Religion and Society 83. 
20 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University 
Press 2002). 
21 Joel H. Westra, International Law and the Use of Armed Force (Routledge 2007). 
22 Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
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The use of force has since become a contentious issue in the modern world due to the increasing 
number of threats to national security, the power practice by the hegemons and lack of power 
distribution between states. This is particularly the case between the Muslim majority states 
and Western states. These states are often come into ideological conflict in terms of the 
legitimacy of their laws and actions. States which are subject to religious legal system as well 
as party to international treaty like the UN Charter are under state responsibility to comply with 
general international law.23 However, such states might argue that in case of any inconsistency 
between the general international law and religious law, the latter shall prevail. This might be 
carried out by imposing reservations on the conflicting laws by the states as this has been done 
previously.24 However, such reservations are unlikely to have any effect because international 
law is likely to have taken priority over Islamic law due to the latter’s inferior status at the 
international level. This is not the right solution as the conflict between the two systems would 
continue to exist and is likely to escalate further. This is not a solution of a substantial problem. 
The absolutism of international law is as harmful as it is to disregard Islamic international law 
in determining the issues in a matter where both systems provide conflicting provisions.  
The problem of denouncing Islamic international law from its supranational nature and 
operation at the international level is enormous since this law is being adopted and applied by 
a considerable group of sovereign states. Besides the fifty-seven member states of Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), there are now forty-three Muslim majority states, of which 
twenty-three have declared Islam as state religion.25 Muslim majority states might advance the 
view that a Muslim state cannot be bound to an international legal obligation that contradicts 
Islamic law; this is in fact implied in the constitution of certain Islamic States.26 In these 
circumstances, it is desirable to overcome the contradiction by application of legal principles 
which are capable of discovering the true legal concepts and complement these concepts to fit 
in plural fashion. This thesis endeavours to do this by applying ‘legitimacy’, as a legal principle, 
to discover the true meaning of use of force in Public international law and Islamic international 
law followed by the application of ‘legal pluralism’ theory to fit the legitimate use of force 
provisions in plural fashion.  
                                                          
23 Application of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the UN Headquarters Agreement [1988] ICJ Rep 
34, para 57.  
24 For example, the constitutions of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen.  
25 Niaz A. Shah, ‘The Use of Force under Islamic Law’ (2013) 24 EJIL 343, 363. 
26 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP 2014) 28; see also supra note 24 for the list of 
countries.  
6 
 
1.4 Architecture of the study  
The following outline sets out the core objectives of the substantive chapters which, taken as a 
whole, aim to highlight the problems arising from the use of force at international level. It 
focuses on extra-Charter use of force and its legitimacy in Public international law and use of 
force by state and non-state actors in Islamic international law.  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis explores the general prohibition of use of force under article 2(4) and 
use of force in self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter. This chapter also focuses on 
the current practices of the states and regional organisations around the UN Collective Security 
system. While exploring the main provisions of use of force and current state practices, this 
chapter recognises the current challenges which resulted in extra-Charter use of force in 
modern world.  
Chapter 3 analyses the use of force provision of Islamic international law and its use and abuse 
by both state and non-state actors, at the state level and inter-state level. It demonstrates how 
the main provision of use of force, which is ‘jihad’, has been developed and subjected to 
different meanings and significances. This chapter also denotes that the development of Siyar, 
which is Islamic international law, was not only based on the Qur’an and sunna but also the 
intellectual efforts of Muslim jurists and exegetes, made while dealing with other states.  
Chapter 4 encompasses the Islamic law of rebellion. It covers the development of the law from 
historical milestones. This chapter introduces the modern law of rebellion and treatment of 
rebels in Islamic law. There is also a section which conducts a comparative analysis of the 
Islamic law of rebellion and Public international law with particular focus on the former’s 
potential to complement the latter. Eventually, this chapter concludes by articulating the 
distinguishing features between jihad, rebellion and terrorism, and drawing a fine line between 
each of them.  
Chapter 5 deals with the core question, which is the legitimacy deficits of Public international 
law and Islamic international law in the use of force. This chapter scrutinises the state practices, 
in relation to use of force, to find out if such uses of force are legitimate. Following the finding 
of legitimacy deficits, this chapter recommends on overcoming such legitimacy deficits 
including a reform of the decision-making process at the Security Council. This approach is 
adopted in this chapter to emphasise on the proposition that law must be legitimated before 
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considering the applicability of legal pluralism.27 This chapter applies ‘legal pluralism’ theory 
to assess the overall compatibility between Public international law and Islamic international 
law in the use of force. Chapter 5 concludes that the barrier of Public international law on the 
use of force lies on its own sense of deriving its own legitimacy from its purported universality, 
and this barrier could be overcome by application of the cultural relativists’ approach of 
international law which provides for input legitimacy of the system by recognition of diverse 
cultural values.  
Chapter 6 examines if Public international law and Islamic international law can be compatible. 
It scrutinises the main objective of these two systems, such as promoting peace and justice, to 
see if these can be reconciled. For this purpose, a section is devoted for analysing peace and 
justice and their interplay in promoting legitimacy. Compatibility of these two systems is also 
considered to see if the ‘crime of aggression’, as adopted by the International Criminal Court, 
is consistent to that of use of force in Islamic international law. Eventually, this chapter 
discusses the role of treaties, both from Islamic and Public international law perspectives, in 
the complementation process between these two systems. This chapter proposes for a 
complemented system where legitimacy, justice and peace can be promoted at the same time.  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by demonstrating how the chapters contributed in answering 
the main research question, which is ‘to what extent use of force in Public international law 
and Islamic international law can be compatible and legitimate?’ In answering this question 
this chapter focuses on the research findings of the previous chapters and their implication in 
answering the three research questions articulated in the abstract (above). 
1.5 Methodological approach  
This thesis primarily deploys both doctrinal and theoretical inquiries, which include doctrinal 
inquiry into the UN Charter system followed by a theoretical inquiry into the legitimacy and 
compatibility of Public international law and Islamic international law in the use of force. In 
other words, a doctrinal methodological approach informed by comparative analysis to achieve 
the fundamental aims of the thesis, namely to develop a complementary legal framework 
between Public international law and Islamic international law. This method was chosen 
                                                          
27 Margaret Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kirtzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook on 
Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010) 805, 812. 
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because doctrinal analysis ‘is the research process used to identify, analyse and synthesise the 
content of the law.’28 More specifically, doctrinal analysis requires the researcher to - 
 
Collect and then analyse a body of case law, together with any relevant legislation […] 
This is quite often done from a historical perspective and may also include secondary 
sources such as journal articles or other written commentaries on the case law and 
legislation. The researcher’s principle or sole aim is to describe a body of law and how 
it applies. In doing so, the researcher may also provide an analysis of the law to 
demonstrate how it has developed in terms of judicial reasoning and legislative 
enactment.29 
 
Theory constructs a point of derivation which becomes the foundation of law even if mythical 
or notional in its premises. This foundation varied from theism to secularism, from God, nature 
and reason to the command of the sovereign or the will of the people. These theoretical 
constructions provide ideological context to the legal system, control legal reasoning and 
predetermine the outcome.30 These are not internal to the legal arguments but these facilitate 
to overcome the rigidity of the legal arguments. It does not, however, conclude the debate 
because it refers to those presupposed foundations where agreement is hard to obtain and which 
taint with their subjectivity and the neutrality of legal rules. Hence, legal discourse receded and 
reclaimed the distinction between theory and doctrine, between prescription and description, 
as a means of preserving the distinctive nature of law.31 Legal professionals feel that they 
should engage in the study of proper law only because theory jeopardises the presumed 
objectivity of legal norms by extending the ambit of discord to rather abstract assertion and this 
is vulnerable to antagonistic constructions.32 This has been described graphically by A. M. 
Honoré in the following words: 
 
                                                          
28 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Many Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 9.  
29 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2010) 19.   
30  Nikolas T. Tsagourias, Jurisprudence of International Law: The Humanitarian Dimension (Manchester 
University Press 2000) 1.  
31 ibid. 
32 ibid. 
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Decade after decade Positivist and Natural Lawyers face one another in the final of the 
World Cup … Victory goes now to one side, now to the other, but the enthusiasm of 
players and spectators alike ensure that the losing side will take its revenge.33 
 
On the contrary, doctrinal argument has also failed to provide the anticipated sense of security 
and clarity. There are instances where doctrinal outcomes seem either irrelevant or 
controversial. 34  The area on the use of force is an example as despite the UN Charter 
prohibition to use inter-state force except in self-defence to an armed attack and with the 
authorisation from the Security Council, there are instances of use of force where there were 
no justification for using inter-state force or no authorisation from the Security Council either, 
for instance invasion of Iraq by the coalition force of USA and UK. The argument of the 
proponents of such use of force was to promote anticipatory self-defence and collective 
security.35 As a result, the doctrinal arrangement provided by Article 2(4) and 51 of the UN 
Charter have become irrelevant or controversial with the arguments offered by the proponents 
of extra-charter use of force. These proponents, therefore, resort to theory as the final arbiter 
by employing principles such as justice, human rights, peace and sovereignty.36 
 
This thesis endeavours to close the gap between legal or doctrinal and theoretical discourses 
appertaining to use of force by moulding of the doctrinal discourses through theoretical 
dispositions and their dialectical interplay. For example, extra-Charter use of force can be 
theoretically legitimate to protect national security but such use of force is not doctrinally 
permissible, for instance general prohibition of use of force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
In this conflicting situation, customary international law can reconcile the theoretical and 
doctrinal position and facilitate their interplay. While considering the compatibility of use of 
force, this thesis acknowledges the multifariousness, namely legal arguments, political 
objectives, moral and personal values, and human or psychological factors. 
 
In the process of developing arguments and drawing conclusions, this thesis has included 
international treaties and case law from international courts and tribunals, and published books 
                                                          
33 A. M. Honoré, ‘Groups, Laws and Obedience’ in A. W. B Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 
Second Series (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1973) 1.  
34  Nikolas T. Tsagourias, Jurisprudence of International Law: The Humanitarian Dimension (Manchester 
University Press 2000) 1. 
35 William H. Taft and Todd F. Buckwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and International Law’ (2003) 93 American Journal 
of International Law 557. 
36  Nikolas T. Tsagourias, Jurisprudence of International Law: The Humanitarian Dimension (Manchester 
University Press 2000) 2. 
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and academic journals obtained by hard copy through local and inter-library loan and online 
via various legal databases such as Westlaw, LexisLibrary, HeinOnline, BAILII and online 
databases of other common law jurisdictions. In addition, the official websites of United 
Nations, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and International Law Commission 
have also been referred throughout the thesis.  
1.6 Case law  
There is an emphasis on case analysis throughout this study. This approach was chosen because 
of the emergence of, although very few, case laws in this area. The scarcity of case laws in this 
area due to the lack of jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to decide questions 
of Charter interpretation. This is because, ICJ has jurisdiction only in cases that both sides have 
agreed to refer to it unless a state has accepted its compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) 
of the ICJ Statute.37 Because most states have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ, few cases regarding the Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition of use of force come before it.38 
However, these cases, although very few in numbers, provide valuable source materials in 
determining the meaning and significances of the Charter provisions. For example, the use of 
force necessary to trigger an ‘armed attack’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the 
definition of non-international armed conflict. Furthermore, the findings of these cases have 
been utilised to conduct a comparative analysis between legitimate use of force and its 
compatibility with Islamic international law.  
1.7 Contribution to existing literature 
A plethora of academic commentary and much heated debate arose during the aftermath of 
9/11 terrorist attack. Some reformers claimed the legitimacy of extra-Charter use of force to 
deal with the current challenges of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Others 
expressed the same view taken by this thesis that the restrictions imposed, by the general 
prohibition of use of force except in self-defence on the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’, is not 
fit and proper any more in the modern world to deal with extensive security challenges. As L. 
Vincent and P. Wilson rightly claimed that: 
 
                                                          
37 Joel H. Westra, International Law and the Use of Armed Force (Routledge 2007) 15. 
38 Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 65. 
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The current challenges and the recurring state practices turn out to be no more than a 
rationalisation of the existing order without any interest in its transformation.39  
  
The legitimacy-deficit of international law lies in the fact that it fails to take into account the 
legitimate interest of groups consisting of substantial number of world population, such as 
Islamic international law, seriously enough and often operates so as to threaten their welfare.40 
One has to emphasise here that the principles of Islamic international law on use of force are 
not an integral part of Public international law, but such principles should be considered as an 
integral part of the latter. This is because, Muslim majority states are parties to the Charter of 
the United Nations Organization.41 
Respect for rule of law and justice is the basic principle of Islamic international law. It gives 
precedence to the rule of law over aggression, reprisals and retaliation, and exercise of 
excessive political power and self-interest gratification. However, this basic principle of 
Islamic international law and its effectiveness to promote higher degree of legitimacy on the 
use of force has not been given its international phase. Therefore, it is essential to incorporate 
Islamic international law in the process of internationalisation of Public international law on 
the use of force.  
 
Internationalisation is necessary at every level whether national, regional or international by 
reaching to others to understand, share and assist in the development of effective international 
law on the use of force. In the process of internationalisation, this thesis tried to interpret and 
develop an international legal framework which is based on wider political, historical and 
systematic context. This thesis tried to show that careful theoretical analysis and systematic 
thinking from international perspective with respect to a crucial rule of Public international law 
and Islamic international law, which is the use of force, if well done, are not only compatible 
with each other but ultimately interdependent. This research methodology is necessary for the 
proper identification of the challenges and development of the effectiveness of international 
law on the use of force, and this thesis is aimed at making a valuable contribution to this end. 
Therefore, the contribution of this research includes the legitimate use of force in Islamic 
international law, such as jihad and rebellion, the legitimate use of force in Public international 
                                                          
39 R. Vincent and P. Wilson, ‘Beyond Non-Intervention’ in I. Forbes and M. Hoffman (eds), Political Theory, 
International Relations and he Ethics of Intervention (London: Macmillan 1993) 124. 
40  Allen Buchanan, ‘Legitimacy of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 86.  
41 Farhad Malekian, ‘The Canon of Love against the Use of Force in Islamic and Public International Law. Part 
ii: The Anatomy of Love against Violations’ (2015) 15 International Criminal Law Review 867. 
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law where extra-Charter use of force is not normatively legitimate but theoretically justifiable 
and supported by customary international law, and the interdependency of these two systems 
in order to overcome the legitimacy deficits and promote peace and justice at the same time.  
1.8 Ambit of the study  
The author concludes that the comparative informed doctrinal method adopted in this thesis 
provided the most effective means of fulfilling the primary purpose of the study, which is to 
find out the legitimacy deficits of Public international law and Islamic international law. This 
thesis does not delve into or addresses the question ‘what constitutes a threat of force according 
to article 2(4) of the UN Charter’ and ‘on what grounds recourse to a threat of force is justified’. 
For the purpose of this research, this thesis treats Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as being limited 
to military force and imposition of economic or political sanctions is beyond its scope. In 
addition, this research has only focused on ‘use of force’, and reference to force does not 
include force used to cause threat of force except in very specific context, namely when threat 
of force is claimed to be capable of triggering ‘pre-emptive or anticipatory use of force in self-
defence’.  
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Chapter 2 
The Legal Status of International law on the use of force 
 
This chapter examines the legal status of international law on the use of force as provided by 
the United Nations Charter. This examination includes exploring the challenges posed on the 
Charter framework in regulating use of force in modern world. The current challenges posed 
on the Charter framework include the expansion of the limitation of use of force provided by 
the Charter and its ineffectiveness to regulate use of force in the current world affairs. As a 
result, the key question to answer is ‘whether the UN Charter can effectively prevent and 
control armed violence in contemporary world?’ It is very important to answer this question 
because, the Charter framework is the peremptory norm of international law on the use of force 
and the legitimacy as well as effectiveness of this framework is of vital importance in order to 
promote peace and justice. Furthermore, answering this question would advance the thesis in 
answering the first part of the first research question, which is ‘to what extent use of force in 
Public international law is legitimate’?1  
To answer this question, examination of the Charter provisions in relation to use of force is the 
first port of call as these are the primary norms of international law on the use of force. While 
it is relevant to scrutinise Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter in this regard, it is also 
necessary to scrutinise the scholarly positions for justifying use of force on other grounds, 
namely to protect national security of states and to safeguard or restore other people’s 
fundamental rights or action the necessity of international order and stability. These categories 
include humanitarian intervention, intervention by invitation, and use of force in response to 
an ‘armed attack’ by non-state actors. It is also necessary to analyse the nature and extent of 
use of force in customary international law and its potential in the adaptation of the UN Charter 
from the perspective of overcoming the legitimacy deficits of the use of force. For example, 
use of force which is not permitted in the Charter framework but in the customary international 
law. This analysis would advance the thesis to discover the extent of legitimate use of force 
from the viewpoints of customs and the UN Charter. 
                                                          
1 See the ‘abstract’ in chapter 1.  
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2.1 International law on the use of force in the United Nations Charter 
The fundamental principles of international law on the use of force are provided in Articles 2(4) 
and 51 of the UN Charter. Whereas Article 2(4) provides for a general prohibition of use of 
inter-state force, Article 51 permits use of defensive force in response to an ‘armed attack’. 
However, the right of self-defence is not absolute as this right is subject to satisfaction of other 
conditions, namely necessity, proportionality, and last resort. 2  Furthermore, there are 
disagreements as to situations which are likely to trigger the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ 
and hence legitimate defensive use of force.3 In these circumstances, the prohibition of force 
and the occurrence of an armed attack are subject to crucial controversies among scholars and 
state authorities.  
2.1.1 The General Prohibition of use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter 
Article 2(4) of the Charter professes that - 
All Members shall refrain in the international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.4 
By prohibiting the use (or threat) of force in international relations, Article 2(4) transcends war 
and covers equally other uses of inter-state force (which may be regarded as ‘short of war’).5 
The expression ‘force’ in Article 2(4) is not preceded by the adjective ‘armed’ and this means 
that it extends to non-armed violence.6 Two specific objectives, against which the use (or threat) 
of inter-State force is forbidden in Article 2(4), are the ‘territorial integrity’ and the ‘political 
                                                          
2 Hans Blix, ‘Third Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture’ (24 November 2004) 
<http://lcil.law.cam.ac.uk/lectures/hersch_lectures_2004.php> accessed 2 September 2017. 
3 Kimberley N. Trapp, ‘Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 693-694; see also Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ 
and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
377; Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University 
Press 2002) 4; Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol II (2), 84, para 21 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2001_v2_p1.pdf> accessed 11 August 2017; Antonio 
Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 90. 
4 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 9 Int. Leg., 332, Article 2(4), <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> 
accessed 13 August 2017. 
5 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (fifth edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 88. 
6 Brigitte Reschke, ‘Use of Force’, Prohibition of’, A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations (2nd edn, 
Helmut Volger, Brill: Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 842, 843. 
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independence’ of States.7 These dual considerations form the centre of gravity because they 
create ‘a residual “catch-all” provision’ as the conjunctive phrase ‘or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ was added to underscore the all-
embracing prohibition of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.8  
The provisions of this article have been confirmed as the reflection of customary international 
law in Nicaragua case.9 As Judge Sette-Camara concluded that - 
I firmly believe that the non-use of force as well as non-intervention … are not only 
cardinal principles of customary international law but could in addition be recognised 
as peremptory rules of customary international law which impose obligations on all 
states.10 
In addition, the prohibition of use of force has also been buttressed by International Law 
Commission.11 However, the sweeping exclusions of recourse to inter-state force, under Article 
2(4), is subject to exceptions. There are only two enduring settings, in which the Charter 
permits the use of inter-State force, are - (i) self-defence (Article 51); and (ii) when collective 
security measures are taken by fiat of the Security Council (Article 39).  
2.1.2 Use of force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter  
The obvious exception to the prohibition of use of force is Article 51 of the UN Charter which 
has given legality to resort to force on the ground of ‘self-defence’. Article 51 states that 
“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs.”12 The precondition to use force under the banner of self-
defence is the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’. This term has been used by scholars to cover a 
variety of attacks, but the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has clarified that not all uses of 
force amount to an ‘armed attack’. The court added that:  
The armed action has to be sufficiently sustained, using military means at a certain level 
of intensity. This would rule out border incidents or minor skirmishes. The attack must 
                                                          
7 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (fifth edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 90. 
8 Manfred Lachs, ‘The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time’ (1980) 9 RCADI 162 
cited in Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (fifth edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 88. 
9 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. United 
States) [1986] ICJ Rep.14, 99. 
10 ibid, 199 – 200, para 90.  
11 Art 50, the Articles on the Responsibility of States, Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the 
work of its 53rd session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, A/56/10, ch IV.E.1. 
12 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 9 Int. Leg., 332, Article 51, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> 
accessed 14 August 2017. 
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be specifically aimed at the victim state. Firing a missile at undefined targets would not 
meet that criterion.13 
Therefore, the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ is required to invoke the right of self-defence 
under Article 51. However, such invocation also requires satisfying the test that the action in 
self-defence was ‘necessary and proportionate’ to repel the ‘armed attack’. The ICJ in the Oil 
Platform Case has decided that - 
Self-defence is only allowed in response to an armed attack, as specified in Article 51 
of the UN Charter and customary international law, and that it has to be necessary and 
proportionate, and that the envisaged target must be a legitimate military target, open 
to attack in the exercise of self-defence.14  
It is ‘necessary’ to recourse to defensive use of force when all other alternatives had been 
considered and proven insufficient.15 Therefore, defensive use of force is necessary only when 
it is used as a ‘last resort’.  
The extent to which an ‘armed attack’ can be defended is determined by the necessity to repel 
the attack, but not to retaliate or in any way take revenge against the aggressor. In other words, 
defensive use of force must be used to stop or end the armed attack rather than to use excessive 
force to destroy the military capacity of the aggressor in initiating another attack. Scholars have 
claimed that the force used in accordance with the right of self-defence should be 
‘proportionate’ to the actual armed attack. 16  But this claim undermines the ‘necessity’ 
requirement of self-defence’ which allows the self-defence to be to that extent as necessary to 
repel the armed attack. Therefore, the word ‘proportionate’ must be interpreted considering 
what is ‘necessarily proportionate’ to repel the armed attack rather than what is proportionate 
to the actual armed attack. In the words of Marc Weller:  
                                                          
13 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. United 
States) [1986] ICJ Rep., 14, 103. 
14 Oil Platform (Iran v. US) Judgment, ICJ Rep 2003, para 51. 
15 Raphael Steenberghe, ‘The Law of Self-Defence and the New Argumentative Landscape on the Expansionists’ 
Side’ (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 43, 61.  
16 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 152 -55; see also 
Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press 2004) 
148-53; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence (fifth edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 208-
10.  
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It would not be permissible to continue the conflict in order to diminish and degrade 
the military capacity of the attacking state, for instance in order to alter the military 
balance in a way that would make a further, future attack less likely.17 
Therefore, any defensive use of force must correspond to the use of force that is ‘necessary and 
proportionate’ to end the armed attack, but not to correspond the extent of use of force by the 
aggressor. For example, if the aggressor has used three air strikes then using the same amount 
of force in self-defence might be proportionate but might not be necessary when only one air 
strike by the victim state would end the attack from reoccurrence. In this scenario, the criterion 
for determining the right proportion of defensive use of force is based on military necessity 
rather than proportionality per se.  
2.1.2.1 Use of force by non-state actors  
There are controversies on the issue “whether use of force by non-state actors can constitute an 
‘armed attack’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter”. Traditionally, this question would have 
been answered in the ‘negative’ because up until 9/11 it was assumed that only states could 
mount an ‘armed attack’. However, the UN Security Council determined that the events of 11 
September 2001 amounted to an ‘armed attack’ – a use of force so sustained that it triggered a 
right of self-defence on the part of the US.18 This is despite the International Court of Justice 
has repeatedly pronounced otherwise. 19  Furthermore, Judge Higgins, Kooijmans, and 
Buergenthal (in the Wall advisory opinion) and Judge Koojimans and Simma (in the Armed 
activities case) have been less reluctant than the Court and have all expressed their preference 
for recognising the possibility of ‘non-state actors armed attacks’ within the meaning of Article 
51.20 
The 9/11 attack being an exceptional circumstance of heinous terrorist attack so far in the 
history of 21st Century, the Security Council focused on counterterrorist measures and 
                                                          
17 Marc Weller, ‘Introduction: International Law and the Problem of War’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 22. 
18 SC Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm> accessed 11 
August 2017. 
19 Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, ICJ, 
Advisory Opinion, General List No 131, para 138; see also DRC v. Uganda, 19 Dec 2005, General List No 116, 
para 146. 
20 Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para 33; Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para 35; Declaration of Judge 
Buergenthal, para 6; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (DRC v Uganda), Judgment, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, paras 28 ff; Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para 11. 
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acknowledged the right of self-defence in such exceptional circumstances.21 But this is not the 
general stance of international law on the use of force. Few scholars say that this was a mere 
positive response to the pressures for momentous and situational changes but never 
demonstrated the actual legal position.22 There is no conceptual or normative link between 
‘armed attack by non-state actors’ and ‘automatic trigger of self-defence’.23  
However, Article 51 of the UN Charter does not specify the source of an ‘armed attack’ to 
trigger the right of self-defence. Hence, ‘armed attack’ by non-state actors could trigger such 
right of self-defence in certain circumstances. For example, where the nature of the attack is so 
grave that it can amount to an ‘armed attack’. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that 
‘armed attack’ for the purpose of self-defence included:  
Not merely action by regular forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending 
by or on behalf of a state of armed band, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry 
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) 
an actual armed attack conducted by irregular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement 
therein’.24 
Therefore, states are responsible for an ‘armed attack’ launched by non-state actors who are 
operating within their territory and attributable to those states. However, such attribution of 
responsibility is not automatic and clear proof of the states’ unwillingness or inability to control 
such armed attack is necessary. The nature and extent of the ‘attribution of responsibly’ has 
been discussed below.  
2.1.2.1.1 State Responsibility for use of force by non-state actors 
If non-state actors can mount an armed attack, even in exceptional grievousness of the attack, 
triggering the exercise of Article 51 self-defence25, the challenge against invoking Article 51 
                                                          
21 Resolutions 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) and 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), respectively, recognise the right to take individual 
and collective measures in the aftermath of the attack by al-Qaeda on the United States.  
22 Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence (Chatham 
House: Royal Institute of International Affairs 2005) 66; see also Christine Gray, International Law and the Use 
of Force (OUP 2008) 164; Eric Myjer and Nigel White, ‘The Twin Towers attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-
Defence’ (2002) 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5. 
23 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Changing Jus Cogens through State Practice? The Case of the Prohibition of the 
Use of Force and Its Exceptions’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International 
Law (OUP 2015) 173. 
24 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US) Merits, ICJ Rep 1986, para 
195. 
25 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Non-State Actors and the Use of Force’ in Jean d’Aspremont (ed), Participants in the 
International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (Oxford: Routledge 
2011) 326-41. 
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self-defence is that those non-state actors would most likely be based on foreign soil and this 
would mean that force would be used not only against emanations of the terrorist movement 
but also against the state on whose territory it is based.26 Use of force in this circumstance 
would be a violation of Article 2(4) which prohibits use of extraterritorial force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. However, some scholars argue that 
states that harbour terrorists or violate the rights of their own people are no longer entitled to 
the sovereign prerogatives that underpin Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.27 
On the contrary, the General Assembly (GA) has made declaration on the inadmissibility of 
intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of their independence and 
sovereignty. 28  In 2005 the World Summit Outcome Document reiterated the GA’s 
determination to establish a just and lasting international peace and to refrain from the threat 
or use of force in international relations in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
UN.29 The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States also provides for the duty to refrain from encouraging or organising 
irregular forces or terrorist acts.30 
This duty to refrain from interference in the domestic affairs of other states is a very critical 
problem in international law on the use of force because attacking the non-state actors in the 
territory of a state would amount to attacking that state and this is prohibited in Article 2(4). 
After all, many conflicts are being fought by irregular troops, giving rise to the question 
‘whether the actions of those groups can be attributed to the state concerned’?  
In certain circumstances, extraterritorial use of force by non-state actors could amount to an 
‘armed attack’ by one state against another and hence triggering self-defence under Article 51 
                                                          
26 Marc Weller, ‘Introduction: International Law and the Problem of War’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 24. 
27 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 220; see also Juttee Brunee and Stephen Toope, 'The use of force: 
International law after Iraq' (2004) 53 ICLQ  785; Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, ‘Statement to the House of 
Lords’ (Hansard, 21 April 2004, column 370) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldhansrd/vo040421/text/40421-07.htm> accessed 2 September 
2017. 
28 A/RES/2131 (XX) (21 Dec 1965) <http://www.un-documents.net/a20r2131.htm> accessed 14 August 2017. 
29 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ A/RES/60/1 (2005) para 5 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_6
0_1.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.   
30 General Assembly, ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ A/RES/2625 (XXV) (24 Oct 1970) 
Principle 1 <http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm> accessed 15 August 2017.  
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of the UN Charter.31 For example, when a state ‘tolerates or supports’ extraterritorial use of 
force by non-state actors operating within its territory, or in certain circumstances, in the 
territory of another state. The ICJ also considered the ‘toleration’ by a state of non-state actors 
who make use of that state’s territory for cross-border armed action as a violation of the 
prohibition of use of force.32  
The main legal controversy on the responsibility of states for the violence of non-state actors, 
in recent years, has crystallised around precisely the issue of ‘standard of attribution’, with ICJ 
in the Nicaragua case applying a different standard (‘effective control’ by the state33) from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (endorsing the lower 
standard of ‘overall control’34), and being able to distinguish this in terms of the situations 
coming before both tribunals.35  
The question is, which test would be applied to determine attribution of responsibility to the 
host state from which terrorist attacks have been carried out? Whereas ‘Effective Control’ test 
has been criticised for being too restrictive,36 ‘Overall control’ test has been identified as too 
wide as it does not demonstrate a strong link between the ‘control’ of the non-state actors and 
‘state responsibility’ for attack by non-state actors susceptible for attribution.37  
However, a strict requirement to demonstrate attribution or imputability would, after all, 
‘severely limit the ability of states to take defensive action in a situation which is so urgent that 
it does not logically allow a state victim of an armed attack to wait to raise questions of 
responsibility’.38 On the other hand, a wide or flexible requirement would be prone to abuse by 
the victim states.39 In addition to this dilemma, it is very difficult to obtain evidence to prove 
                                                          
31 Article 8, International Law Commission, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (12 
December 2001) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf> accessed 24 
December 2017. 
32 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) Judgment, ICJ Rep 2005, 168, para 300. 
33 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US) Merits, ICJ Rep 1986, 14, 
para 115. 
34 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment in Appeal, ICTY, Case IT-94-1-A (15 July 199) para 162. 
35 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Rep 2007, 43; see also James Crawford, State Responsibility 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 146. 
36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US) Merits, Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Rep 1986, para 155.  
37 James Crawford, State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press 2013) 152. 
38 Van Steenberghe, ‘Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-State Actors in the Light of Recent State 
Practice’, 195-6 cited in Lindsay Moir, ‘Action against Host States of Terrorist Groups’ in Marc Weller (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 735. 
39 Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence (Chatham 
House: Royal Institute of International Affairs 2005) 8; see also Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2004, 
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the level of control, whether effective or overall, exercised by the state susceptible for 
attribution of responsibility due to the hidden nature of the groups and secretive contact of state 
officials.40 In the words of Antonio Cassese: 
How could one prove that a particular terrorist group has acted upon instructions or 
directions or under the specific control of a state in such manner as to imply that the 
state has … directed the perpetration of individual terrorist actions? The hidden nature 
of those groups, their being divided up into small and closely-knit units, the secretive 
contacts of officials of some specific states with terrorists’ groups, all this would make 
it virtually impossible.41 
In these circumstances, the effective or overall control test does not have the potential to 
regulate use of force decision by states for armed attack by non-state actors. Even if it is 
possible to determine, whether by application of these tests or otherwise, that the armed attack 
carried out by non-state actors is not attributable to the state concerned, could the victim state 
invoke right of self-defence against those non-state actors without any consent from the host 
state?   
The current state practices of militarily willing and able states suggest that defensive force can 
be used in the host state without obtaining its consent if it is ‘unwilling or unable’ to take 
effective counter measures against non-state actors ‘to the satisfaction of the victim state’.42 
These state practices indicate a strong proposition for the support of use of force in self-defence 
for non-state actors’ ‘un-attributable’ attack on the victim state. As Kimberley N. Trapp aptly 
worded:  
Although the failure to condemn such invocation of self-defence should not be viewed 
as indicating broad acceptance or support, given the abundant state practice of expressly 
condemning notified uses of defensive force in letters to the Security Council, the 
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House: Royal Institute of International Affairs 2005) 9; see also Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force 
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muted reaction (most particularly of the League of Arab States and the NAM) to the 
US operation in Afghanistan is significant and certainly signals the beginning of the 
emerging consensus that uses of force specifically targeting non-state terrorist actors, 
in response to armed attack they launch from foreign territory, is a legitimate exercise 
of the right of self-defence.43 
If this is the case, then neither the control tests nor any other measures are likely to have any 
implication on the attribution of responsibility on states for use of force by non-state actors. 
This is because the state practices, stated above, indicate that irrespective of the nature of 
control of the host state over the non-state actors and their activities, an ‘unwillingness or 
inability’ by the host state (as perceived by the victim state) would suffice to hold it responsible 
for the attack carried out by non-state actors from its territory. Such practices include the 2001 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the 2006 Israeli/Hezbollah conflict in Lebanese 
territory and Israel’s response to the terrorist attack in a Haifa café by Islamic Jihad in 2003 in 
Syrian territory.44  
What role do the ‘control tests’ play where these are not operative in using defensive force 
against non-state actors in foreign territory? Attribution of an ‘armed attack’ to a state is, 
therefore, more relevant to the question of ‘who may be targeted’ by the defensive response 
than to the question of whether the victim state has been subjected to an armed attack per se.45 
In these circumstances, the decision to trigger use of defensive force under Article 51 is being 
made by a party to the conflict, such as the victim state, who is likely to be biased towards 
upholding its self-interest rather than complying with the legal requirement of the control tests. 
This decision-making process by the states is unlikely to achieve the required degree of 
legitimacy due to lack of accountability and deference to scrutiny by an independent 
international body or organisation.46  
On the one hand, international law on the use of force requires to satisfy the principle of 
‘attribution of responsibility’ for an ‘armed attack’ to trigger defensive use of force under 
Article 51. On the other hand, state practices of the willing and able claim legitimacy of such 
                                                          
43 Kimberley N. Trapp, ‘Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 693-694. 
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use of force based on unwillingness or inability of the host state to take countermeasures against 
the non-state actors to the satisfaction of the former. In these circumstances, the willing and 
able states are unwilling to obtain consent of the host state before using defensive force or to 
satisfy the legal requirement for attribution of responsibility.47 Furthermore, the existence of 
uncertainty in the legal requirement for attribution of responsibility, as stated above, has put 
the willing and able states in a stronger position to claim legitimacy of defensive use of force 
against non-state actors without satisfying the legal requirements for attribution of 
responsibility on the host state. However, this course of action, although accommodates in 
recent state practice, conflicts with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the principles of 
sovereignty and state responsibility which permit use of force in self-defence only if non-state 
actors’ attack can be attributed to the host state or it consents.48  
In this complex situation, the ICJ jurisprudence has offered a solution by adopting the position 
that attribution is only ‘a necessary condition’ for the applicability of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter if a use of defensive force is targeted against the state from whose territory non-state 
actors operate.49 This is because it is not always necessary to use such defensive force against 
the host state but only against the non-state actors, and in such situation it is also not necessary 
to satisfy the requirement of attribution of responsibility or obtain consent of the host state.50 
As a result, the ICJ jurisprudence has facilitated use of defensive force against non-state actors 
rather than addressing the lack of effective legal principles for attribution of responsibility and 
articulating ideal legal requirement for satisfying attribution of responsibility. However, this 
position is likely to encourage the willing and able states to use extraterritorial force under the 
banner of self-defence without fulfilling the hefty burden of satisfying the required degree of 
legitimacy and in violation of the general prohibition of use of force provided in Article 2(4) 
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of the UN Charter. Examples of such use of extraterritorial force include the US and Russia’s 
air strikes in Syria against ISIS51 and the Saudi Arabia air strikes in Yemen against the Houthi 
rebels.52 
2.1.3 Use of force in the Gap between Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter  
International law permits use of force in ‘law enforcement activities’ if it is unavoidable, 
reasonable and necessary but such action may not always be legitimate especially when threat 
of force has been used rather than mere law enforcement.53 In the Corfu Channel case, the UK 
justified its minesweeping action as a lawful measure responding to unlawful behaviour by 
Albania and, more specifically, as limited intervention in order to secure possession of evidence 
to be submitted to an international tribunal.54 The legal argument anticipated by UK was that 
the Article 2(4) prohibition is subject to an exception for certain ‘non-aggressive’ use of force.55  
In order to satisfy the non-aggressive nature of use of force the states have to satisfy that the 
‘threshold’ for ‘armed attack’ has not reached and such use of force is necessary for law 
enforcement purposes. Satisfaction of these requirements facilitate use of force ‘short of armed 
attack’ in the gap between Articles 2(4) and 51. Force can be used in this gap if it is a necessary 
action which is not to the gravity of an armed attack or which is a ‘reaction’ or ‘response’ to a 
non-armed attack. Use of force by way of retaliation or reprisal is generally unlawful56 but such 
unlawful acts can become lawful if they constitute a reaction to the delinquency by another 
state.57 However, such actions would not be legal if the only purpose was to take revenge.58 
For example, sanctions and countermeasures against a delinquent state which has used force 
but not to the extent of an ‘armed attack’ is lawful as far as such sanctions and countermeasures 
are necessary to enforce the law but not to take revenge against the delinquent state.  
                                                          
51 The Daily mail, ‘US Airstrikes Destroy ISIS Targets in Syria’ (4 October 2014) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-1122157/New-video-U-S-launches-airstrikes-against-ISIL-
Syria.html> accessed 21 April 2017. 
52 BBC News Desk, ‘Yemen Crisis: Who Fights Whom?’ (28 March 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-29319423> accessed 8 August 2017. 
53 Guyana v. Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 17 Sept 2007, para 445. 
54 Christine Gray, ‘A Policy of Force’ in Karine Bannelier, Theodore Christakis, and Sarah Heathcote (eds), The 
ICJ and the Evolution of International Law. The Enduring Impact of the Corfu Channel Case (Abingdon: 
Routledge 2012) 234-5. 
55 Michael Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)’ (1984) 78 American 
Journal of International Law 642. 
56 GA Res 2625 (XXV) of 24 Oct 1970 <http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm> accessed 20 August 2017. 
57 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 299.  
58 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1, peace (Longman: London 
1992) 395; see also Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 2010) 70; Derek 
Bowett, ‘Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force’ (1972) 66 AJIL 1.  
25 
 
The use of force, in this gap, is permissible although Article 2(4) prohibits threats or any sort 
of inter-state use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any 
state.59 This is because, without this it would not be possible to carry out law enforcement 
activities, stated above, where necessary. For example, where the victim state has not been 
subject to an ‘armed attack’ but mere interference of its sovereignty, such as border incidents 
or minor skirmishes.60 Therefore, non-aggressive limited use of force could be used in extreme 
circumstances where it is necessary. In the Eichmann case,61 for example, Israel’s action was 
considered as a violation of Argentina’s sovereignty, not as a breach of jus contra bellum as 
such. In the Saiga case,62  the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea qualified an 
excessive use of force as a violation of the law of the sea, not of Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
The same distinction was debated in other precedents, like the Fisheries case (Spain v. 
Canada)63 or the Guyana/Suriname case.64 
As a result, ‘necessity’ seems to be a very powerful tool to legitimate use of force in the gap 
between Articles 2(4) and 51 or which does not fall within the Charter system. Article 25 of 
the ‘International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility’ mentions ‘state of 
necessity’ as a general circumstance precluding wrongfulness.65 However, necessity alone 
cannot legitimate use of force where there is an express legal requirement in place, such as the 
occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ in article 51 of the UN Charter.66 Therefore, the state of 
necessity can only be invoked on an exceptional basis.67 For instance, states and Regional 
Organisations are very much inclined to rely on self-defence according to Article 51 rather than 
‘necessity’ alone. Examples include the Israeli Operation at Entebbe in 1976, 68  the 
unsuccessful raid to rescue hostages in Iran in 1980,69 or the US military action against Sudan 
                                                          
59 See section 2.1.1 of this chapter (above).  
60 See section 2.1.2 of this chapter (above).  
61 SC Res 138 (1960) of 23 June 1960, para 1 
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and Afghanistan in 1998.70 The only example of an explicit and clear invocation of the state of 
‘necessity’ can be found in the context of the war against Yugoslavia in 1999 where Belgium 
pleaded state of necessity if it had failed to plead humanitarian intervention.71 However, it is a 
very dangerous move by states or regional organisations to find legitimacy of the use of force 
solely on the basis of ‘necessity’ because such move is not only very weak but also 
demonstrates violation of the prohibition of use of force.   
2.1.4 Use of force by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter 
The UN Charter has established a system of collective security where the Security Council has 
been entrusted with the responsibility to invoke collective measures in the occurrence of threat 
to peace, breach of peace and act of aggression.72 There is a wide range of measures that the 
Security Council could adopt to suit its needs ranging from non-forcible measures to forcible 
measures including using military force.73  This section illuminates on the use of force in 
circumstances where the Security Council is responsible to do so according to the provisions 
of the UN Charter, such as maintenance of international peace and security.74  
2.1.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention 
The precondition of state sovereignty is its responsibility to protect the people within it.75 The 
2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
argued that the essential nature of ‘sovereignty’ had changed from ‘state privileges and 
immunities’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’ people from atrocity crimes.76 As the primary 
responsibility to protect the people is on the state and if it fails or loses the capacity to do so 
then the secondary responsibility of the Security Council comes into effect. The goal is to 
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promote human rights, protect civilian victims of humanitarian atrocities, and punish 
governmental perpetrators of mass crimes.77 
However, there is no legal basis under the collective security system for ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ by any state or regional organisation on the ground of responsibility to protect.78 
Measures on this ground only include peacekeeping, peace enforcement and military action 
against tyrants and oppressive governments by UN forces or by regional organisation that have 
been authorised to do so by the Security Council.79 Therefore, intervention on this basis can 
only be carried out either by the Security Council or by its authorisation to that effect. In the 
World Summit Outcome the General Assembly stated that:  
We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in co-operation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.80  
As a result, humanitarian intervention without the authorisation of the Security Council is not 
legal in the Charter framework. However, such intervention has been seen to have occurred in 
the history to end humanitarian crises. For example, Kosovo intervention by NATO in 1999, 
and legitimacy of such intervention has been claimed on the basis of necessity and justice.81  
2.1.4.2 Responsibility to Protect 
Despite the legal requirement to obtain authorisation from Security Council before using force 
to promote and protect human rights and mass atrocities, states and regional organisation have 
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used force without such authorisation.82 For example, operation to Provide Comfort in 1991, 
aimed at the protection of Kurds in northern Iraq, and the Shi’ites in the south, 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, the NATO action in Kosovo in 1999 under the name Operation Allied Force in response 
to the suppression of the Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbs.83 Unilateral use of force by states 
or regional organisations has been contested as unlawful due to absence of direct link between 
the ‘international community (through Security Council)’ and ‘the people to whom protection 
was to be afforded’.84 The Secretary-General’s Report on ‘Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect’ also emphasised the ‘decisive response by the international community through the 
UN’ as one of the pillars of responsibility to protect.85 Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter required 
regional organisations to obtain authorisation from the SC before taking any enforcement 
action.86 
Furthermore, authorisation from the SC itself is not sufficient for any use of force to be 
legitimate. For example, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has acknowledged that 
“Libya in 2011 demonstrated that human protection is a defining purpose of the UN but the 
execution of our collective responsibilities was not always perfect in Libya and some innocent 
lives were lost in the name of responsibility to protect.”87 NATO’s operation was permitted to 
provide humanitarian protection but it ignored its restrictions, spurned hints of a negotiated 
ceasefire, and broke the arms embargo of the UN by supplying weaponry to the rebels.88 
Therefore, the Libya experience guided the international community on the notion that 
‘responsibility to protect’ cannot provide the sole basis of legitimacy of use of force on 
humanitarian ground because it does not provide an independent legal basis.  
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In addition to the requirement of independent legal basis, other factors are required to be 
satisfied before gaining legitimacy namely, ‘good intention’ to protect the civilian and absence 
of any ‘ulterior intention’ to any other material gain, for instance, regime change.89 While 
‘responsibility to protect’ presupposes some underlying obligations, in itself it does not create 
obligations for all states, as a matter of law.90 Therefore, inaction by bystander states is justified 
even at the occurrence of mass atrocities in other states because the principle of non-
intervention remains a ‘formidable barrier’ for third states seeking to respond.91  
2.1.4.3 Intervention by Invitation 
A state can invite or give consent to another state to intervene in its affairs.92 Such invitation 
or consent includes military intervention as far as the use of force is within the parameters of 
the state consent.93 However, there are controversies as to who can give a valid consent or 
invite another state to intervene. The general principle of ‘state consent’ is based on the 
reflection of the will of the people which is inferred from de facto ‘effective control’.94 The 
problem with this principle lies in the fact that sometimes it is very difficult to conclude ‘who 
is in effective control’? For example, in 1998 the intervention into Sierra Leone by ECOMOG 
(Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) troops based on consent 
from its democratically elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was claimed to be insufficient 
by the military officers who ousted Kabbah.95 
In these circumstances, it is desirable for the intervening state to seek authorisation from the 
Security Council which would decide on the issue of ‘effective control’.96 The Security Council 
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may consult experts, such as Special Rapporteur, or engage independent body to make decision 
on its behalf, for example, ICJ.97 However, such decision-making is likely to be very difficult 
due to lack of available evidence.98 On the other hand, if the Security Council is invited to 
intervene into the affairs of another state then it must consult experts, as stated above, rather 
than jumping on to a conclusion spontaneously. For example, the invitation of the President 
and Prime Minister of Congo in 1960 requesting the then UN Secretary-General to intervene 
who then decided the situation in Congo as ‘a threat to peace and security’ under Article 39 
without consulting the Security Council.99 Therefore, the Security Council must collectively 
satisfy that international peace and security are at stake before intervening into any country by 
the latter’s invitation.100 This procedural compliance is likely to promote higher degree of 
legitimacy of intervention by the Security Council. 
2.2 Origins of the current international law system in the 
context of colonialism 
Public international law forms a part of colonialism and the use of force legitimised at that time. 
Amongst many aspects of the relationship between colonialism and international law is the fact 
that international law legitimised colonial use of force in the project of ‘the civilising 
mission’.101 For example, use of force by European Empires since sixteenth century in general 
and since 1940s in particular on the emergence of colonial encounter by the non-European 
societies and territories. 102  As a result, colonialism was central to the constitution of 
international law in that many of the basic principles of international law – including, most 
importantly, use of force – were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could 
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account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial 
confrontation.103  
Colonial confrontation was central to the formation of international law and, in particular the 
use of force.104  From the beginning of sixteenth century, international law was not exclusively 
concerned with the relations between states, but, and more importantly, with the relations 
between civilisations and peoples.105 The grand project that has justified colonialism as a 
means of redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the 
non-European world by incorporating them into the universal civilisation of Europe.106 In the 
field of international law, the civilising mission was animated by ‘cultural difference’.107 The 
imperial idea that fundamental cultural differences divided the European and non-European 
worlds was profoundly important to the civilising mission in number of ways: for example, the 
characterisation of non-European societies as backward and primitive legitimised European 
conquest of these societies and justified the measures colonial powers used to control and 
transform them. 108  It is in this way that international law extended itself horizontally, to 
encompass the entire globe and, once this is achieved, vertically, within each society, to ensure 
the emergence of civilised states.109 This process of extension of international law represents a 
history of the incorporation of the peoples of Africa, Asia, the Americans and the Pacific into 
an international law which is explicitly European, and yet, universal.110  
2.2.1 Nineteenth Century Colonialism and its role in shaping international 
law 
By 1914, after numerous colonial wars, virtually all the territories of Asia, Africa and the 
Pacific were controlled by the major European states and this resulted in the assimilation of all 
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these non-European peoples into a system of law which was fundamentally European in that it 
derived from European thought and experience. 111  Although the traditional view of the 
discipline downplays the importance of the colonial confrontation for an understanding of the 
subject as a whole, it is clear that much of the international law of the nineteenth century was 
preoccupied with colonial problems.112 Amongst the colonial problems, the most acute one was 
the status of the colonisers and the colonised societies. For example, international law applied 
only to sovereign states and asserted further that international law applied only to the sovereign 
states which comprised the civilised ‘family of nations’.113 This attempt to distinguish between 
civilised and uncivilised societies was confronting the jurists as many of the uncivilised Asiatic 
and African states easily met both the definition of sovereignty and the requirement of control 
over territory. 114  Furthermore, in Africa, the kingdoms of Benin, Ethiopia and Mali, for 
instance, were sophisticated and powerful political entities which accorded the respect due to 
sovereigns by the European states with which they established diplomatic relations.115  
The colonisers could hardly disregard these facts, given especially that European powers had 
entered into treaties with such communities.116 The expansion of colonial Empires was one of 
the defining features of the international relations of that period.117 The works of eighteenth 
and nineteenth century jurists, for instance, gave accounts of diplomatic usages in countries 
such as Persia, Siam, Turkey and China, analysed the negotiations that led to the making of 
various treaties, and included these treaties within larger collections of international treaties.118 
Confronted with this dilemma, the colonisers resorted to the concept of society. The broad 
response was that Asiatic states, for example, could be formally ‘sovereign’; but unless they 
satisfied the criteria of membership in civilised international society, they lacked the 
                                                          
111 Andrew Fitzmaurice, ‘Scepticism of the Civilising Mission in International Law’ in Martti Koskenniemi, 
Walter Rech and Manuel J Fonesca (eds), International Law and Empire (OUP 2017) 359, 360. 
112 J. H.W Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol 10 (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff 1968) 435. 
113 Luigi Nazzo, ‘Territory, Sovereignty, and the Construction of the Colonial Space’ in Martti Koskenniemi, 
Walter Rech and Manuel J Fonesca (eds), International Law and Empire (OUP 2017) 263, 272. 
114 C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1967) 14; see also Ian Brownlie, ‘The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for 
the Law of Nations’ in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press 1984) 357.  
115 Taslim Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff 1972) 6. 
116 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 58; see also see also Ian Brownlie, ‘The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law 
of Nations’ in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1984) 361. 
117 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 65. 
118 Jeremy Thomas, ‘History and International Law in Asia: A Time for Review?’ in Ronald St John Macdonald 
(ed), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1994) 813. 
33 
 
comprehensive range of powers enjoyed by the European sovereigns who constituted 
international society.119 The distinction between the civilised and uncivilised was to be made, 
then, not in the realm of sovereignty, but of society.120 Society and the constellation of ideas 
associated with it promised to enable the jurists to link a legal status to a cultural distinction.121  
Thus, the colonised people remained outside the realm of international law, not so much 
because they lacked sovereignty, but because they were wanting in the other characteristics 
essential to membership of international society.122 As a result, despite the colonised society’s 
participation in the treaty making process with imperial sovereign powers the latter did not 
recognise the former as subjects of international law. The ambivalent status of the colonised 
societies, outside the scope of law and yet within it, lacking in international personality and yet 
necessarily possessing it if any sense was to be made of the many treaties which European 
states relied on, was never satisfactorily defined or resolved. 123  As Oppenheim aptly 
acknowledged -  
No other explanation of these and similar facts [the fact that these non-sovereign entities 
engaged in sovereign behaviour] can be given except that these not-full Sovereign 
States are in some way or another International Persons and subjects of International 
Law.124 
The history of sovereignty doctrine in the nineteenth century, then, is a history of the processes 
by which European states, by developing a complex vocabulary of cultural and racial 
discrimination, set about establishing and presiding over a system of authority by which they 
could develop the powers to determine who is and is not sovereign.125 European states could 
inflict massive violence on non-European peoples, invariably justified as necessary to pacify 
the natives, and followed this with the project of reshaping those societies in accordance with 
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the European vision of the world.126 Sovereignty was therefore, aligned with European ideas 
of social order, political organisation, progress and development. 127  In this way, colonies 
played an important role in the discipline of international law. It was through an examination 
of the process of sovereignty coming into being which jurist could self-consciously grasp as a 
mechanism, an artefact, a technology whose characteristics could be both theoretically 
understood and practically developed precisely through its operation in the ‘new countries’ of 
the colonised world.128 
2.2.2 Decolonisation and the creation of international institutions 
The monolithic view of sovereignty that developed in the nineteenth century, its formalism and 
rigidity, were important causes of the First World War. 129  The complete complicity of 
international law with colonial project has led to the denunciation of an international law of 
imperialism.130 Subsequent generations of international lawyers have strenuously attempted to 
distance the discipline from that period, in much the same way that positivists distanced 
themselves from naturalists.131 The efforts made by international law, from the nineteenth 
century onwards, to dismantle rather than promote the colonial conception of sovereignty, after 
all, promoted the process of decolonisation.132 
The mandate system of the League of Nations, in the inter-war period (1919-39), that provided 
the international system with a new means of managing colonial relations through the 
technologies developed by international institutions.133 With the creation of the League, the 
international institution emerged as a new actor in the international system, providing 
international law with a new range of ambitions and techniques for the management of 
international relations. 134  The mandate system commences the task of promoting self-
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government among colonised peoples, and consequently can be seen as the beginning of the 
great project of decolonisation that was taken up and completed by the United Nations.135 This 
great project facilitated the transformation of colonial territories into sovereign and 
independent states.136   
Formal sovereignty was very important and provided the colonised societies with a vital means 
of protecting and furthering their interests. However, the enduring vulnerabilities created by 
the processes by which colonised societies acquired sovereignty posed an ongoing challenge, 
not only to the colonised people, but also to international law itself.137 The process of gaining 
the sovereignty status started with decolonisation which begun with the colonial confrontation 
by resistance and rebellion by the non-European states that were colonised by the great 
Empires.138 The mandate system of the League of Nations embarked upon a new universalising 
mission of international law through the task of liberating the colonised people.139 In this way, 
the universalising mission of international law was adopted to changed circumstances and 
anticolonial political sentiments, and continued its task of ensuring that the Western model of 
law and behaviour could be seen as a natural, inevitable and inescapable. 140  Eventually, 
decolonisation supported the powerful claim that international law had finally become truly 
universal.141 With the emergence of the sovereign states of Africa and Asia, international law 
became universal in the more profound sense that Asian and African societies that had been 
excluded from the realm of sovereignty even while being subjected to the operation of 
international law, could now participate in that system as equal and sovereign states.142 
However, the claim of ‘universality’ of international law posed major question. Given that 
international law was inherently European, how could it accommodate the new states which 
                                                          
135 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Mandate Under International Law in the Covenant of the League of Nations’ in 
Hersch Lauterpacht and Elihu Lauterpacht (eds), International Law, vol 3 (Cambridge University Press 1970) 29.  
135 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 115. 
136 League of Nations Covenant, article 22, para 3.   
137 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 195. 
138 Nathaniel Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2012) 42. 
139 Frank Furedi, The New Ideology of Imperialism: Renewing the Moral Imperative (London: Pluto Press 1994) 
5.  
140 Luigi Nazzo, ‘Territory, Sovereignty, and the Construction of the Colonial Space’ in Martti Koskenniemi, 
Walter Rech and Manuel J Fonesca (eds), International Law and Empire (OUP 2017) 263, 284. 
141 R. P. Anand, ‘Role of the “New” Asian-African Countries in The Present International Legal Order’ (1962) 56 
American Journal of International Law 383, 390.  
142 Haskell Fain, Normative Politics and the Community of Nations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987) 
99; see also J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell 2001) 46. 
36 
 
belonged to very different cultural traditions?143 Therefore, the problem of cultural difference 
has been crucial to the development of international law.144 For example, initially Muslim 
majority societies were excluded from international organisation, like the League of Nations, 
based on their cultural differences.145 The emergence of new nation-states, particularly from 
the abolition of dar al-Islam (abode of Islam), created a platform for international law to 
operate in a certain uniformity and inclusiveness. Due to lack of such uniformity and 
inclusiveness, the legitimacy of international law has been challenged, particularly in relation 
to use of force.    
It was only in the United Nations period that the independent societies of the non-European 
states were able to use the newly acquired resources of sovereignty to develop their own 
internal polities on the one hand, and to advance their interests in the international system on 
the other.146 However, the practices of powerful Western states in the period following the 
establishment of the United Nations witnessed the end of formal colonialism, but the 
continuation, consolidation and elaboration of imperialism.147 
International law is created, in part, through its confrontation with the violent and barbaric non-
European ‘other’; and the construction of the ‘other’ and the initiatives to locate, sanction and 
transform its disrupt existing legal categories and generate new doctrines regarding, very 
significantly sovereignty and the use of force.148 The impact of colonialism on international 
law is reformation of the European-led system into a universal legal framework. That means 
reconciliation of the interests of the new states and their cultural differences irrespective of 
their economic and political strength. Seen in this way, sovereignty was not only extended but 
also improvised out of the colonial encounter, and adopted unique forms, which differed from 
and destabilised given notions of European sovereignty.149  
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2.3 The Challenges posed on the Charter framework of international law on 
the Use of Force 
The Charter framework has been subject to challenges for being ineffective and incapable of 
dealing with the use of force in the modern world.150 It is important to examine these challenges 
in order to assess the legitimacy of the arguments made by the critics. By assessing the 
legitimacy of these arguments, it would be possible to conclude the extent of the legitimacy of 
these arguments and their compatibility with Public international law and Islamic international 
law. This analysis of legitimacy would also demonstrate which arguments are based purely on 
political grounds rather than legal.  
The challenges that have been posed to the general prohibition of use of inter-state force are 
overwhelming in nature and the extent of such challenges can be a very powerful factor in 
questioning the effectiveness of the Charter system as a whole. The fundamental provision of 
the Charter system is the prohibition of use of force and if it is questioned then the Charter 
system may be at high risk of failure due to being unable to effectively deal with violence in 
contemporary world. In the words of Nico Schrijver: 
Expansive interpretation of the right of self-defence, including the claimed legality of 
pre-emptive and even preventive self-defence, and the invoked right to use armed force 
unilaterally, in cases of humanitarian emergencies, the ‘global war’ against terrorism, 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, do infringe, each on their own but 
certainly in combination, on the legal status of the prohibition on the use of force, 
especially when the practice of leading states frequently deviates from the general norm 
of the Charter.151 
These challenges are the core concerns of Public international law on the use of force. 
Furthermore, the challenges posed by different ideological groups, such as realists and 
expansionists, are questioning the legitimacy of the Charter system. The following analysis of 
the realists and expansionists arguments would further advance the assessment of legitimacy 
of the challenges posed.  
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2.3.1 Challenges posed by the Realists’ attack on the prohibition of use of 
force 
The most grievous attack to the prohibition of use of force has been made by the realists’ 
argument that the rules on the use of force are ineffective. 152  Scholars from within the 
international law, who do not claim themselves to be realists, have also argued that the 
prohibition on the use of force has been violated so often that it no longer represents 
international law. 153  The realists have acknowledged that states may sometimes seem to 
comply with the rules on the use of force, but perhaps that is only because the rules happen to 
coincide for the time being with the underlying geopolitical interests that really shape their 
behaviour. 154  Andreas Paulus sums up this realists’ approach to international law in the 
following words: 
When the basic interests of states are at stake, in ‘high politics’, international law is 
considered marginal to international politics. In this topic, international law is merely a 
superstructure, a Marxian Uberbau that masks the real forces of international law – 
above all, power and military capabilities. This ‘search for the actual laws’ in political 
reality, not legal norms, characterises realism. At the heart of international relations, it 
is power relationships that count: at the personal level, at the state level, at the interstate 
level.155 
A conflict of interest has been witnessed between ‘state necessity’ and ‘prohibition of use of 
force’. The national security strategies adopted by powerful states purely focused on their 
national security interests rather than showing respect and compliance with the prohibition of 
use of force. For example, US National security strategy in support of the use of pre-emptive 
and even preventive self-defence.156 The ‘realists’ have attacked, directly or indirectly, the rule-
pacta sunt servanda, on which all else depends in international law.157 They have done this in 
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the name of humanitarian intervention and preventive measures against terrorism, both very 
modern issues high on almost everyone’s list of concerns which, they believe, cannot any 
longer be met with the old rules and processes.158 In this way the realists are attacking the 
Charter framework of international law on the use of force.  
2.3.2 Challenge posed by the ‘Expansionists’ on the prohibition of use of 
force 
Another challenge has been posed on the Article 2(4) prohibition of use of force as well as its 
exception Article 51 by the ‘expansionists’. They claim that use of defensive force after 
occurring an ‘armed attack’ is not sufficient mechanism to confront the current threats posed 
on states by terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.159 In this regard, 
the expansionists claim the legitimacy of using defensive force before an ‘armed attack’ has 
occurred by invoking anticipatory, pre-emptive and preventive self-defence. For example, 
Israel’s attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 which the SC condemned in 
Resolution 487 (1981). 160  The Council’s position at that point essentially signified the 
opposition of the community of states to acts such as those, with the effect that state practice 
leading to the relevant change in the Charter-based legal framework would be difficult to 
consolidate.161 
Pre-emptive self-defence means the use of force in self-defence to halt an imminent armed 
attack by a state or non-state actor.162 This approach adheres to the Caroline principle that a 
state may respond to an attack before it is completed, but only where the need to respond is 
‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’163 
On the other hand, anticipatory self-defence means the use of force in self-defence to halt a 
particular tangible course of action that the potential victim state perceives will shortly evolve 
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into an armed attack against it.164 The potential attack appears more distant in time than an 
attack forestalled by pre-emptive self-defence, but the potential victim state has good reasons 
to believe that the attack is likely, is near at hand, and if it takes place, will result in significant 
harm.165 On the contrary, preventive self-defence means the use of force in self-defence to halt 
a serious future threat of an armed attack, without clarity about when or where the attack may 
emerge.166 
2.3.2.1 Cultural relativism and its role in developing a pluralistic framework 
of international law 
The problem of cultural difference has been crucial to the development of international law.167 
The discussion on the ‘expansionists’ and ‘restrictivists’ views of international law on the use 
of force shows that the arguments to expand the defensive use of force beyond the Charter 
framework and restrict such expansion reflect their respective cultures. For example, the 
expansionists’ argument reflects the dominant Western cultures and conversely the 
restrictivists’ argument reflects the Muslim majority as well as most third world states’ cultures. 
As a result, the question of legitimacy of international law on the use of force becomes acute 
when it is addressed from these culturally diverse viewpoints.  
While the arguments of the expansionists’ has been recognised, in part168, by the modern 
international law by adopting the Caroline principle to reflect customary international law, this 
adaptation has not facilitated overcoming of the legitimacy deficits of Public international law 
on the use of force. This is because, this adaptation hardly considered the cultures of the 
restrictivists who are represented by most Muslim and third world states, and extra-Charter 
defensive forces are often directed against these states in the contemporary world. Moreover, 
the civilising mission in the colonial context is still operating in the corpus of international law 
on the use of force.169 This mission has been operating for the continuous goal of transforming 
‘the other’ into a civil state, but this task has acquired an unprecedented  urgency, an imperative 
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character, precisely because it is now so powerfully linked to the idea of self-defence and 
survival, not only of the United States but of the civilisation itself.170 Within this scheme, 
cultural differences in themselves have become a marker of an ‘armed attack’ justified as self-
defence, whether actual or pre-emptive. In this circumstance, it is necessary to bridge this gap 
of cultural differences in order to develop a complementary framework of Public international 
law on the use of force. 
2.3.2.1.1 Cultural diversity and international law on the use of force 
The current framework of international law is applicable to the entire world where almost every 
sovereign states have signed and ratified the United Nations Charter, which regulates 
extraterritorial use of force. The charter is composed of peremptory norms of international law 
on the use of force, which are universally applicable to the whole world due to their status as 
jus cogens. In other words, expansionists argue that international law is universally applicable 
to the whole world irrespective of the diversity of cultures, values and beliefs that exist and 
thereby secures equal treatment.171 On the other hand, the cultural relativists argue that because 
every society is ‘distinct’ from others, international law cannot be universally applicable to the 
people worldwide.172  As a result, cultural relativism questions the universal and uniform 
application of international law. Furthermore, cultural relativists criticise the current 
international law for being predominantly of Western origin and thereby primarily benefiting 
the Western cultures.173 This criticism has also gained support in the third world scholarships 
of international law.174 According to the third world scholarships, the claim of equality before 
international law does not take into account the cultures of the colonised people who gained 
their sovereignty through the process of decolonisation and are still subject to an international 
legal framework that are of Western origin and developed to serve mainly the Western 
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cultures.175  These scholarships also claim that the rich variety of practices among different 
cultures do not make the uniform application of universal international law.176  
The basic conflict between current international law and the perspective of cultural relativism 
lies in the degree to which either should be the chief underlying consideration when dealing 
with the great diversity of peoples worldwide.177 Whereas the cultural relativists are concerned 
with achieving a greater degree of understanding, in functional terms, of the diversity of 
cultures worldwide, current international law framework, based on the concept of universal 
human rights, are concerned with a preconceived notion of human nature that produces an 
outline of behaviours, and liberty and justice for all.178 Samuel Huntington has named this 
conflict as ‘clash of civilisation’.179 According to Huntington, the main reason for the use of 
force between Muslim and Western countries are nothing but a clash between these two 
civilisations where the former being too barbaric and hostile towards the latter.180 However, 
classifying the conflict in this way does not provide a strong solution to this conflict.  
2.3.2.1.2 Cultural relativism and the advertence of Islamic international law 
on the use of force  
Whereas the Muslim majority states and most of the third world states have accepted the 
universal application of international law on the use of force by ratifying the UN Charter, it is 
hard to deny the universal application of the Charter framework by these states. Moreover, 
international human rights law, in particular, have strong basis of its claim of universality of 
application based on its origin in natural law theory, the theory of rationalism and human 
capabilities.181 These theories strongly promote the notion of individual reason as an internal 
consideration and human rights as fundamental characteristics that are inherent for being 
human.182 However, international law on the use of force cannot claim such strong basis of 
universality of application. This is because, the challenges posed on modern international law 
on the use of force and its deviation from the ‘just war’ theory do not suggest that such a claim 
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can be validated especially for the frequent direction of use of force towards Muslim majority 
states in this 21st Century.183 Therefore, the issue is not that a cultural clash exists between 
Muslim majority states and Western states but the legitimate basis of such cultural clash. In 
other words, the diverse cultural effects between Muslim majority states and Western states 
must conform to a legitimate basis.  
It is a legitimate claim for the expansionists that use of force, as promoted and controlled by 
the UN Charter, is not fit for the purpose of effectively dealing with the threat of force posed 
on the states.184 Therefore, the expansion of defensive use of force beyond the limitation of an 
‘armed attack’ should be allowed within the Charter framework. Similarly, it is also a 
legitimate claim for the restrictivists to oppose any such extension of use of force because of 
the likely abuse and uncertainty of such extensive use of force. As a result, the expansionists’ 
argument reflects the dominant Western cultures of use of force and conversely the restrictivists’ 
argument reflects the Muslim majority as well as most third world states’ cultures. Both claims 
are being legitimate; the question is which claim is just?  
The background of the claims for expansion of the defensive use of force in the current 
framework of international law and accordingly implementing its universal application suggest 
that such claims have been based on the national security of the Western states which have 
been the subject of imminent threat of force in the 21st Century.185 On the other hand, the claim 
of the restrictivists is based on the same threat of being targeted by militarily powerful Western 
states. As a result, a common basis of both the expansionists and restrictivists is ‘national 
security’. However, in the course of the claims made by these scholars they have been engaged 
in each other’s criticism. For example, each other criticised that the expansion as well as the 
restriction of use of force protect the interests of the groups respectively and hence these claims 
are not legitimate.  
The question of legitimacy of the claim is dependent on the question of bias of the respective 
scholars in the expansionists and restrictivists sides. In other words, legitimacy question is to 
be determined considering the advantages and disadvantages of the expansion and restriction 
of use of force. It is apparent that the advantages and disadvantages of expansion and restriction 
of use of force are mutually exclusive and hence do not correspond to each other’s necessity 
and interests. The nature and extent of national security claimed to be necessary for Western 
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states are not sufficiently addressed by the restrictivists and vice versa. In these circumstances, 
there are apparent biases on both sides in their claims to legitimate extension and restriction of 
defensive use of force. These biases are based on the external views of the scholars who 
accused each other’s culture as unsuitable for integration and making a positive contribution to 
a universally applicable international law.  
While it is true that Western states accuse Muslim majority states as backwards and hostile 
towards them, it is also true that there seemed to be an inherent bias in the Western cultures in 
that they were assumed to be superior, and that other cultures should be judged in comparison 
to what Western cultures find to be acceptable norms of behaviour.186 This inherent bias and 
superiority of the Western cultures mainly reflect on an external view about the Muslim 
majority states and thereby prone to error and misconceptions. This is because one must be 
careful not to allow the values, customs, beliefs, and so on of an external culture to influence 
one’s understanding of the culture under study or to influence one’s judgement regarding the 
functions that various cultural practices perform.187 If one fails to do this, then one will be quite 
tempted to impose a judgment that is derived not from the truths of the culture under study, but 
from one’s own culture.188 Therefore, any conclusion based on the values, customs, beliefs, 
and so on of Western cultures are likely to impose such values, customs and beliefs on the 
cultures of the Muslim majority states.  
This approach of imposition of a foreign cultural values, customs, beliefs, and so on resembles 
with the ‘civilising mission’ that emanated from colonialism.189 The refusal of sovereignty of 
the colonised societies by imperial states was based on non-civilised nature of the former and 
such status was determined on the basis of Western values, customs, beliefs and so on.190 This 
denial of status and determination of the criteria for awarding such status were external and 
foreign to the colonised societies, which the modern day Muslim majority states form a part. 
In this way, Western cultural values, customs, beliefs, and so on were imposed on the Muslim 
majority states since the colonial time and this dominant position of the Western cultures are 
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still operating in the corpus of international law on the use of force.191 The result, according to 
cultural relativists, can be quite damaging, because one is asserting what types of behaviours 
ought or should be approved or accepted by another culture based on what has been accepted 
or approved by one’s own culture.192  For example, if the cultures of Western states believe in 
the expansion of defensive use of force and, therefore, suggest that cultures of Muslim majority 
states should share this belief, then to do so would be tantamount to condoning cultural 
imperialism with respect to this issue.  
If one is to be judgmental, perhaps using one’s own cultural standards to evaluate another 
culture, then it is highly unlikely that one has been value-free in one’s assessment. Seen in this 
way, international law on the use of force has not been value-free in its assessment of the other 
potential legal system like Islamic international law. As a result, international law on the use 
of force lacks legitimacy for not including the cultural values of Muslim majority states on the 
one hand and consistently upholding the values of Western cultures on the other. Because 
legitimacy is a value system 193  and it is not possible to be entirely value-free as far as 
international law is concerned,194 it is essential that the cultural values of the Muslim majority 
states be adopted in the formation and development of modern international law on the use of 
force together with the values of Western cultures. The concept of ‘tolerance’ could facilitate 
this process of complementation between the cultural values of these two systems as supported 
by cultural relativists.195  
The views of the expansionists and restrictivists reflect the different and competing 
civilisational perceptions, expectations and interpretations of even agreed norms.196 Although 
these different and competing perceptions, expectations and interpretations posed challenges 
to international law on the use of force, the relevance of such cultural relativism is very 
important in overcoming its legitimacy deficits. The cultural relativists’ approach has a very 
strong proposition as it is supported by the fact that application of international law is highly 
dependent on its application at the national level, where it is the sovereign state that has 
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absolute authority.197 If a sovereign authority refuses to apply the international law on the basis 
that it does not reflect the culture of the people of the sovereign state then the universal 
application of international law is likely to suffer from legitimacy deficits due to lack of 
universal application. Therefore, the claim of the cultural relativists that cultures of the Muslim 
majority states and most third world states experience international law on the use of force 
differently from the way it is experienced by the Western cultures which it is currently 
dominated by, and on that basis have distinctive ideas and perspectives to offer in order to 
overcome its legitimacy deficits which lie in its claim of purported universality.  
Indeed, as rightly noted by a scholar, ‘[a] universal application of human rights without 
deference to cultural traits . . . [represents] a human rights violation in itself’. 198  This is 
confirmed by the third sentence of the preamble of the two 1966 UN Covenants on Human 
Rights,199 according to which everyone must enjoy not only his civil and political rights, but 
also his economic social and cultural rights; the latter in particular imply that all human beings 
are entitled to enjoy and develop their own cultural specificity. This shows that since the very 
beginning of its evolution, international human rights law has left some space open to cultural 
relativism. This space should be filled by Islamic international law (Siyar) so that international 
law on the use of force reaches the necessary degree of legitimacy and hence justice by an 
understanding of universality of international law which is sensitive to cultural diversity and 
based on common set of cultural values.  
2.3.3 Challenges posed by the extra-Charter practices of powerful states 
The influence of the great powers in the Security Council in upholding their geopolitical 
interests is a case in hand to identify the challenges posed by the powerful states of willing and 
able. The institutional inequality between the members of the Security Council takes the 
conflict of interests between states to enhanced controversy. The permanent members’ rights 
are always prevailed over the rights of other non-permanent members by the exercise of veto 
power of the former.200 Use of force has been authorised when it is at the best interest of the 
great powers and often inaction by the Security Council has been witnessed when veto is 
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exercised to stop authorisation to use force which would be against the geopolitical interest of 
the great powers.201  
In addition, hegemony amongst the great powers also served the hegemons in the Security 
Council by exercising influence over other members to carry out the hegemonic goals.202 It has 
also been witnessed that powerful states and their allies have disregarded the necessity to obtain 
authorisation from the Security Council before unilaterally intervening into another state.203 
Examples include but not limited to the invasion of Iraq in 2003204 and Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine in 2014.205   
From practical perspective, where the powerful states’ interests would be served by not 
complying with the prohibition of use of force then such practices of non-adherence of the 
Charter are likely to be witnessed very often than not. On the other hand, when the interests of 
the powerful states would be protected by the prohibition then they will always uphold the 
necessity to comply with Article 2(4). Therefore, if there is a conflict of interest between 
powerful and non-powerful states then the geopolitical interests of the former often prevails 
over the latter.206 Gerry Simpson explains this asymmetry by distinguishing two groups of 
states: 
An elite group of states, commonly referred to as the ‘Great Powers’, and a large mass 
of middle and smaller powers who defer to these larger powers in the operation and 
constitution of international legal order. These Great Powers occupy a position of 
authority within each of the legal regimes that has arisen since 1815. Sometimes these 
regimes are constructed around loose affiliations of interested Great Powers (the Vienna 
Congress), at other times the role of the Great Powers is laid out in the detailed 
provisions of an originating document (The United Nations Charter). In each instance, 
these powers have policed the international order from a position of assumed cultural, 
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material and legal superiority. A key prerogative of this position has been a right to 
intervene in the affairs of other states in order to promote some proclaimed community 
goal.207  
The powerful states are in advantageous position in terms of influencing the decision-making 
process at the Security Council and outside of it. The interests of the powerful states are secured 
by the exercise of their veto power at the Security Council and their political influence on the 
less powerful states. In these circumstances, the legitimacy of the Security Council and the 
power practice of the powerful states are at stake and is subject to further legitimacy 
assessments in the descriptive sense.208  
2.3.4 The Response of the Restrictivists 
The ‘restrictivists’ believe that allowing pre-emptive, anticipatory and preventive use of force 
will result in not only violation of the prohibition of use of force proscribed by Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter but also unreasonable stretching of the Article 51 requirement of an ‘armed 
attack’.209 The unreasonableness lies in the fact that such stretching would allow the states to 
use aggressive force in the name of self-defence against their enemy states.210 Furthermore, the 
enemy state, in this circumstance, would likely use defensive force accusing the first state to 
have used force in aggression. An example is Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1967, after the 
Egyptian government unilaterally had ordered the withdrawal of the United Nations 
Emergency Force, which since 1956 had served as a buffer between the two enemies, and had 
redeployed its own forces to occupy the buffer zone in threatening posture.211  Such situation 
would also result in aggressive use of force by those states who are militarily able and 
politically willing against their enemy states. Therefore, the current legal framework, according 
to restrictivists, of the UN Charter in regulating inter-state force is appropriate.212  
In the presence of these controversies regarding the necessity of resilience of the self-defence 
under Article 51, the current state practices can be a very useful point to consider. After 9/11, 
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there has not been any such situation where recourse to self-defence without an ‘armed attack’ 
having occurred has been necessary. Although there had been few terrorist attacks that took 
place since 9/11, they are sporadic in nature and do not possess the ‘intensity’ to invoke pre-
emptive, anticipatory or preventive self-defence.  
According to the Restrictivists, under the current security and threat of force, it does not seem 
necessary to invoke right of self-defence without occurring an ‘armed attack’. The 
Restrictivists also argue that this situation can be witnessed from the massive change in the US 
National Security strategy in recent years. Following 9/11 terrorist attack the US National 
Security Strategy included the use of force in pre-emptive, anticipatory and preventive self-
defence but the 2011 National Security Strategy does not discuss use of force in advance of an 
attack.213 The 9/11 attack being the most heinous terrorist attack in history, the Expansionists’ 
claim for the expansion of defensive use of force have much weight. However, owing to the 
circumvention and mitigation of such threat of force in the contemporary world, as claimed by 
the Restrictivists, there is no need to such extension. This claim of the Restrictivists has been 
weaker in comparison to that of the Expansionists and Realists.  
2.3.4.1 Minor adaptation of the Charter framework to facilitate the 
challenges posed by Realists and Expansionists  
Despite the strength of the argument of the Restrictivists against expanding the current Charter 
proscription of defensive use of force, the Expansionists and Realists have triumphed over the 
Restrictivists on the logic behind their support for such expansion, namely threat of imminent 
attack from terrorist groups.214 The challenge posed by the nature and intensity of the terrorist 
attacks in contemporary world has given rise to the number of claims of extension of these 
exceptions by the scholars215 and the state parties216 as well. On the other hand, there are 
possibilities of abuse of the self-defence system if any types of defensive force is allowed where 
an ‘armed attack’ has not occurred because there are immense uncertainties as to whether a 
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potential ‘armed attack’ would materialise or not?217 Of course states, who want to use pre-
emptive, anticipatory or preventive force in self-defence, would argue that there were 
certainties or likelihood that an ‘armed attack’ would have occurred had they taken no action 
in self-defence.  
In these circumstances, a solution has been offered to balance the conflicting but strong views 
of the Restrictivists on the one hand, and Expansionists and Realists on the other. From the 
case-by-case interpretation by the Security Council of the prohibition of use of force except in 
self-defence, in practice, has qualified the meaning of ‘armed attack’ so as to include instances 
of imminent attack.218 However, the International Court of Justice has been reluctant to deal 
with this issue despite having the opportunity to do so in Nicaragua Case. Whereas the ICJ has 
declined to opine on the lawfulness of a pre-emptive, anticipatory, or preventive self-
defence,219 the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has 
stated the possibility of pre-emptive self-defence to respond to an imminent armed attack.220 
This view has also been endorsed by the secretary-general.221  
However, there is no basis in international law for going further than this.  In particular, in so 
far as a right of pre-emptive (or preventive) self-defence implies a departure from the 
requirement of ‘imminence’ it has no basis in the law as Hans Blix said in his third Hersch 
Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture on 24 November 2004:  
Although ‘imminence’ may be a severe time requirement, ‘a growing threat’ would 
be an unacceptably lax criterion and would not tally with the generally accepted 
position that force should be used only as a last resort.222 
 
Therefore, the right to use defensive force without reference to Security Council is limited to 
instances of actual or imminent armed attack.223  
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However, this position is an adaptation of the Charter system by invoking the Caroline 
principle. As a result, customary international law has provided a solution to the question of 
legitimacy of the pre-emptive use of force by adopting it in the Charter framework. Therefore, 
customs have a very important role to play to promote higher degree of legitimacy of extra-
Charter use of force.224  
2.3.5 Failure of the Collective Security System 
Another challenge posed to the collective security system is the failure of the scheme embodied 
in the UN Charter to function as intended. Such failure has resulted in the division among the 
members of the Security Council in situations like imprecise authorisation, implied mandates 
and failure to act.225 The ‘revival doctrine’ has been utilised by the coalition force in their 
search for legitimacy to invade Iraq in 2003.226 The coalition has resorted to Resolution 678 
(1990) to draw their legal basis to attack Iraq but that Resolution was adopted to throw Iraq out 
of Kuwait. However, there was no ‘time limit’ or ‘scope of action’ specified for the 
effectiveness of the Resolution. Such ‘imprecise’ nature of the Resolution led the coalition 
force to invoke it more than 12 years after its adoption.227 This has created a dangerous legal-
political legacy in international law on the use of force.228  
In addition, this type of Resolution could give rise to ‘implied mandate’ for using force as 
claimed by NATO as the basis of its 14-week bombing campaign in response to Belgrade’s 
violence against the civilian population in Kosovo.229 The legal basis as claimed by participants 
was Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), and 1203 (1998) but these were all adopted under 
Chapter VII and condemned the use of force by Serbs and made demands on Belgrade.230 There 
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was no express authorisation to use force for failure of the Serbs to meet those demands and 
therefore NATO’s use of force was assumed on the basis of implied authorisation.231  
Furthermore, the Libyan experience232 has been criticised by China and Russia who vetoed 
draft Security Council Resolutions in relation to Syria on the basis of NATO’s abuse of 
authority in Libya in 2011.233 Such abuse of authority has resulted in ‘inaction’ by the SC in 
situations where protection of civilian people was necessary to restore international peace and 
security.234 Both China and Russia were strongly opposed to any resolution that could set the 
train a sequence of events leading to a Resolution 1973-type authorisation for outside military 
operations in Syria. 235  In this regard, the Secretary-General’s High Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change has aptly stated that: 
For the first 44 years of the United Nations, Member States often violated [the Charter] 
rules and used military force literally hundreds of time, with a paralysed Security 
Council passing very few Chapter VII resolutions and article 51 rarely providing 
credible cover.236  
2.4 The Effectiveness of the Charter system in regulating use of force in 
modern world 
The incidents of intervention by foreign states in the internal affairs of another state with and 
without the authorisation of the Security Council have raised the question of effectiveness of 
the UN Charter and its role in regulating use of force.237 These interventions by foreign states 
have often been manipulated for their own interests rather than the reasons given for such 
intervention.238 In these circumstances, it is necessary to examine the legitimacy of uses of 
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force which are not authorised by the Security Council. This assessment would assist in 
concluding whether the decision-making process at the Security Council is legitimate and 
effective to control illegitimate use of force in the contemporary world.  
Despite a general prohibition on interstate use of force, the intervention by one state into the 
territorial integrity and political independence of another state by using force has contested the 
legitimacy of such force under the Charter system.239 It seems that war in the modern world 
has taken a different shape where states do not use force directly against each other but they do 
use force indirectly by intervention into the internal matters of another state which may amount 
to an international armed conflict by the back door.240 For example, Russia’s intervention in 
Syria by invitation and NATO’s air strikes on the basis of pre-emptive self-defence since 
2014.241   
How should international law on the use of force be examined regarding its effectiveness? It 
can be looked at from the perspective of the actor contemplating the violation242 but such 
method is likely to be liable to huge criticism due to the perceived bias of the contemplators in 
disregarding the international law norms while taking actions. As Caner Dagli has rightly said 
“one cannot hope to understand a law by studying the actions of those who break it.”243 In these 
circumstances, the right approach would be to examine reasons for the violations by the 
contemplators as well as the function of the Charter system on the prohibition of use of force.244  
It is impossible to predetermine the effectiveness of the prohibition of use of force in 
international law without examining the practical implication of this prohibition within the state 
practice. State practices of using force and their abstention from using such force would include 
either of the three phenomena, namely (a) the use of force is in accordance with the 
international law; (b) the use of force is not in accordance with the law because it is an attempt 
at normative change in the law by custom; and (c) the use of force is within the recognised 
exception.  
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If the use of force is in accordance with international law then such state practice is not only 
upholding international law on the use of force but also creating examples of jus cogens.245 
However, there are instances where justifications have been offered on the basis of using force 
in a manner which cast doubt about their validity and undermine their continuity of practice. 
For example, the US in Dominican Republic in 1965 (referring first to protection of nationals 
and then to the spreading of communist threat) and Grenada in 1983 (referring first to the 
invitation from the government and then to the approval by the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) and the need to combat the regional threat consisting in the spread 
of armaments).246 
The war against Iraq in 2003 witnessed another articulation of a claim in state practice that the 
use of force was permitted in a pre-emptive manner.247 The coalition initially claimed pre-
emptive self-defence against the threats caused by Iraq but later it changed its course. The legal 
basis, as claimed by the coalition, was the revival of the SC Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991) 
and 1441 (2002) which never authorised use of force against Iraq in 2003.248 A new Resolution 
authorising use of force against Iraq was necessary to legalise the invasion.249 But without such 
Resolution the coalition force attacked Iraq. Such change of course is fatal to the international 
law on prohibition of use of force.250 
State practices also suggest that force has been used under the banner of self-defence when it 
was not necessary to do so. For example, although SC Resolution 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) 
authorised attack on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 attack on US, there is no plausible 
evidence that has been presented by US to demonstrate that it was undertaken in response to 
an ‘armed attack’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter.251 The use of force resembled more a 
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reprisal than self-defence252 and armed reprisals are prohibited.253 Although there are doctrinal 
attempts to subsume armed reprisals within self-defence, it is acknowledged that reprisals are 
essentially aimed at retaliating and forestalling recurrence, mostly well after the initial attack 
has taken place, as opposed to responding to an ongoing armed attack.254 
In addition to the above, the use of force to protect vulnerable populations from governments 
that expose the people to war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, or governments 
that refrain from protecting them from such atrocities have become a contentious issue. Such 
use of force under the banner of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ and ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
have been claimed to be legitimate by their perpetrators.255 However, such use of force turned 
out to be suffering from legitimacy-deficits.256 For example, NATO’s use of force in Kosovo 
to protect Kosovo Albanians in 1999 and in Libya to protect the civilian population in 2011 
have been condemned by international community.  NATO’s use of force in Kosovo was 
instantly condemned by India, China and a group of Latin American states as unlawful.257 The 
statement of the Non-Allied Movement (NAM), backed by 132 states, ‘reject[ed] the so-called 
“right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the 
general principles of international law.258 This position shows that, no legal entitlement to 
humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect has ever emerged in state practice. The 
following words of Alexander Orakhelashvili are the true indicators of the current legal status 
of the state practices:  
Claims in favour of the extra-Charter exceptions have always been incoherent to 
constitute valid state practice for the purposes of customs-generation, and fallen far 
short of commanding the support of states to produce an amending peremptory norm 
under Article 53 VCLT. All this practice has either been fragmented and not general; 
or inconsistent in relation to the same state, same incident, or as between multiple states; 
or it has consolidated within a group of states but been rebuffed by the rest of the 
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community of states. The whole practice in relation to anticipatory self-defence, pre-
emption, humanitarian intervention, or self-defence against non-state actors has 
attempted to gain higher ground by professing to follow the UN Charter framework of 
jus ad bellum, and is therefore subsumable within the previous dictum from Nicaragua 
that unilateral claims reinterpreting the established legal framework are generally 
counterproductive.259 
Furthermore, states and regional organisations have claimed the ineffectiveness of the 
prohibition of the use of force provision for being too strict.260 For example, Article 2(4) and 
its exceptions do not give lawful authority to intervene in humanitarian crises. However, the 
Security Council can authorise a humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter 
but without such authorisation any unilateral intervention on any grounds would raise the 
question of legitimacy.261 Hence, the question here is whether the effectiveness of the Charter 
is limited by the fact that intervention on humanitarian or other grounds are only permissible 
under Chapter VII? The limitation of legality of intervention on humanitarian grounds is in 
place within the Charter system to prevent unjustified and biased intervention where the sole 
purpose of the intervention is upholding the interests of the intervening state.262 Obtaining 
authorisation from SC is therefore a ‘must criterion’ to avoid any contestation in terms of 
legitimacy of such questionable and controversial intervention.263  
2.4.1 Just war and international law on the use of force 
The challenges posed on the UN Charter framework regarding its effectiveness and ability to 
regulate use of force in international affairs are also subject to scrutiny from the perspective of 
‘just war’ theory. The extra-Charter use of force and paralysis of the Security Council have 
raised the question of effectiveness of the Charter system as a whole. The nature of the 
challenges has made it necessary for the scholars to analyse if the use of force outside the 
charter proscriptions is consistent with ‘just war’ theory and thereby legitimate. Furthermore, 
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this analysis is also expedient because international law has been one of the major carriers of 
‘just war’ tradition in the modern era.264  
Just war theory had been followed by rulers in Classical, Middle Ages and Modern periods in 
making their decision to wage war justly. Just war theory provided constraints of the 
circumstances when war can be legitimately waged. Historically, jus ad bellum has been a 
political decision of the rulers. Commentators of early modern period considered these 
requirements and stipulations as expressions of natural law having universal characteristic.265 
Theorists of international law wove the inherited just war tradition into their reasoning without 
questioning this conception, and the development of positive international law followed suit.266  
To limit the total war, the just war theory evolved to limit the war. Among the limitations on 
when war might be fought are the following:  
In order to be fought justly, 
1. War must be publicly declared. 
2. War must be declared by a competent authority. 
3. War must be fought for just cause. 
4. War must be a last resort.267 
Public declaration of use of force is necessary by waging war under the just war theory.268 
Although making a declaration of war before using defensive force in circumstance when an 
attack is imminent may result in destruction of the state susceptible to be attacked, such 
declaration is generally mandatory to show the right intention and competent authority.269 This 
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declaration must specify the cause of the war as it has to be just.270 Medieval authorities made 
a correlation between ‘competent authority’ and ‘just cause’.271 
Fighting a war with just cause is problematic and this is because what is just for one party might 
be unjust for other and vice versa. In the absence of common understanding of what is just and 
what is unjust it is inappropriate to categorise someone’s war as just and some else’s as unjust. 
In order to overcome this dilemma, although partially, the decision to wage war had been 
entrusted to more people in addition to the rulers and thereby was made a shared decision to 
make.272 The rulers made the decision and consensus was required on the part of the advisors 
and the subjects.273 This, however, eventually resulted in expansion of the grounds of just war 
because one cannot expand the power to declare war and hope thereby to limit it.274 For 
example, in the Classical formulation of just war theory war was just if conducted to punish 
the evildoers, to repulse an injury in the process of being committed, and to recover property.275 
This list is too broad to include every possible harm to respond by war. 
However, in the writings of contemporary commentators and in positive international law, this 
list is sharply restricted, so that self-defence is recognised as the only legitimate aim in 
justifiable war.276 In the modern context the issue is resolved with the claim that only those 
wars that are fought in self-defence can be considered just, and then only if those wars are wars 
of self-defence in response to aggression.277 Such reduction of just cause to self-defence against 
aggression adds an element of objectivity to the judgment, but exactly what constitutes 
‘aggression and self-defence’ remains controversial. 278  In addition, the practice of states 
suggests that the defensive use of force has been stretched beyond the point at which an injury 
is in progress.279  
Furthermore, war must also be waged as a last resort even in self-defence. This principle 
reflects the requirement that war is the only necessary means of self-defence, and if there is 
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other means of self-defence than war then it would be unjust.280 In other words, all the ‘short 
of war’ means must be accomplished before using defensive force. However, state practices in 
the contemporary world suggest that recourse to force has been the first rather than last 
resort.281 There were also situations when recourse to force were necessary and just but due to 
the exercise of veto power no action was taken to respond to serious humanitarian crises.282 
In these circumstances, the expansion of use of force beyond the proscription of the UN Charter 
and blocking the recourse to force action by permanent members are held to be repugnant to 
just war theory.283 This is because such extra-Charter use of force as well as blockage of 
necessary recourse to force to respond to humanitarian crises are inconsistent with the 
parameters prescribed by just war theory as stated above. Whereas it is true that the reasons for 
excessive use of force and unnecessary use of veto power by permanent members are political 
than legal, the states and regional organisations have failed to reconcile their political 
disagreements by working beyond political interrelationships.284 They instead reinforce the use 
of superior force to decide political matters to the detriment of lawful rules on force.285 As a 
result, international law on the use of force has gone beyond the reach of law and has become 
a focal point of politics. 
2.5 Use of force in customary international law 
Customary international law has a very important role to play in the development of the law 
relating to use of force when the codified law, such as the UN Charter, does not recognise such 
use of force as legal. In this way, customary international law sometimes provide for the basis 
of legitimacy of extra-Charter use of force. Hence, any occurrence of use of force beyond the 
Charter framework but within the ambit of customs is likely to be legitimate. From this 
viewpoint, this section would endeavour to find the compatibility of extra-Charter use of force 
with customary international law. This finding would advance the legitimacy argument of 
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customary international law on the use of force and assist to find if such legitimacy argument 
can develop further to promote peace and justice.  
Use of force in self-defence without an ‘armed attack’ occurring, such as, pre-emptive use of 
force, has been the subject of customary international law for a very long time. In the Caroline 
case, such use of force has been recognised as legitimate only where the need to respond is 
‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’286 
This argument is compatible with the realists who argued that any instant threat of force must 
trigger the right to use force in self-defence when such threat is overwhelming and there is no 
choice of deliberation due to the imminent nature of the threat.287 
Similarly, use of force to end humanitarian crises has been claimed to be legitimate even when 
such force was used without authorisation from the Security Council. For example, NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo to end humanitarian crises was held to be legitimate although not legal 
as no authorisation was obtained before intervention. 288  On the other hand, NATO’s 
intervention in Libya in 2011 was with the authorisation from the Security Council and the US 
and UK intervention in Iraq in 2003 was without such authorisation but these interventions 
were held to be illegitimate.289  
These uses of force, as stated above, are all beyond the ambit of the UN Charter but all of these 
uses of force are not illegitimate in descriptive sense. Although these uses of force are 
representing customary international law, the transformation of these customs to legitimate 
uses of force has not been succeeded in respect to each of them. For example, although Kosovo 
intervention was held to be legitimate, the Libya and Iraq interventions were held to be 
illegitimate. The reason for this difference lies on the scrutiny of the customs by the descriptive 
legitimacy test.290 The descriptive legitimacy test has a vital role to play and this is because it 
requires acceptance of use of force by the subjects as legitimate. Therefore, any use of force in 
                                                          
286 Letter from Daniel Webster, US Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (6 Aug 1842), 
quoted in John Bassett Moore, ‘A Digest of International Law’, vol 2 (Princetown, NJ: Princetown University 
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59 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 81; see also Emily Schroeder, ‘The Kosovo Crisis: Humanitarian 
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customary international law does not automatically render it legitimate. As Oscar Schachter 
rightly observed: 
The role of law is to enable decisions to be made that will be accepted as legitimate by 
governments and peoples concerned. To achieve that, the legal concepts of necessity, 
proportionality, responsibility, humanitarian norms and obligations of peaceful 
settlement need to be applied to the diverse situations in a way that takes full account 
of the particular circumstances and yet results in principled conclusions.291 
The pre-emptive use of force in response to an imminent threat of an ‘armed attack’ has 
provided the legitimacy of such use of force based on the customary international law. 
Similarly, the Kosovo intervention in 1999 secured the legitimate status of intervention without 
the authorisation from the Security Council when serious humanitarian crises were about to 
unfold. The legitimacy of these uses of force is supported by descriptive legitimacy as it focuses 
on output or result of the norm. On the contrary, politically motivated and biased uses of force 
failed the legitimacy test, and accordingly do not provide the legitimate basis of such uses of 
force through customary international law. These state practices, which do not pass the 
legitimacy test, neither obtain the status of customary law nor legitimate uses of force.292 Hence, 
any use of force which emanates from valid customary law also requires passing the legitimacy 
test stated above. In the absence of the authorisation from the Security Council, legitimacy of 
customary international law on the use of force operates as a guiding star to determine which 
forces are legitimate and which are not. Therefore, finding the legitimacy of use of force is the 
key to prevent illegitimate use of force and advance the inquiry to the next stage, namely how 
the legitimacy deficits of the uses of force can be overcome to make it compatible with Islamic 
international law.  
Conclusion 
If international law tolerates extra-Charter use of force then the Charter system is likely to be 
under a potential threat of failure.293 Due to the acceptance or at least toleration by international 
legal framework of the use of force outside the Charter framework by powerful states and their 
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political willingness to continue to do so have raised the question of the legal status of the 
prohibition of use of force. Its effectiveness has also been subject to constant criticism for the 
unilateral use of force by states and regional organisations without authorisation from the 
Security Council. Moreover, the inaction by the Security Council when it is necessary to use 
force to respond to humanitarian crises has also raised the question of capacity of the Security 
Council to promote and protect international peace and security which it is responsible for.294  
In addition, the challenges posed to the Charter framework by the Realists and Expansionists 
by claiming pre-emptive, anticipatory, and preventive self-defence in response to serious and 
imminent threats could be an option for the powerful state having the military capacity to 
launch such attack to promote self-interest. These challenges and the resulting state practices 
have resulted in crucial legitimacy issues which include the capacity of international law to 
effectively regulate use of force in contemporary world. In these circumstances, it seems 
necessary to develop appropriate international legal framework for overcoming the existing 
legitimacy issues and obtaining the required degree of legitimacy. 
Customary international law has, to certain extent, provided the platform for legitimate uses of 
force which are not permitted by the Charter system. However, customs themselves do not 
legitimate such uses of force because the degree of legitimacy that is required is not achieved 
without passing the test of descriptive legitimacy. As a result, it is necessary for a customary 
law to obtain the necessary degree of legitimacy by passing the test of descriptive legitimacy 
before considering it as a tool for legitimate extra-Charter use of force. 
This chapter concludes that the legal status of international law on the use of force is a very 
important question in the modern world due to the challenges posed to the Charter system. 
These challenges claim to legitimate extra-Charter use of force on various justifications. 
However, it is necessary that such justifications are legitimate in order for the uses of force to 
be just and compatible with other major legal systems like, Islamic international law.  As the 
provisions for uses of force in international law has been dealt with in this chapter, it is 
necessary to assess the provisions for use of force in Islamic international law so that the 
compatibility of these two systems can be assessed by analysing the ability of these systems to 
complement each other and accordingly to overcome the legitimacy deficits.
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Chapter 3 
Use of Force in Islamic International Law 
 
This chapter advances on the conclusion of the last chapter that legitimacy of use of force in 
international law must achieve the degree required to promote peace and justice. In addition, 
such legitimacy assessment would also allow this research to further investigate the 
compatibility of use of force between Public international law and Islamic international law. 
Therefore, it is necessary to assess the legitimacy of use of force in Islamic international law. 
This approach would advance the study to answer the second question of the thesis, which is 
‘how the legitimacy deficits could be overcome?’ This is because without identifying the 
legitimacy of use of force of both these legal systems it is improbable to assess the second 
question stated above and to find if they are compatible.  
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to examine the justification of extraterritorial use of force 
under Islamic international law. Unlike Public international law there is no general prohibition 
of use of force in Islamic international law. However, defensive use of force is permitted in 
Islamic international law in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort within the strict 
prescriptions of Shari‘a. In addition, Islamic international law prohibits aggression. 1  The 
Shari‘a has been subject to evolution since the first century of Islam (seventh century CE) and 
as a result expanded to include socio-political influences.  
This chapter endeavours to define the core elements of Islamic international law on the use of 
force and the significance of those elements in the formation and interpretation of the most 
disputed term ‘jihad’. This chapter also examines the nature and extent of extraterritorial use 
of force in the practices and ideologies of state and non-state armed actors in Muslim majority 
states.  
Finally, this chapter evaluates the findings of both Western and Muslim scholars in regards to 
the use of force provisions in Islamic international law followed by a critical analysis of the 
legal position of these findings in the core of Islamic International law, such as the Qur’an and 
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the Hadith (the actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), the practices of the four rightly 
guided Caliphs, the juristic opinions of the different schools of thought (Madhhab, pl. 
Madhahib), and the treaties concluded between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
3.1 What is Islamic international law? 
Islamic international law has been introduced under the Arabic word ‘siyar’ which is the plural 
form of ‘sirah’.2 Sirah is a technical term in the Islamic sciences meaning the biography of the 
Prophet while its plural form, siyar, refers to legal matters.3 The Qur’an and Hadith (also 
known as ‘sunna’) provided the framework of relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
However, they never specified for any provision as having international legal status. Therefore, 
Islamic international law developed through practice of the rulers beginning from the Prophet 
himself up until the current world.  
The development of Islamic international law began since the Prophet migrated to Medina in 
622CE and formed an Islamic community. The later conquest of Mecca followed by the 
astonishing conquests by the Prophet and his rightly guided Caliphs developed the major 
practices of Islamic international law. Siyar or Islamic international law was later built on the 
orthodox practices of the early Caliphs and other Muslim rulers, arbital awards, treaties, pacts 
and other conventions, official instructions commanders, admirals, ambassadors and other 
State officials, the internal legislation for conduct regarding foreigners and foreign relations, 
the custom and usages.4 
Since the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic international law has evolved over time 
through the work of jurists as a response to the needs created by the progress of the changing 
Islamic society.5 Therefore, Islamic international law is that part of the law and custom of the 
land and treaty obligations which a Muslim de facto or de jure State observes in its dealings 
                                                          
2 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1966) 38; See 
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Islamic International Law (Siyar) according to Orthodox Schools (University Press America 2008) 1; Mohamed 
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with other de facto or de jure States.6 Siyar or Islamic international law is the sum total of the 
rules and practices of Islam’s intercourse with other peoples.7 
The practices of these Muslim states had been the subject of in depth analysis of the jurists in 
the second century of Islam (8th Century CE) when juristic development of Islamic 
international law took place. The exegetical works of these jurists resulted into different 
schools (Madhhab, pl. Madhahib) on the basis of different methods of interpretation (Ijtihad) 
adopted by these schools.8 However, the most significant in Islamic international law related 
matters came from the Sunni branch. The first and major classical work on Siyar came from a 
Hanafi jurist of the Sunni branch, Al-Shaybani, whose remarkable treatise al-Siyar al-Kabir 
(the Major Siyar) serves as a standard work of reference to date.9 In addition, ‘Abd al-Rahman 
al-Awza‘i, had also contributed to Siyar by writing a treatise on this subject which has failed 
to reach the modern jurists.10 However, his doctrines were primarily based on the Sunna of the 
Prophet as well as the practice of Muslims of his time including official orders, which is 
preserved in the works of Abu Yusuf and Al-Shaf‘i.11  
Like Roman Law, Islamic international law used to be a ‘jurist law’, in the sense that it was 
neither a product of legislative authority or case law, but a creation of the classical jurists, who 
elaborated on the sacred texts.12 Therefore, Islamic international law began its foundation 
surrounding the principles of Shari‘a. That means its development had been subject to being 
consistent with the Shari‘a  which is based on the Qur’an and Sunna. While the Western notion 
of international law rests on a post-Westphalian premise of territory based nation-states who 
enjoy full sovereign rights and equality of status,13 the ‘Islamic Law of Nations’ or Siyar is a 
legal system based on the Shari‘a intended to apply universally to all people in every time and 
place.14 However, the formation and applicability of Siyar has been questioned by scholars, 
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such as Hans Kruse, Hilmar Krüger and Jörg Manfred Mössner, as to its nature as an 
international legal order.15 
3.1.1 The Meaning and Significance of Shari‘a 
Shari‘a consists of the two core sources of Islamic international law, which are the Qur’an and 
the Sunna (the actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Whereas the Qur’an is the 
unique and authentic source of Shari‘a, the authenticity of the Sunna depends of the 
authenticity of the chain of transmission (isnad).16 Therefore, all the Sunna are not authentic 
and the disagreements among the jurists that not all of them agreed on the authenticity of 
transmitting such traditions, and each jurist cites only what he considers to be authentic.17 
However, the chain of transmission of a sunna provides the link between a sunna’s source and 
its trustworthiness. The more remote the chain the more likelihood of such sunna being 
unauthentic. As a result, chain of transmission is the key to the legitimacy of any sunna.  
Shari‘a also allows to follow the dictates of secular reason in situations where these two core 
sources are unable to provide answer to any question or issue.18 Islamic Shari‘a law, taken 
from the Qur’an, is not in contravention of, or in opposition to, God’s cosmic Sunna which he 
made the basis for the faith of the believers and the basis for the disbelief of the unbelievers, 
and this is because man is free to choose for himself through examination and conviction.19 
There are circumstances where the Shari‘a has not provided any specific guidelines. In such 
circumstances the Shari‘a permits the application of juristic interpretation (Fiqh).20  
The process of interpretation, however, requires more than simply citation of texts; it involves 
a search for a fit between history and present circumstance, or between approved texts and new 
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contexts.21 This process of interpretation is known as ‘Fiqh’ which literally means the scholarly 
interpretation of the Shari‘a. ‘Fiqh’ has made Islamic international law a living matter where 
the nature of the finding changes with the change of circumstances but always under the 
scrutiny of the Shari‘a. In the words of Joseph Schacht, “the interpretation of a religious ideal 
not by legislators but by scholars, and the recognised handbooks of the several schools are not 
‘codes’ in the Western meaning of the term. Islamic law is a ‘jurists’ law’ par excellence: 
Islamic jurisprudence did not grow out of an existing law, it itself created it.”22 
As a result, the ‘Fiqh’ has extended the sphere of Shari‘a following the deaths of the Prophet, 
his rightly guided Caliphs and companions. The Muslim scholars adopted the method of Ijtihad 
(exertion in intellectual efforts) in order to interpret the principles of Shari‘a and also to provide 
Islamic solution to new issues and circumstances. This process of interpreting the Qur’an 
exemplifies the independence of Muslim scholars and the absence of institutionalised 
interpretation of the Qur’an in Islam.23 It is undeniable that these scholars were influenced, 
throughout Islamic history, by the socio-political conditions of their times.24   
The Shari‘a, Fiqh and Islamic international law have evolved for more than fourteen centuries, 
and is not entirely devoid of influences from other legal systems and the experiences of other 
cultures with which the Islamic ummah (community) has been in contact.25 Even when part of 
the religion is believed to be from the Divine, some people still offer their own understanding 
of such divine material and attempt to infer the divine intention that lies behind it.26 As a result, 
the dividing line between what is provided in the Qur’an and what is interpreted by a scholar 
about the meaning of a Qur’anic text often becomes blurred. This blurring of dividing line has 
also resulted in conflicting views in Islamic international law.  
The sources upon which Islamic international law has been formulated that is,  the incidents of 
warfare that took place between Muslims and their enemies during the Prophet’s lifetime, and 
the relevant Qur’an and hadith texts, have been variously interpreted by Muslim historians, 
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exegetes, and jurists.27 In addition, the Islamic community witnessed its first splinter in the 8th 
Century CE when the community was divided into Shi‘a and Sunni Muslims which resulted in 
the formation of armed groups like Khawarij and Mu‘tazila.28 These movements and divisions 
also created disputes within the community and eventually resulted in the killings of the 3rd and 
4th Caliph of Islam Uthman and Ali respectively.29  
In the 10th Century CE the Sunni scholars became concerned with the influx of various new 
knowledge systems and their respective methods that came from other civilisations.30 However, 
such influx was the result of expansion of Islam into Europe, Persia, Greece, Byzantine and 
India. In order to save the community from further splinter and save the Shari‘a from diverse 
interpretation the then Sunni scholars31 declared a close to Ijtihad (exertion in intellectual 
efforts) by the end of 10th Century CE.32 The call to the ‘close of Ijtihad’ in the ninth century 
CE has posed an enormous challenge to the Muslim jurists in modern period because such call 
has adversely affected the potential contribution to the ‘Fiqh’ (Islamic jurisprudence). 
Following the conclusion of Abbasid period by the invasion from Mongol in 10th Century CE 
and Seljuk in the 12th Century CE respectively, the option of Ijtihad had been practically closed. 
Since then there have been many refinements and additions to the legacy of that period.33 
However, the closing of Ijtihad brought about a stultification of theology with a regressive 
tendency that reversed the progressive tradition that existed between the ninth and twelfth 
centuries CE.34 
However, many Muslim scholars objected to such a closure of Ijtihad and claimed the validity 
of the application of Ijtihad to deal with contemporary challenges. 35  As a result diverse 
approaches to Shari‘a developed following the 12th Century CE which resulted in further 
                                                          
27 Ibid 103. 
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division between Shi‘as and Sunnis, namely the Sunnis believe the Shari‘a is complete while 
the Shi‘as consider it evolving jurisprudence.36  
3.2 Use of Force in Islamic international law 
The political circumstances of the Islamic world following the killing of the 3rd and 4th Caliphs 
of Islam had an enormous influence on the development of the Islamic international law on the 
use of force. The power struggle encountered by the Muslim rulers and leaders in this period 
created further major division in the Muslim community which resulted in the Shi‘a and Sunni 
sects. The various schools of thought developed in the second half of the ninth century CE.37 
The major division was followed by further sub-division within the Shi‘a and Sunni sects.38 
Different views have been developed within the schools as far as use of force is concerned. 
The majority of Sunni and Shi‘a jurists have held that use of force is legitimate only in defence 
against aggression.39 In the Classical period the four schools of Sunni law and at least two 
schools of Shi‘a law had been evolved where most of the schools (except Shaf’i school in the 
Sunni sect) reaffirmed the Islamic position of use of force for defensive purposes only.40 
However, Imam Shaf’i and his followers had justified fighting against non-Muslims on account 
of their disbelief (kufr).41 Clearly this classical theory took the view that polytheism and 
unbelief are the main causes behind the hostile attitude of Muslims towards non-Muslims.42  
The Classical theory on the use of force was formulated in the medieval imperial world order, 
of which Muslim states were a part. Such theory was based on the idea of continuously 
expanding one’s borders because ‘conquest’ (fath) provided economic, political and 
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demographic stability.43 As a result, a distinction of the world into dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) 
and dar al-harb (abode of war) was created. The essence of this classical exegetical theory is 
based on the assumption that Muslims must launch all-out war against non-Muslims because 
of the latter’s unbelief.44 The history of early struggle of the Muslims suggests that, this attitude 
of Muslims against the non-Muslims was prevalent during the second Islamic Century. 
The separation of the world into the ‘Abode of Islam’ and the ‘Abode of War’ reflects the 
reality, brutal and unavoidable, that the world was not always governed by the universal treaties 
of today.45 The terms Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb are not terms from the Qur’an or from the 
teachings of the Prophet, but grew out of the work of jurists coming to terms with the new 
international profile of Islam.46 The invention of these terms were based on ad hoc juristic 
interpretations of particularly verses 9:5 and 9:29, largely in deference to realpolitik in the 
Abbasid period.47  It seems that this dichotomous classification is a product of the exertion of 
intellectual reasoning in understanding laws (ijtihad) mainly based on the attitude of the 
Muslim state towards its enemies and friends during the second Islamic century.48 
The medieval imperial world order, ‘the Islam that conquered the northern regions was not the 
Islamic religion but the Islamic state … it was Arabianism and not Muhammadanism that 
triumphed first’.49 As a result, Dar al-‘Ahd (‘Abode of treaty’) and Dar al-'Sulh (‘Abode of 
Reconciliation’) emerged during and after the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE when the 
Muslim states were confronted with political realities other than unabated conquest and 
resounding victories.50 This change in tone and emphasis, however, was not a completely novel 
phenomenon for the concept of Dar al-'Sulh can be traced back to the treaty that the Prophet 
had signed with the Christian population of Najran when he was in Medina.51 
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Figure 1: Divisions of the World in Islamic international Law 
 
 
 
Due to a denial of the elaboration of Islamic Empire by the Christian crusaders, Tartars and 
Mongolian invaders, the European power emerged in the Classical Age and this resulted in the 
dar al-Islam becoming only under the rule of the Ottoman Empire till up to the twentieth 
century.52 Following the decline of the territorial expansion of dar al-Islam and the growing 
influence of colonial power in the territories under the Muslim rulers it became impracticable 
to further expand the territory. Therefore, the focus of the Islamic leaders was to liberate the 
territory from colonialism.53 However, the bipolar division between dar al-harb and dar al-
Islam became obsolete with the collapse of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in 1924.54 In this 
period the modern Islamic jurists legitimised use of force in defensive purposes only.55  
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3.2.1 Formation of Islamic international law on the use of force 
The use of force in Islamic international law has been formulated through the stages of fighting 
that the first Muslims had undertaken under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. There 
were two stages on which the Qur’an provided for use of force. These stages had been 
developed through the historical and political situations that the Prophet had to undertake to 
protect the faith from aggression at its infancy.56 
First Stage: The first set of Qur’anic verses that permit use of force is against unbelievers who 
had oppressed the Muslims at the very early stage of the birth of the religion.57 The Qur’anic 
verses proclaim that: 
Permission is granted to those who fight because they have been wronged. And Allah 
is truly able to help them; / those who were expelled from their homes without right, 
only because they said: ‘Our Lord is Allah’. Were it not for Allah’s causing some people 
to drive back others, destruction would have befallen the monasteries, and churches, 
and synagogues, and mosques in which Allah’s Name is mentioned greatly. Assuredly 
Allah will help those who help Him. Allah is truly Strong, Mighty—/ those who, if We 
empower them in the land, maintain the prayer, and pay the alms, and enjoin decency 
and forbid indecency. And with Allah rests the outcome of all matters.58 
These verses discuss and justify permission for combat because the injustices the Muslims 
faced, and because they were expelled from their homes and forced to emigrate. 59  The 
imperative of meeting force with equal force in order to prevent defeat and discourage future 
aggression.60 
The Classical exegetes differ on whether 2:190 was the first to be revealed in regard to fighting 
(qital). It may be appropriate to consider that, as 22:39 preceded 2:190 the former constitutes 
permission to engage in fighting that was prohibited ab initio, whereas the latter clearly ordains 
fighting in self-defence.61 However, at this stage, fighting was allowed to fend off aggression 
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and this has been clearly exemplified in verses 2:190, 194; 4:91; 9:36; and 22:39 of the 
Qur’an.62 
Second stage: This stage is marked by the verses that directly ordered Muslims to fight those 
who fight them.63 This is a continuation of defensive fighting that was allowed in the first stage. 
At this stage, pre-emptive fighting was also permitted for Muslims according to verse 4:75.64 
After the Prophet had made his migration to Medina, there were still some Muslims who 
remained in Mecca although they could not practice their religion, and some Meccans who 
wished to be Muslims but would not convert out of fear of their fellow tribesmen.65 In both 
cases these difficulties were due to the weakness of these people vis-à-vis the polytheistic 
members of their own clans who sought to oppress them with threats and even torture. 
Therefore, verse 4:75 was revealed to call the Muslims of Medina to use force: (1) to free their 
brethren who were left behind in Mecca from religious oppression, and (2) to give those 
Meccans who desired to convert the ability to do so without fear of reprisals from the enemies 
of Islam.66 
3.2.2 Development of Islamic international law on the use of force 
History of Islam suggests that Prophet Muhammad was not permitted to use force even for self-
defence until all the other alternatives were extinguished for saving the religion in its infancy.67 
The Prophet and his companions remained in Mecca for thirteen years, advocating their faith 
in the face of brutal persecution and injustice.68 Throughout this period, they were instructed 
by the God (Allah) to refrain from using force against their persecutors.69  Only after the 
Prophet’s immigration to Medina, at the beginning of the fourteenth year of his message, 
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permission to fight against oppression was given.70 In a Qur’anic direction the God (Allah) has 
said: 
Permission to fight is given to those against whom war is waged, because they have 
been wronged. Most certainly, God has the power to grant them victory. Those are the 
ones who have been driven from their homelands against all right for no other reason 
than their saying, “Our Lord is God!” Were it not that God repels some people by means 
of others, monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques – in all of which God’s name 
is abundantly extolled – would surely have been destroyed. God will most certainly 
succour him who succours God’s cause. God is certainly Most Powerful, Almighty.71 
Defensive use of force against aggression has been permitted only in Medinan verses of the 
Qur’an.72 This aggression includes the demonstration of unbelievers of hostility towards Islam. 
Reluctance to fight, in verses 2:190 – 9173, which may be understood in terms of priority of the 
rule against killing, is overcome by the security needs of a persecuted and outnumbered 
community.74 Therefore, use of force progressed from a state of patience to the use of force in 
self-defence followed by an obligatory jihad against the polytheists and People of the Book 
who persecuted Muslims.75 
However, from historical background of use of force by the Prophet Muhammad and his rightly 
guided Caliphs, it is apparent that anticipatory defensive force had been used in the infancy of 
Islam followed by pre-emptive defensive use of force when aggression was incumbent but had 
not actually occurred.76 For example, force in anticipation had been used against the Byzantines 
in the battle of Mu’tah, against the Jews in the battle of Khaybar where the Muslims mounted 
a surprise attack, and against the Quraysh when the Prophet triumphed back to Mecca.77 
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The anticipatory defensive force had been used to protect the faith from aggression from groups 
and tribes all around it. Such use of force in anticipation was necessary to protect the faith in 
its infancy and from destruction. As soon as the faith had been established in the holy land of 
Mecca by the Prophet’s return, force had only been used on pre-emption as anticipatory 
defensive use of force was not necessary any longer. Prophet’s hadith that supports this position 
is that - ‘Now we campaign against them but are not campaigned against by them. We are 
going to them.’78  
Pre-emptive force had also been used against those tribes and groups which had broken the 
treaty provisions with the Prophet, such as Banu Mustalaq, Banu Khaybar, and Banu Ghatafan, 
and conspired to assassinate him. Such force had also been used against Byzantines following 
the killing of the Prophet’s envoy by the Byzantine leader.79 The circumstances which triggered 
pre-emptive use of force in self-defence were only when an enemy had the intention to cause 
harm, or had been planning to cause harm, or conspiring with others who were already causing 
harm.80 There exists a saying in Arabic, ‘When the Byzantines are not campaigned against, 
they campaign.’ This saying advocates the reason for pre-emptive self-defence that was 
necessary at that point in time.  
Pre-emptive use of force upon the enemy’s breaking of their peace treaties with Muslims has 
also been authorised by the Qur’an.81 However, before using pre-emptive force in self-defence 
Islamic international law requires Muslim rulers to have clear evidence of treachery from the 
other side.82 ‘It is obligatory on the part of the Muslim head of government and/or their 
representative to apprise the enemy beforehand of the non-existence of pacts and treaties and 
fighting without this previous notice is unlawful.’83 
3.2.2.1 Humanitarian intervention and Intervention by invitation in Islamic 
international law 
Islamic international law permits extraterritorial use of force for humanitarian purposes. 
Muslim states are responsible for the elimination of any power that prevents their people from 
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knowing any doctrine except that dictated to them and to liberate the people that they may 
freely choose the creeds they want.84 The current situation, in which Western forces are making 
inroads into the territory of Islam, constitutes such a case.85 With further citations from al-
Ghazali (d. 1111), the greatest scholar of his day, al-Sulami goes on to stipulate that if a town 
in, say, Syria is attacked by the Franks and cannot defend itself, all the other (Muslim) cities 
of the region are obligated to come to its aid.86 This stipulation also demonstrates the provision 
of use of force in collective self-defence among Muslim states.  
Defensive war to liberate Muslims from the persecution (fitnah) and aggression of the 
unbelievers has also been commanded in the Qur’an.87 However, the threshold for using force 
in the defense of oppressed and weak Muslims is that the oppression suffered must be so severe 
as to compel Muslims to leave their homes, for instance, genocide or torture.88 The weak 
Muslims who could not flee Mecca were suffering from serious persecution. The following 
verses confirmed that intervention is possible to save those weak Muslims from tyranny: 
Would not you fight in the way of Allah for al-mustadafin (the oppressed socially weak 
Muslims) from men, women and children who pray: Our Lord! Take us from this city 
of the oppressive people and appoint for us from Your side a guardian and appoint us 
from Your side a protector. Those who have believed fight in the way of Allah and 
those who disbelieve fight in the way of Satan, so fight the allies of Satan; surely the 
plot of Satan is weak.89 
Unless there is a valid peace treaty in existence between a Muslim state and another state which 
is persecuting the Muslims on their land, every Muslim state is entitled to intervene into the 
states which is persecuting Muslims in order to free them from persecution. This has been 
permitted by the Qur’an in the following Chapter: 
… But if they (Muslims who have not come into exile) seek your aid in religion, it is 
your duty to help them, except against a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual 
alliance. And Allah sees all that you do.90 
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However, active intervention by the Muslim state to defend another Muslim state would require 
an invitation from the latter’s ruler. This is because only a Muslim ruler can use extraterritorial 
use of force if another Muslim ruler seeks assistance.91 In addition, Islamic international law 
also permits extraterritorial use of force in the invitation of the people who are prisoners of war 
and this includes both Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners and dhimmis (non-Muslims living 
under Muslim rulers).92  
The Qur’anic provisions and Sunna suggest that Islamic international law permits a step-by-
step intervention process. It permits intervention in order to resolve dispute and promote peace. 
In case of failure to resolve the dispute and promote peace it permits use of force against the 
aggressor if invited to do so by the Muslim states in crisis. The Shi‘as have also recognised the 
possibility of inviting neighbouring Muslim states for help where the enemy forces raise the 
spectre of an emergency.93 Moreover, Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari (d. 1979) argued that at 
least in some cases, fighting in defence of the oppressed citizens of another country may be 
classified as imposed war, and seen as an even greater or higher duty than defence of one’s 
own homeland.94 
Intervention by invitation has also taken a place in article 3 of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
which provides that “fostering virtue in citizens is one of the goals of the Islamic state, and that 
the foreign policy of the republic is devoted to the defence of Islamic values, first in the sense 
of maintaining its own boundaries, and second in the sense of a readiness to intervene in cases 
in which Islamic interests are at stake – for example, in the struggle against tyranny.”95 
The Qur’anic provision, the Sunna of the prophet and practice of the Muslim majority states 
suggest that humanitarian intervention is allowed in the absence of any peace treaty irrespective 
of the fact that it is a Muslim or non-Muslim state. However, Islamic international law requires 
an invitation from the ruler of the country which needs foreign assistance on any other grounds 
than humanitarian. In both cases, a Muslim state must readily aid another Muslim state even in 
the absence of any treaty between them. On the other hand, intervention in whatever reasons 
into a non-Muslim state is regulated by treaty provisions rather than necessity.  
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3.2.2.2 The Role of Treaties in Islamic international law on the use of force 
The treaties concluded by the Prophet Muhammad and the four rightly guided Caliphs are the 
foundations of Islamic international law.96 The Prophet himself has made the status of every 
treaty entered into by Muslims as binding.97 One of his hadith (sunna) confirms him saying 
that “the Muslims are bound by their obligations, except an obligation that renders the lawful 
unlawful, and the unlawful lawful.”98 The binding nature of treaties has also been upheld in the 
Qur’an in the following chapters:  
And fulfil (every) engagement, for (every) engagement will be enquired into (on the 
Day of Reckoning).99 
Fulfil the contracts you have made … such are the people of truth who fear Allah.100 
… it is righteousness … to fulfil the contracts which you have made … Such are the 
people of truth, the Allah-fearing.101 
A treaty is valid and takes precedence over all other laws and regulations as long as it is not 
inconsistent with the Shari‘a.102 However, even in such cases the specific prohibition has to be 
considered in light of the values, goals, and purposes involved and which are ascertained 
through application of the Shari‘a.103 For example, in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya the Prophet 
entered into peace agreement with Quraysh whereby the Muslims were barred from going to 
pilgrimage (hajj) in Mecca despite the fact that the Shari‘a specifically requires all able 
Muslims to go to pilgrimage as it is one of the five pillars of Islam.104 However, the Prophet 
agreed so in order to avoid bloodsheds and the aggression that Quraysh held towards Muslims. 
Therefore, it is permissible to enter into agreement against the proscriptions of Shari‘a but 
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subject to the condition that such agreement would bring greater good for the Ummah such as 
saving the community from imminent loss of life.105 
In order to maintain peace with the abode of war (dar al-harb) Islamic international law 
encourages entry into peace treaties.106 As long as the non-Muslims do not break their oaths 
under the treaties they are in peace with Muslim states.107 The Qur’an provides: 
But if they break their oaths after [making] their pact and assail your religion, then fight 
the leaders of unbelief—verily they have no [binding] oaths, so that they might desist.108 
Therefore, Islamic international law takes breach of treaty provisions very seriously.109 Muslim 
states are not allowed to use force on the sole ground that another state’s ruler and people are 
non-Muslims.110 Sustainable peace must exist between Islamic and non-Islamic states as long 
as no pacts are broken, da’wah (call to Islamic faith) is not attacked and no obstacles are placed 
in the path of religion. 111  Use of force is not justified to impose Islam as a religion on 
unbelievers or to support a particular social regime and the Prophet only fought to repulse 
aggression.112 
3.2.3 Fundamental Principles of Islamic international law on the use of force 
The Islamic perception of use of force may be studied from the viewpoints of both Muslim 
States’ practice and of Islamic jurisprudence. 113  Unlike Public international law, Islamic 
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international law does not prohibit use of force in general terms. Islamic international law 
prohibits aggressive use of force but permits defensive use of force in certain circumstances. 
However, the Qur’an gives only three reasons for using force, namely fending off aggression, 
protecting call to the faith (da’wah) and safeguarding freedom of religion.114  
Use of force for fending off an aggression and safeguarding freedom of religion are for 
defensive purposes and therefore these are permitted in Islamic international law.115 However, 
use of force for protecting da’wah has been a point of controversy in terms of ‘to what extent 
use of force is permitted by Islamic international law for this purpose.’ Some scholars 
(especially the fundamentalists116) have supported use of force for calling to the religions to a 
very large extent which includes aggressive use of force to expand the land under Islamic rule. 
On the other hand, modern scholars have only promoted and agreed peaceful calling to the 
religion and denied availability of use of force for da’wah. The modern scholars have argued 
that aggressive use of force for da’wah is unjust and likely to bring hatred to the religion which 
have been made forbidden by the Qur’an.117 The Qur’an proscribed that - “Let not your hatred 
of a people cause you to be unjust. You must do justice.”118  
Therefore, use of aggressive force for spreading the faith is not supported by the Qur’anic 
provisions and the extent to which call to the Islam is permitted is by all means peaceful. Even 
when freedom of religion and call to the da’wah are denied it is not permitted to use force 
which is likely to result in unjust killing of human being. As the Qur’an proclaims that - 
“Whosoever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall 
be if he had killed all humanity.”119 In such circumstances only peaceful measures to protest 
such denial of freedom of religion and call to the da’wah is permitted which is recognised in 
Islamic jurisprudence as ‘jihad by tongue against the tyrants.’120  
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If, however, peaceful measures fail to secure peaceful co-existence between Muslim and non-
Muslim states then use of force is permitted as a last resort but only for defensive purposes.121 
Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963), the then rector of al-Azhar University, was of the opinion that only 
defensive wars are permissible in response to external aggression.122 In support of this view, 
Shaltut has relied on the history of Islam on the circumstances under which the battle of Badr 
(624CE) was fought. For instance, shortly before the start of the battle the Prophet Muhammad 
sent a message to the Qurayesh telling them they had no reason to fight him and his companions, 
and that, therefore, a peace arrangement should be easily agreed upon.123 Although very few 
of the Qurayesh leaders accepted the logic that a battle was unnecessary and tried to persuade 
their people to abandon the war, the hardliners were determined to go on the warpath and were 
soon able to drag everyone into the battle that had been fought by the Prophet and his 
companions to defend themselves from aggression of the Qurayesh.124  
If defensive use of force begins to fend off aggression, then the question arises when the 
necessity of such use of force ends under Islamic international law. The Qur’an has dictated 
the end of use of force as soon as the end of persecution (fitnah).125 However, there has been 
controversy on the meaning of fitnah in verse 8:39. If it means unbelief in God (as interpreted 
by Classical exegetes) then this verse requires the Muslims to fight the unbelievers until 
unbelief is totally eradicated and therefore to wage a complete war against unbelievers.126 On 
the other hand, if it is interpreted to mean the persecution of Muslims until they recant (as 
interpreted by Modern exegetes), Muslims are required to fight their persecutors until they 
enjoy complete freedom of worshipping God without fear or the need to hide their belief.127 
Whereas the former interpretation denotes an offensive war, the later interpretation denotes a 
defensive war. On the basis of the latter interpretation, defensive use of force ends as soon as 
persecution ends. 
The Islamic casus belli are the prevention of aggression and religious persecution, and so 
fighting must cease once religious freedom is secured, and the mission to preach Islam is 
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protected.128 This suggests that the preferred interpretation of fitnah is ‘persecution’ rather than 
‘unbelief’. Rida quotes Abduh (a modern exegetes) as saying that interpreting persecution in 
this verse to mean ‘unbelief’ takes the interpretation of the verse out of context. 129  The 
Classical Muslim jurists, who interpreted fitnah as unbelief, formulated the Islamic 
international law in a world “where war was the natural state.”130  
The historical period when Islamic international law has shaped into its primary stage suggests 
that the fundamental principles of use of force was based on self-defence and non-aggression. 
The Prophet fought to defend the religion and its adherents from persecution of non-Muslims 
and that was a measure taken as a last resort. Islamic international law does not permit or 
promote use of force in order to legitimise forced conversion to the faith as the Qur’an itself 
provides that ‘there is no compulsion in religion’.131 Moreover, the Prophet would not have 
wanted the non-Muslims to be subjected to the same religious persecution the Muslims had 
been subjected to at the infancy of the faith and God (Allah) would not have made provision in 
the Qur’an for non-Muslims to pay poll tax (Jizyah) instead of converting to Islam. 132 
Therefore, the fundamental principle of Islamic international law on the use of force provides 
for defensive use of force but only at the extinction of all other options to end religious 
persecution.  
3.2.3.1 Who can authorise use of force in Islamic international law? 
In Islamic international law ‘use of force’ decision must be declared by a legitimate leader.133 
Hence, no group, party or organisation has the authority to take up arms in the name of jihad 
without authorisation from lawful authorities.134 In this way, Islamic international law has 
made provisions to control disorder and anarchy. A hadith (saying of the Prophet) has 
supported this stance: ‘A Muslim ruler is the shield [of his people]. A war can only be waged 
under him and people should seek his shelter [in war].135 
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Questions about who can legitimately call for or initiate use of force as part of any jihad, in a 
world which no longer has Caliphs leading the ummah, are debated by Islamic scholars, with 
a vast majority arguing that only state leaders in Islamic (or Muslim majority) lands would be 
legitimately able to do so if a genuine ‘just cause’ emerged. 136  However, the two major 
branches of Islam, the Sunni and Shi‘a, differ sharply for doctrinal reasons on the necessary 
authority to wage war in the sense of jihad. The position established by the Sunni jurists was 
that both offensive and defensive jihad could be waged by any Muslim authority against the 
dar al-harb.137 The Shi‘a position, on the other hand, has been that a divinely appointed person, 
the just Imam, who would unite political and religious sovereignty, is necessary for any jihad 
that is not defensive.138 The last divine Imam, the Twelfth Imam, being not available there is 
no legitimate authority to use offensive force in Islam until his return from the hidden 
position.139  
Consequently, the eminent Shi‘a and Sunni authorities have respectively maintained that use 
of force, except for self-defence, is forbidden in the absence of the ma’sum, that is ‘the inerrant 
Imam’,140 or the Caliph (central government).141 This does not give a clear message about who 
can legitimately declare war. However, eventually the legitimacy of the ruler must emanate 
from the Qur’anic provisions. A ruler who uses defensive force which is inconsistent with the 
Qur’anic proscriptions is not legitimate and accordingly is not authorised to make a decision 
on use of force under the banner of Islamic international law.142 As a result, if a head of the 
state or government does not use necessary force and his abstention amounts to disregard of 
the Shari‘a then such omission can give the undisputed leaders of Muslim community the 
authority to declare use of defensive force to protect the Muslim community. For example, the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Afghan leaders declared jihad against the 
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invaders as well as the pro-communist ruler of Afghanistan. Muslims around the world joined 
the Afghan jihad. This kind of jihad would be considered as a war in self-defence or defensive 
jihad, although it was not declared by a Muslim ruler.143 Further example, on the authority to 
wage war of aggression, includes the letter written by one hundred scholars addressing al-
Baghdadi (the then leader of ISIS) which confirmed his lack of legitimate authority to use force 
under Islamic law as he was neither a ruler nor an undisputed leader of the Muslim world.144  
Figure 2: Elements of war of aggression (offensive use of force). 
 
This difference of opinion points not only at the fundamental differences between the two 
schools of thought in the matter of right authority, it also demonstrates their understanding of 
the political history of Islam and of the connections of the Qur’anic jihad with that history.145 
Whereas the Sunni jurists have been influenced by the reality of war, the Shi‘a jurists have 
focused on the ideal. This made the Sunni jurists to justify aggressive use of force based on 
historical conquests by Muslim rulers. They treated aggressive use of force (offensive jihad) 
as a divinely approved political tool for furthering the ‘sphere of Islam’ and keeping the ‘sphere 
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of war’ in check.146 On the other hand, the Shi‘a jurists were able to question the legitimacy of 
the conquests by aggressive use of force and thereby establishing such use of force opposed to 
Qur’anic commands.  
In the absence of a rightly guided Caliph and in the presence of different schools of thought in 
Islamic jurisprudence, it is very likely to be confronted with different conclusions by different 
rulers. As the ruler has the ultimate responsibility to protect the people, use of defensive force 
(as opposed to offensive force) is only subject to the decision making of a ruler.147  
However, such defensive use of force can be actual or pre-emptive considering the 
circumstances of the case. This is a decision based on knowledge and evidence available to the 
ruler and is not purely based on Islamic international law.148 The only point that is relevant to 
Islamic international law is that such use of force must not be aggressive or for any other 
purposes than self-defence as a measure of last resort. The ruler’s permission is mandatory and 
only then it is permissible to use force in pre-emptive self-defence.149 However, by the fourth 
century of Islam (tenth century CE) due to the changing of the political situation especially in 
the Abbasid period the Caliph’s duty of waging offensive armed jihad, as theorised by earlier 
generation, to have essentially lapsed.150 
Only a legitimate ruler of a Muslim state, or in the absence of a Muslim ruler the undisputed 
leader of the Muslim community can make a decision of use of force in self-defence.151 This is 
a very high requirement. Therefore, the leaders of any group or organisation are not eligible to 
make decision and declaration to use force under Islamic international law.152 These leaders of 
such group or organisation are not representative of the Islamic belief or behaviour and they 
do not have any recognised status as an authority in Islamic international law to make such 
decision and declaration. For example, the text of the proposed constitution for an Islamic state 
issued by Hizb al-Tahrir in 1979 stated that the leader (Caliph) has the responsibility to lead 
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the army and he also has the right to declare war.153 The recent al-Azhar position has also 
confirmed that the declaration of use of force by al-Qaeda, ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), 
ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and Levant), QSIS or Al-Qa’ida Separatists in Iraq and Syria, and 
other similar group or organisation is not legitimate due to lack of right authority.154 
As soon as legitimacy of a ruler is established it is necessary to determine the cause of the use 
of force. The cause must be just because without ‘just cause’ the use of force cannot be 
legitimate. The justness of use of force is determined by necessity of using such force. 
Therefore, in addition to the circumstances under which the use of force is necessary, it is also 
a requirement to ensure that such circumstances are legally justified for using force in self-
defence. This is a test which undertakes a theoretical analysis of justness of the use of force.  
The three words (with their derivatives) used in the Qur’anic context of use of force are: qital 
(fighting, murder, killing, infanticide), jihad (struggle, striving) and harb (war).155 Classical 
Islam developed its own just war doctrine as early as the seventh and eight centuries C.E., that 
is before the just war tradition of the West began to coalesce into its classical form, based on 
the Qur’an and Hadith.156 Al-Shaybani, an Islamic Jurist in Classical period, developed a 
sophisticated concept of the use of force theory that governed the relationship between 
nations.157 It is the Classical jurists who differentiated between harb (war) and jihad (struggle, 
effort) and the only relationship between these two concepts was overlapping. This overlap 
was established by the jurists by demonstrating a connection between harb (war) and qital 
(fighting).  
The above findings suggest that the Qur’an permits use of force or fighting (qital) only in the 
path of God (jihad) in a state of war (harb). Just war develops when jihad and harb merge 
together and at that point jihad enters the mode of qital. Therefore, the following theory applies 
to just war in Islam: 
Jihad + harb = Qital 
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Jihad requires religious authorisation whereas harb requires political authorisation and 
direction. Therefore, qital (fighting) is only just when both religious and political authorisations 
have been given by the appropriate authorities.158 Accordingly, the ‘just cause’ test is satisfied 
when jihad is approved by religious authority and use of force is approved by political authority. 
These authorisations do not necessarily have to emanate from the same person or origin as long 
as these are coming from a legitimate authority and in consistent with the Shari‘a. For instance, 
a ruler of an Islamic country can authorise defensive use of force if the population of that 
country is under an actual or imminent armed attack from another state or under forceful 
invasion or occupation by foreign power. If the political authority is responsible for the foreign 
invasion or occupation then the religious authority can alone authorise use of force. For 
example, the 1951 British invasion of Egypt with the invitation of the legitimate ruler (a 
political authority) Khedive Tawfiq when defensive use of force was declared by the Ulama 
(religious authority) to save the country from non-Muslim invasion.  
As long as call for use of force in jihad is concerned, the scholars in Mardin declaration has 
concluded that only leaders of states can issue a call for jihad and that no other individual has 
the right to wage war against a nation or population.159 Taking direct aim at contemporary 
jihadists and their reliance on Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa, the scholars declared that “anyone who 
seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation 
and has misapplied the revealed texts.”160 
Therefore, non-state actors are not allowed to recourse to extraterritorial use of force due to 
lack of legitimate authority under Islamic international law. The Qur’an has provided that: 
...‘Our Lord, bring us forth from this town whose people are evildoers and appoint for 
us a protector from You, and appoint for us from You a helper’.161 
On the other hand, non-state actors like al-Qaeda has been trying to justify their violent actions 
to be in accordance with Islamic international law on the basis that it justifies defensive actions 
against aggression by non-Muslims who constructively resort to aggression for their benefit.162 
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In addition, these groups also used force against Muslims who they accuse for assisting and 
even supporting the non-Muslim Western powers in their influence on the Muslim countries 
and as a result subjecting God’s command to them.163 However, these justifications are not free 
from scrutiny due to being influenced by political agenda.  
3.3 Political influence in the shaping of Islamic international law 
Islamic jurisprudence has always been the subject of an interplay between political context and 
theological doctrine in different historical periods.164 Despite the Shari‘a requirement to wage 
just war, use of force in Islamic international law had not been free from encroachment from 
political leaders who had temporal reasons to use extraterritorial force. As James Turner 
Johnson pointed out that “despite the invoking of religious authority of war, the causes of the 
wars in question were essentially temporal; despite being termed jihad, they were wars of the 
state, not wars of religion.”165  
In the course of time, the Caliphs of Islam used defensive force (actual and pre-emptive) against 
external aggression which resulted in expansion of the land ruled under Islamic law.166 In the 
wake of the phenomenal conquests achieved by Muslims during the 7th century CE, the scholars 
of Islam began to apply the term ‘jihad’ to military action and to efforts to expand the ‘sphere 
of Islam’ (dar al-Islam) through the expansion of boundaries of the Islamic polity.167 As a 
result, jihad became a political tool to legitimise use of force in order to achieve political goal 
rather than purely religious ones. Throughout the centuries, competing claimants to the khalifa 
(leadership) resorted to the doctrine of jihad in their struggles for power.168 This doctrinal 
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extension of jihad to political goals has increased dramatically over the past 200 years, during 
which time it has come to justify political regime change and political opposition to rulers.169 
The conquests by Muslims rulers had not continued for long. Following the death of the last 
rightly guided Caliph (Ali), the Muslims were afflicted by internal and external affairs that 
prevented them from observing God’s prescriptions and laws. 170  As a result, the Islamic 
international law has not evolved through jurisprudence comparing other major legal systems, 
instead it developed mostly through the doctrinal thinking of theologians. This has given rise 
to an almost symbiotic relationship between the ruler and the theologians where the ruler found 
support from theologians for his rule and the theologians found wealth and power from the 
ruler for having provided with him the religious support. 171  This convenient relationship 
resulted in the evolution of Islamic international law as interpreting the Shari‘a in a way that 
became both rigid and yet at the same time quite elastic when politics and other inducements 
or disincentives required it.172  
Since politics became an integral part of the development of Islamic international law on the 
use of force, the rulers like Ummayyad, Abbsid, Mongols, Seljuks and the Turkish Ottoman 
Empire entertained a broader concept of military jihad together with few classical jurists like 
al-Shaf‘i and his followers. The spiritual nature of jihad was very rarely used by the rulers and 
leaders. The transformation of jihad from mainly spiritual to mainly military in nature resulted 
in the wider recognition of ‘jihad’ as ‘holy war’ especially by the Western scholars. This is due 
to interpretation of the classical exegetes that jihad is a permanent and total war against 
unbelievers.  
The use of jihad to legitimise armed struggle against colonial power became the political 
agenda of the Muslim leaders and rulers in the colonial period. Despite the enormous 
difficulties faced by Muslim scholars, leaders, merchants, and villagers in Egypt, Africa, India 
and other places, the jihad calls against the European armies did not lead to an all-out war 
against local non-Muslim communities. Even in cases where the Muslim population had to 
bear the full brunt of colonialism, extreme care was taken not to label local non-Muslims as 
the enemy because of their religious and cultural affiliation with European colonial powers. 
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When, for instance, the Sanusi call for ‘jihad against all unbelievers’ caused a sense of urgency 
among the Christians in Egypt, Muslim scholars responded by saying that jihad in Libya was 
directed at the Italian aggressors, not all Westerners or Christians.173 
After the independence from colonial power, the Muslims were divided into independent states 
and there was no prospect or necessity to form a unified Islamic Caliphate at that time. As a 
result, the bipolar distinction had been dissolved altogether. The distinction between Dar al-
Islam and Dar al-harb began to fall into disuse because they no longer accurately described 
contemporary historical and political reality. 174  However, some of these components may 
nevertheless be deemed applicable by traditional scholars, because fiqh traditionalists have not 
evolved their thinking to consider the passage of centuries, and only a few Muslim jurists have 
addressed evolution of Islamic international law since the twelfth century CE.175  
It is apparent that, current discussion of the use of force in the Islamic context is usually 
oriented towards the concept of jihad.176  Therefore, the following section of this chapter 
contains the meaning and significance of jihad from the viewpoint of Islamic international law.  
3.4 Jihad: Meaning and Significance 
In Islamic international law, it has been witnessed on numerous occasions that the ‘use of force’ 
has been demonstrated by the term ‘jihad’ in the scholarly works of the Muslim and non-
Muslim scholars.177 For this reason, ‘jihad’ has been at the central point in Islamic international 
law as far as use of force is concerned. Due to being given too much attention ‘jihad’ has been 
subjected to extensive use and as a result substantial abuse in regard to its true meaning and 
significance.  
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The classical laws of jihad assumed that the default position between states was a state of 
war.178 This has been widely understood to mean that Muslims consider themselves obligated 
to wage war on all non-Muslim lands until they become part of Dar al-Islam. The relationship 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in this period was hostile in nature.179 A state of war 
between the Muslims and, in Qur’anic terms, the idolaters/unbelievers/polytheists of Mecca 
was the norm until 6/628, when the armistice of al-Hudaybiyah was concluded.180 The reasons 
for this enmity were hostility, persecution, and aggression.181 On the other hand, the modernists’ 
view of jihad is to use force in defence of aggression and persecution of the Muslims.182 
However, such defensive use of force is allowed as a last resort, that is after extinguishing all 
other options to end aggression and persecution.183 The modernists also do not support armed 
jihad to expand the territory of Muslim states and to facilitate forced conversion to Islam.184 
There have been those who have sought, in a sense, to brush aside the whole issue and history 
of military jihad in Islam in favour of a purely spiritualised notion of ‘striving’ in the way of 
God, and there have also been those, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who have provided literal 
or surface readings of Qur’anic verses related to jihad and ‘fighting’ (qitāl) in an attempt to 
reduce all of Islam to military jihad.185 For instance, the majority of classical theologians, 
jurists and traditionalists understood the obligation of jihad in a military sense while the 
modernisers and reformists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries argued that jihad should 
be understood in a moral and spiritual concept.186  
In addition to the few Muslim scholars,187 the non-Muslim scholars188 notably from the West 
have demonstrated their endeavour to give a misconceived meaning of ‘jihad’. According to 
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James Turner Johnson, “between Western and Islamic culture there is possibly no other single 
issue at the same time as divisive or as poorly understood as that of jihad.189 The problem in 
the current state of scholarship on jihad in the West is ‘a practical one,’ in that there is a lack 
of ‘preliminary work on a vast subject.’190  
In order to overcome the misuse and distortion of the term ‘jihad’ it is important to explain 
what it stands for through a careful reading of the Qur’an and Hadith (the recorded words and 
actions of Muhammad). This is the most effective way to discover the true meaning and image 
of jihad. The Qur’an has directed that ‘And when you speak – speak with justice.’191 This 
analysis of the Qur’an and sunna would set aside the innovative meanings of jihad and develop 
its true meaning by assessing the legitimate use of force under the banner of jihad. 
3.4.1 Meaning of Jihad 
Jihad derives from the root word ‘jahada’ (pl. yujahiduna), which means to strive or to exert 
effort.192 The Qur’an refers to these two meanings in 9:79 and 24:53.193 Due to being given to 
a very limited scope to its meaning, jihad is now commonly associated with Islamic violence 
by many Western as well as Muslim scholars.194 Whereas the Classical meaning of jihad is 
limited to ‘armed struggle’ its meaning in modern context goes far beyond such limited 
scope.195 
Understood in its comprehensive sense, jihad is an inherent aspect of the human condition in 
facing the imperfections of this world.196 The Prophet Muhammad has said that ‘the mujahid 
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is one who wages a struggle against himself.’197 In the Qur’anic usage, specifically military 
activity is consistently identified by terms other than jihad (e.g., qital), whereas jihad is 
reserved for the overall religious struggle, whether in the form of personal purification or the 
collective effort to establish an Islamic social order.198 Therefore, the use of force in Islamic 
international law is ‘jihad’ but use of this term does not necessarily denote use of force because 
this term also includes other types of non-forceful struggle.199 
The literal meaning of the word jihad is ‘effort’ or struggle, and that the ‘greater’ jihad was 
defined by the Prophet as the jihad al-nafs, the struggle against the soul.200 The priority thus 
accorded to inward, spiritual effort over all outward endeavours must never be lost sight of in 
any examination of jihad.201 Therefore, jihad should be ‘for Allah’s sake’ (fi sabilillah) even 
when it has related to fighting (qital).202  
However, the Qur’anic term fi sabilillah is not as widely attached to military jihad as 
sometimes depicted by some modern Western researchers, such as Randall, Firestone and 
others,203 who attempt to interpret jihad and jihad fi sabilillah in the same way.204 It carries 
both military and non-military meanings and it generally refers to the way in which a believer 
chooses to live to please Allah.205 For example, spending in the cause of Allah and emigrating 
for fear of persecution. Therefore, jihad does not always denote fighting in the Qur’an. Every 
qital is jihad but not every jihad is qital.206 
The Qur’an contains several references to jihad, some of which have the distinct meaning of 
war-like activities in defence of the faith.207 Nevertheless, the spiritual aspect of jihad was 
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prevalent and predominant, particularly as practiced by the early Meccan Muslims between 
611-632 CE, the period when the Qur’an was revealed.208  
The Qur’an refers to jihad in twenty-four verses, most of which emphasise the spiritual and 
non-violent manifestations of jihad.209 Only few verses specifically address jihad as armed 
resistance to the enemies of Islam and in those cases resorting to use of force as part of jihad 
was always contemplated as self-defence.210 The source evidence suggests that ‘jihad’ has been 
divided into four main varieties, each of which has been subdivided into four types and thereby 
resulting into a total of sixteen varieties.211 The following diagram demonstrates the varieties: 
Figure 3: Divisions and Sub-divisions of jihad.   
 
Among the sixteen varieties of ‘jihad’ the only four varieties when ‘use of force’ is permitted 
is consisted of the last type, which is by person. Therefore, jihad against the self, against the 
unbelievers, against the hypocrites and against the agents of corruption permits use of force by 
person. This is known as militant jihad. However, such use of force is allowed only in very 
limited circumstances which have been specifically circumscribed by the Qur’an and the 
Hadith.212 
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The overriding purpose of jihad is the quest for peace and justice.213 The Qur’an has obliged 
the Muslims to make the world aware of the divine path and required the humanity to obey the 
divine will manifested through the prophet of Islam. 214  This obligation establishes a 
relationship between ‘call to the faith’ and jihad. The Qur’an authorises undertaking of jihad 
for the purpose of establishing an ethical order in the world by calling to the divine path.215 But 
can jihad be undertaken to use force in order to create such an order in the world? 
The call for jihad has been more frequently made both by radical Islamist groups and state 
governments. For example, Iran’s call for jihad to its citizen and beyond during the war against 
Iraq in 1980 -1988.216 Similarly, the then President Saddam Hussain called for jihad to Iraqi 
people against the imminent attack of US in 2003.217 However, the call for jihad is more 
frequently used by the leaders of Islamic resistance or insurgent groups than by officials of 
States.218 
3.4.1.1 Is Jihad a ‘Holy War’? 
Most of the Western scholars have described jihad as a ‘holy war’ to convert non-Muslims and 
to expand the territory of Islam.219 This description of jihad has been the subject of huge 
controversy between the scholars from the West and from Muslim majority states. The scholars 
from inside the Muslim communities claim that the wrong description of jihad by the Western 
scholars is due to their lack of understanding of the religion and hostile attitude towards 
Islam.220 An outsider from the West tends to interpret and judge the religion of others through 
the historical, religious, and cultural experience that have formed his/her own intellect.221 
Furthermore, the complexity is doubled in the case of the study of the law of war in the religion 
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of others because outsiders may find themselves to be the enemy according to the law of war 
they are studying.222  
‘Jihad’ is translated in the Western media and scholarly writings as ‘holy war’ would in Arabic 
be equivalent to al-harb al-muqaddasah, which is totally unfamiliar and unknown to Arabic 
speakers.223 The term ‘holy war’ is relatively used lately in the West and it does not directly 
translate any of the regularly used Muslim terms, including central term jihad.224 For example, 
Sir Ian Brownlie has stated that jihad is ‘holy war’ which means ‘a war against the 
unfaithful’.225 
Ruven Firestone claims that jihad in Islam is a ‘holy war’ and he supports his claim by 
proposing that “it was the Prophet but not the Meccan idolaters who initiated aggression against 
the later by berating their God’s and insulting their ancestors who died as unbelievers.226 He 
also claims that the wars fought by the Prophet in his lifetime had developed into the total 
declaration of war against all groups who did not accept the truth of the hegemony of Islam.227 
Jurists attempting to explain and legitimise these expansionist conquests divided the world into 
two parts: the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and the dar al-harb (abode of war). Increasing the 
former and subduing the latter was deemed to be the collective duty of the Muslim State.228 It 
was on this basis that jihad became synonymous with the notion of Holy War – a religious war 
aimed at the subjugation of neighbouring states with the intention of bringing them the true 
faith and if necessary forcing that faith upon them.229 
These claims suggest that Western jurists approached Islam with a tendency to study and 
interpret it through the historical and religious experiences of Judaism and Christianity.230  This 
is not the right approach as it does not take into account the history and Qur’anic texts that 
address the circumstances when armed jihad was permitted. The right approach has been 
adopted by Bruce Lawrence who maintains that “the war Muhammad waged against Mecca 
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was not a struggle for prestige or wealth but for the survival of God’s Word and his own 
person.”231 
The Constitution of Medina, recorded in Ibn Ishaq’s (d. 151 AH/768 CE) Sirat Rasul Allah 
(The Biography of the Messenger of God), the most important historical account of the life of 
the Prophet, indicates that jihad was for any community willing to fight alongside the Muslims 
(with the exception of polytheists). Ibn Ishaq prefaces his account of the Constitution by saying: 
The Prophet Muhammad composed a writing between the Emigrants and the Ansa’r,232 
in which he made a treaty and covenant with the Jews, confirmed their religion and 
possessions, and gave them certain rights and duties. The text of the treaty then follows- 
In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful. 
This is a writing of Muhammad the prophet between the believers and Muslims of 
Quraysh and Yathrib233 and those who follow them and are attached to them and who 
crusade (ja’hada) along with them. They are a single community distinct from other 
people…. Whosoever of the Jews follows us has the (same) help and support…, so long 
as they are not wronged [by him] and he does not help [others] against them.234 
The inclusion of the Jews in this new ummah state and the affirmation that the Jews have the 
right to practice their religion and the Muslims have theirs indicate that the ummah state is no 
longer a religious community.235  
In the very early period of jihad, Christian Arabs from tribes such as the Banu Tayyi’ of Najd, 
the Banu al-Namir ibn Qasiu of the upper Euphrates river valley, and the Banu Lakhm 
participated in the jihad with the Muslim armies.236 In the battle of Badr, Uhud, and Hunayn 
and al-Taif both Jews and idolators fought with the Prophet.237 These examples mitigate against 
the idea that these were wars fought for the spread of a certain religion.238 Historically, jihad 
was directed against those who stood in opposition to the political authority of the Muslim 
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state.239 It was not directed against a people simply because they professed a faith other than 
Islam. 240 Moreover, contemporary Muslim scholars strongly advocated the Islamic 
permissibility of seeking the support of the non-Muslim forces for the liberation of Kuwait 
from the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 to February 1991.241  
In addition to describing jihad as an Islamic legal term mandating forced conversion to Islam, 
the Western scholars have also misinterpreted it by claiming that it denotes territorial expansion 
by use of force.242 David Cook, for example, thinks that the Prophet launched campaigns during 
the last nine years of his life in order to conquer territories. He concludes that the aim in the 
battles of Badr, Uhud, the Ditch, Meccan, and Hunayn was to dominate Medina, Mecca, and 
al-Taif.243  
Firestone has invoked the phrase fi sabil Allah (in the path of God) to qualify jihad as furthering 
or promoting God’s kingdom on earth. 244  However, there is no Qur’anic text which 
corroborates this claim made by Firestone.245 The phrase fi sabil Allah in the Qur’an indicates 
“the way of truth and justice, including all the teachings it gives on the justifications of war.”246 
Most of the Western scholars247 and few Muslim scholars claim that use of force in jihad is 
based on the religious belief of the non-Muslims. That means, any non-Muslims and their 
territories are subject to use of force by Muslims solely on the ground that they are non-
Muslims. This claim is not consistent with the Qur’anic provisions because all the monotheists 
religion except Islam, which are Jews, Christians, Sabaeans, and Zoroastrians are referred in 
the Qur’an as ahl al-kitab (People of the Book) and accordingly are not treated as other 
                                                          
239 David Dakake, ‘The Myth of Militant Islam’ in Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad 
Hashim Kamali (eds), War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (MABDA 2013) 125. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ‘Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The Islamist Perspective’ in Bhyllis Bennis 
and Michel Moushabeck (eds), Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (Oliver Branch Press: New York 1991) 
251. 
242 David Cook, Understanding Jihad (University of California Press: Los Angeles 2005) 6. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ruven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (OUP 1999) 17. 
245 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 57. 
246 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style (London: Tauris 1999) 62.  
247 Richard C. Martin, ‘The Religious Foundations of War, Peace, and Statecraft in Islam’ in John Kelsay and 
James Turner Johnson (eds), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in 
Western and Islamic Traditions (Greenwood Press; New York 1991) 98.  
99 
 
religions but as itself.248 The only requirement that the People of the Book is bound to follow 
in an abode of Islam is to pay poll tax (Jizyah).249  
There is not a single verse in the Qur’an that justifies war to bring about conversion to Islam, 
otherwise jizyah would not have been accepted from non-Muslims.250 Moreover, jizyah was 
accepted from non-Arab idolators but not from Arab idolators and this distinction proves that 
the justification of use of force in jihad is aggression, not the religious belief per se.251 
It is not the unbelievers, as such, who are the object of force but unbelievers who demonstrate 
their hostility and persecution to Islam.252 There is no provision in the Shari‘a for using force 
against unbelievers and this is because the Muslims were not allowed to do the same thing, 
such as persecution, to other religion and their followers which they were subjected to. 
Moreover, war and coercion are not means by which religion may be propagated because belief 
in a religion is only a matter of the conviction of the heart.253 Even the classical scholar Ibn 
Taymiyya had confirmed that difference in religion is not itself a justification for fighting.254 
The study of jihad in most of the Western literature has been limited to distorted reading of the 
Qur’anic texts and the sayings of the Prophet, which creates a totally different impression 
according to which Muslims are transformed from fighters in just and defensive war into 
initiators of offensive holy war.255 
The closing of Ijtihad was also amounting to closing of expansion of Islam. Had the Islamic 
international law meant jihad as ‘holy war’ in the sense of expansion of the religion by 
extraterritorial use of force then they would not have closed the gate of Ijtihad. This is because 
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the influx of foreign systems and methods of interpretation of the Shari‘a by leaving the gate 
of Ijtihad open could have stimulated the propagation of Islam to non-Muslims.  
3.4.2 Transformation of the meaning of Jihad 
The meaning of ‘Jihad’ has been evolving since the time of the Prophet often reflecting 
changing political realities. In the Qur’an the term ‘jihad’ has been used to denote both spiritual 
and forceful dimensions. Whereas the spiritual dimension of jihad was predominant during 
Islam’s first twelve years, later it came to mean the Muslims had an obligation to bear arms in 
self-defence of the ummah.256 This military aspect of jihad was subsequently redefined by state 
doctrine to legitimise preemptive self-defence and justify conquest.257 In time, the political 
legitimisation of force evolved into a doctrine supporting the use of force in the attainment of 
political goals.258 
In the formative period, ‘jihad’ meant defensive use of force against religious persecution 
(fitnah) and aggression against Muslims. In Classical Period the scholarships had been divided 
between aggressive and defensive use of force in jihad. However, in the Modern period jihad 
had been used for justifying use of force for multiple reasons, namely liberation of Muslim 
world from European Imperialism and unlawful foreign occupation. This is because, the one 
state Caliphate abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) had been abolished on March 3, 1924 with the 
extinction of the Ottoman Empire.259  
Unlike the classical jurists, who formulated their theory in a time when a state of war already 
existed in the absence of a specific peace treaty, modern scholars advocate their position in a 
post-United Nations world.260 Modern Muslim scholars of Islamic international law have to 
deal with new circumstances, which have rendered the classical theory “inoperative or even 
irrelevant.”261  
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However, despite the transformation of the nature and extent of use of force to ‘defensive only’ 
purposes, there has been revivals of the classical concept of use of force by the revivalists by 
calling Muslims to engage in individual as well as collective jihad. As a result, state as well as 
non-state actors emerged which propagated jihad as a call for every Muslim to fight Muslims 
in another state or foreign powers or an apostate leader in order to stimulate their political goal. 
For example, Iraq and Kuwait war and Iraq and Iran War, jihad against the Western power and 
the rulers or leaders who supported such Western domination in Muslim majority states.  
3.4.2.1 Invocation of Jihad by State actors 
Use of offensive force in the banner of defensive jihad is not relatively new in the practice of 
Muslim states. Such practice can be traced back to the 13th Century CE when Ibn Taymiyya 
had declared offensive jihad against the Crusaders and Mongols who threatened Islam.262 
Similarly, Muslim religious scholars declared jihad against the British during the Indian Sepoy 
Mutiny in 1857-8.263 In addition, when Sultan Abd al-Hamid (1878 – 1909), the Head of the 
Ottoman Empire, was declared Caliph of Islam, which entitled him to invoke jihad against 
European intervention or pressure, both the Sultan and rulers of the countries that were 
separated from the Empire after World War I, often sought to use jihad as a weapon against 
British and French domination in the Middle East and other Asiatic and African countries.264 
Since then jihad had been invoked to support political goals, such as when the Ottoman Empire 
went to war against Britain and France in 1914, the Caliph declared jihad and called upon 
Muslims in the Middle East and India to rise up against the British and their allies.265 Sharif 
Husayn of the Hijaz (an ally of the British) counteracting the Caliph’s declaration, invoked 
jihad as an Arab ruler.266 Similarly, jihad had been used as a weapon to propagate use of force 
by state authorities on regular basis when they needed extraterritorial use of force. Majid 
Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb have aptly noted the following occurrence of events when 
jihad had been invoked by states: 
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During the inter-war years, the Syrian leaders invoked jihad in their struggle against 
the French in 1920 and 1928. In 1936, the Mufti of Jerusalem invoked jihad against the 
British. In Iraq, nationalist opposition to the British in the revolt of 1920 and the military 
uprising in 1941 were legitimised by invocation of jihad in order to provide public 
support against foreign intervention.267 
In 1980s Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary call for jihad shaped the attitude of Iranian 
people and their view of Iraq.268 His radical revolutionary style government in Iran had been 
felt as a threat by Saddam Hussain in Iraq and his Western allies. 269  Conversely, Iraq’s 
occupation of few territories of Iran had been the focal point for propagating jihad against Iraq 
and its supporters.270 This call for jihad also became popular among the Shi‘a population, the 
Kurdish population and other secular opposition groups residing in Iraq. In addition, an Iranian-
backed organisation committed to the imposition of strict Islamic rule throughout Iraq, the 
Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was active from 1986 in aiming for regime 
change in Baghdad.271 
Iran had also facilitated extraterritorial use of force through jihadist group in Beirut, Lebanon 
against the American and French Military Personnel in October 1983 and in France in 
December of the same year.272 All these attacks were carried out on the basis of liberation jihad 
against foreign interference. This had possibly given Osama bin Laden and his followers a 
Platform to propagate defensive jihad in an offensive nature but from the viewpoint of a non-
state actor.  
In the Iraq-Kuwait war, Iraq’s invocation of jihad against foreign power (in this case the 
Security Council and the Western states and their allies) which intervened in the dispute 
between Iraq and Kuwait had resulted into division among the Muslim scholars. Saddam 
Hussein certainly sought to mobilize Islamic sentiment behind him, calling for jihad and 
placing the Islamic credo la Allah ila Allah ('there is no God but God') on the Iraqi flag.273 
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Some supported Iraq’s call of jihad on the ground that the foreign powers are unbelievers and 
their interference would deprive the Muslims of the opportunity to resolve their disputes by 
peaceful means in accordance with Islamic standards.274 On the other hand, others backed 
Kuwait’s argument that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was the reason for foreign intervention and 
Iraq was solely responsible for this.275  
Although Iraq’s call for jihad has been supported by few Muslim states like Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Sudan and Yemen, Saddam Hussain’s appeal to Muslims and the declaration of jihad 
was considered hypocritical, intended to create dissention among the coalition powers and to 
extract concessions before withdrawal from Kuwait.276 This situation resembles that of World 
War I (stated above) when the Ottoman Sultan (ally of Germany) and the ruler of Saudi Arabia 
(ally of Britain) declared jihad against each other. As a result, use of force in jihad has become 
the subject of a popular political agenda rather than purely Islamic.  
3.4.2.2. Invocation of Jihad by Non-state actors 
Sometimes individual responsibility for armed jihad has been claimed by most radical Muslim 
scholars and authorities even in modern period. They are known as the ‘revivalists’ who lean 
more strongly towards the expansionist doctrines stressing that the clear message of later 
revelations was to spread the word of God by use of force.277 According to them the nature of 
fighting is such that one might consider it analogous to the historical notion of imposed war, 
so that the duty to fight is in some way an individual duty.278 The most pressing task for 
revivalists is the replacement of un-Islamic regimes within Muslim countries, whose hypocrisy 
must be overcome before the external jihad can be resumed.279 In this respect, three examples 
of militant argument are instructive, namely The Neglected Duty (1981), the Charter of Hamas 
(1988), and the Declaration on Armed Struggle against Jews and Crusaders (1998). 
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‘The Neglected duty’ is a testament of the assassination of the then President of Egypt Anwar 
Sadat. The writer of the testament was Muhammad abd el Salam Faraj who was himself 
accused of this assassination. This testament appealed for a rise of militant Islam. According 
to al-Faraj “a well-established rule of Islamic law that the punishment of an apostate will be 
heavier than the punishment of someone who is by origin an unbeliever.”280 The background 
of the text is set upon the precedent set by classical ulama and the political situation posed by 
Sadat’s policies. Of the latter, the most important concerns were with the recognition and 
establishment of formal relations between Egypt and the state of Israel.281 In addition, Sadat’s 
policies towards Egyptian Christians and his readiness to open Egypt to foreign investments 
also suggested a willingness to compromise the Islamic character of Egyptian society.282  
Muhammad abd el Salam Faraj and his followers judged President Anwar Sadat an apostate 
who must repent or be killed. The testament promulgated that “the Rulers of this age are in 
apostasy from Islam … They carry nothing from Islam but their names.”283 It also promulgated 
that “an apostate leader no longer has the qualification in a leader; to obey such a person is no 
longer obligatory, and the Muslims have the duty to revolt against him and depose him, to put 
a just leader in his place when they are able to do so.”284 As the title of the testament hints, the 
“neglect” of the duty to fight is itself a sin, at least of omission.285 This testament, therefore, 
focuses on the near enemy, which is the leader or ruler.  
The Charter of Hamas (1988) reflects the struggles between Israelis and Palestinians where the 
movement established by Hamas believed that Islam is the solution of political ills. The Charter 
conceives armed struggle as resistance to the taking of land entrusted to the Muslim 
community. 286  “The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is 
entrusted to the Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. It is not right to give it up in whole or 
in part. No Arab state … no King or Leader … no organisation, Palestinian or Arab, has such 
authority.”287  The Charter also stresses heavily on the responsibility of fighting by every 
individual in circumstances where Muslims lands have been usurped by foreign power. 
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According to the Charter “there is no higher peak in nationalism, no greater depth of devotion 
than this: When an enemy makes incursions into Muslim territory then struggle and fighting 
the enemy becomes an obligation incumbent upon every individual Muslim (male) and 
Muslimah (female).”288 
The World Islamic Front Declaration on Armed Struggle against Jews and Crusaders (1998) 
was signed by 5 different militant groups from Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh.289 The message sent by this declaration was that US military presence in Arabian 
Peninsula following the Gulf war in 1991 is an imposed war on Muslims and it is an individual 
duty of every Muslim to fight this war. The declaration provides that: 
Ulama throughout Islamic history have unanimously agreed that armed struggle is an 
individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries … The ruling to fight the 
Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is an individual obligation for every 
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it … We call on every 
Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to 
fight the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We 
also call on Muslim ‘ulama’, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on the 
adversary’s U.S. troops and the satanically inspired supporters allying with them, and 
to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.290  
This declaration focuses on the far enemy, such as the U.S. and its allies, and accordingly 
claims justification for both internal and extraterritorial use of force irrespective of the enemy’s 
presence. However, this analogy did not gain much popularity but it gained enough support to 
cause violence all over the world. Shari‘a precedents cast the duty to fight in an imposed war 
as an individual duty but that terminology does not appear to suggest a popular uprising.291 The 
arguments advanced and actions claimed to be justified by such scholars and authorities are 
susceptible for criticism on Shari‘a grounds.292  The authors of the testament, charter and 
declaration do not have the right authority to declare use of force. The cause may be just, which 
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is defensive use of force against foreign usurpation, but the Shari‘a requirement of ‘just and 
legitimate authority’ is lacking here.  
As a result, the Shaykh al-Azhar has criticised ‘the Neglected Duty’ for causing widespread 
harm than good,293 Saudi scholars suggested the operations carried out in accordance with the 
declaration as without precedent in the history of Islam and the participants might best be 
judged as ‘mere’ suicide,294 and both Muslim scholars and Shaykh al-Azhar issued opinions 
against al-Qaeda-sponsored bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.295 
Their action is opposed to Shari‘a notion of honourable combat. According to Shari‘a 
precedents fighting should be the last resort even in self-defence and any claim of imposed war 
must be responded by preaching and then diplomacy before using force.296 The fundamental 
problem with the militant versions of Shari‘a reasoning is that they confuse their own views 
with those of the Qur’an and sunna.297 
Following the presentation of “The Clash of Civilisation” theory by Samuel Huntington in 
1993, the West has related the cause of terrorist attacks including the 9/11 to Islamic religious 
extremism and particularly to jihad.298 This claim of the West is very serious and therefore 
requires scholarly investigation. There have been trends among few modern exegetes who hold 
the classical view of jihad. Among these exegetes Sayyid Qutb and Abu’l A’la Mawdudi had 
been very influential followed by the fatwa given by Bin Laden in 1998. According to 
Mawdudi, military jihad as a ‘perpetual revolutionary struggle’ whose aim is to bring the whole 
world into conformity with the ideals of Islam.299  
Sayyid Qutb rejects abrogation of non-violent verses of the Qur’an, which is a common 
denominator in the classical theory, and comes up with a distinctive and revolutionary vision 
of jihad as a permanent struggle.300 This view of Qutb is not radically different from classical 
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theory. He inclined to support offensive jihad and rejected defensive jihad and named the 
proponents of the latter as ‘defeatists’ and ‘apologists’.301  
On the other hand, leaders of al-Qaeda consider their jihad as purely defensive.302 Those 
scholars attempting to disassociate Islam from the policies of al-Qaeda were said to be 
“ostensible” Muslims, lacking in conviction, untrustworthy, or unrepresentative of the faith.303 
However, this claim of defensive jihad cannot be declared by al-Qaeda legitimately under 
Islamic international law because such claim is opposed to Shari‘a. They lack not only 
‘legitimate authority’ to declare use of force but also ‘just cause’ to use such force. The Western 
powers did not invade any Muslim country at the time of the declaration made by al-Qaeda. 
The term ‘jihad’ is powerful in the Muslim psyche.304 The classical jihad is still invoked by 
today’s extremists, such as Sayyid Qutb, Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, and Bin Laden, who insist on 
practising terrorism in the name of Islamic jihad.305 This interpretation of the Qur’an applied 
by some of the classical exegetes and their modern extremist followers has had its impact on 
the formulation of the modern Western understanding of jihad in Islam.306 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the nature and extent of use of force permitted in Islamic 
international law. The permission to use force for defensive purposes only and as a last resort 
are the core provisions of Islamic international law as validated by the Shari‘a. However, due 
to the influence of politics on the ideology of Islam, the Shari‘a has been subject to elaboration 
beyond the necessity of common good. Self-interest gratification and political agenda have 
been the underlying motivation for abusing the ‘Fiqh’ which resulted into the invocation of 
ideologies, like jihad, to represent religious duty to use force against Muslims, non-Muslims 
and for expansion of territory. Jihad has also been the subject of misuse by few Muslim and 
most non-Muslim scholars who denote this term as synonymous to ‘holy war’. Eventually, 
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jihad has been misleadingly promoted by both state and non-state terrorist groups to facilitate 
international terrorism.  
The consequence of these abuse and misuse of the Islamic international law principles have 
resulted in severe violence in this world including mass murder by act of terrorism. After 
examining the nature and extent of use of force permissible in Islamic international law this 
chapter concludes that Islamic international law does not permit use of force beyond the 
necessity to defend the religion and people from persecution. In very exceptional circumstances 
it allows pre-emptive use of force but never permits anticipatory use of force in the 
contemporary modern world. However, the use of defensive force in pre-emption requires 
‘right authority’ and ‘just cause’ which are lacking in the status and ideologies of non-state 
actors.  
Islamic international law permits extraterritorial use of force by Muslim states for humanitarian 
purposes or if invited by another state. However, on any occasion of such use of force the treaty 
obligation outweighs a general obligation under Islamic international law. The general 
obligation is for Muslim states to be readily available to provide armed support to other Muslim 
states and in case of non-Muslim states either an invitation or treaty provision is necessary to 
provide armed support for some reasons, namely intervention by invitation or humanitarian 
intervention.  
Although few Muslim scholars and terrorist groups have invoked the ideology of classical 
juristic views of permanent war against non-Muslims, this does not represent contemporary 
Islamic international law as the Shari‘a itself does not represent the dominant classical view in 
the modern world. Shari‘a is a living mechanism which evolves in the course of time but such 
evolution does not include invocation of any legal principle which is inconsistent with the core 
elements of Shari‘a, namely the Qur’an and Sunna.  
No aspect of Islamic religion is in the public eye and all over the media on a daily basis as 
much as the issue of use of force, jihad and terrorism.307 Although most of the modernists have 
portrayed ‘jihad’ as ‘defensive war’ and always strived to keep it distinct from terrorism they 
have not been successful. Moderate views are given less coverage than those of terrorists and 
extremists, which receive disproportionate amount of exposure.308 In these circumstances, the 
                                                          
307 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft (Harper Collins 2007) 220. 
308 Elsayed M.A. Amin, Reclaiming Jihad: A Qur’anic Critique of Terrorism (The Islamic Foundation, UK: 2014) 
103. 
109 
 
circulation of the modernists’ views is necessary by all means in order to counter the misleading 
ideologies of the terrorist groups and to educate the world the true position of Islamic 
international law as far as use of force is concerned.  
This chapter, eventually, shows when use of force and by whom such use of force is legitimate 
in Islamic international law. These findings would set aside the illegitimate use of force from 
any claim of their legitimacy in Islamic international law. In addition, such illegitimate use of 
force can be identified to further advance the research to see if the legitimacy-deficits 
associated with illegitimacy could be overcome. 
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Chapter 4 
The Islamic law of Rebellion and its potential to complement 
Public International Law on the Use of Force 
 
In Chapter 3 it has been concluded that, in Islamic international law only a legitimate ruler has 
the authority to make decision on extraterritorial use of force and as a result non-state actors, 
such as rebels and terrorists, do not have such authority due to not having ‘right authority’ and 
‘just cause’. 1  In other words rebels and terrorists 2  are not authorised, under Islamic 
international law, to declare neither defensive nor offensive military jihad against any external 
authority, which is foreign state.3 However, Islamic international law permits use of force by 
rebels against their rulers subject to fulfilment of certain necessary conditions. Advancing on 
this analysis, this chapter aims to find out the legitimacy of use of force by and against rebels 
in Islamic international law and the extent to which such legitimate use of force can potentially 
complement Public international law on the use of force. This method of analysis would also 
advance the study by identifying the legitimacy-deficits of use of force by and against rebels 
so that the second question of the thesis can be addressed, which is ‘how the legitimacy deficits 
could be overcome?’  
Islamic international law prohibits terrorism4 but permits rebellion against internal authority, 
such as government, in order to ‘enjoin good and forbid evil’.5 There is also a hadith from the 
Prophet Muhammad that “if people see an oppressor and they do not enjoin him then God will 
punish all of them.”6 Whereas some scholars have used these Qur’anic and hadith sources to 
argue the right of the ruler to suppress rebellion,7 some other scholars used the same sources to 
argue rebellion as legitimate against unjust rulers. 8  However, these arguments of Islamic 
scholars do not prohibit rebellion but rather provide a platform for critical analysis of this 
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branch of law. This platform, which has been set up by the classical Muslim jurists, has 
progressed further and developed as a special branch of Islamic law of rebellion.  
Rebellion, in Public international law, is classified exclusively as an internal matter of a state 
as opposed to an external matter.9 This position has hindered the development of an effective 
legal framework in the corpus of Public international law in relation to rebellion. The enormous 
political support for ‘state sovereignty’10 and lack of necessary political will to recognise the 
right of rebellion at international level played a vital role in the hindrance. The attempts to 
overcome the hindrance has never been effectively successful due to the fear of the ruling 
authorities that recognition of the right of rebellion might provide legitimacy to their opponents 
and put their authority at risk.11  
In these circumstances, separate legal principles have developed to deal with rebellion in Public 
international law and Islamic international law. Whereas the former failed to develop a body 
of effective legal principles, the latter failed to continue the enforcement of the legal principles 
that were developed in its early development period. Thus, these two legal systems have created 
a ‘gap’ in terms of the legal principles that apply to rebels. The existence of this ‘gap’ is crucial 
because the subjects of these two legal systems are not regulated by the same legal framework 
and this difference has resulted in legitimacy-deficits of these legal frameworks for not being 
able to operate as a single legal framework by complementing each other. In other words, 
Public international law and Islamic international law do not operate at the international level 
in a plural fashion. Furthermore, this ‘gap’ has also created a way for terrorists to claim 
legitimacy of their violent use of force based on their own-invented ideologies.12 Therefore, it 
is of vital importance to fill in this ‘gap’ so that these two legal frameworks can complement 
each other and operate as a single body of laws.  
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In the task of filling this ‘gap’, Islamic law has a vital role to play and this is because it has 
developed a far-reaching body of laws to regulate rebellion. However, the most important task 
is to examine the nature and extent of this ‘gap’ followed by the identification of any barrier 
that could potentially hinder the complementation of these two systems and finally finding out 
the way to overcome any such potential hindrance.  
In order to examine the nature and extent of this ‘gap’ the first part of this chapter conducts a 
historical examination of Islamic law of rebellion following an overview of the basic laws of 
rebellion in Islam. The second part provides a systemic exposition of the Islamic law of 
rebellion and its relationship with Public international law on the use of force. The second part 
of this chapter also evaluates the potential barrier that is hindering the complementation of 
Islamic international law and Public international law of rebellion, and identifies the process 
of complementation. It will be seen, in the process of executing this task, that rebellion in Islam 
has a vital role to play in the development of Public international law as far as use of force is 
concerned.  
4.1 Islamic law of Rebellion in relation to Use of Force 
Rebellion, in Islamic law, is defined by the noun baghy (pl. bughāh) which literally means 
injustice or transgression.13 However, the word baghy has been used by Muslim jurists to 
describe a person who rebels against a ruler of which he or she is a subject.14 The word comes 
from the root word baghā, which in its various forms could mean: (i) to desire or seek 
something; (ii) to fornicate or cause corruption; or (iii) to envy or commit injustice.15 These 
forms indicate that baghy is a person who recourses to violence with the desire to overthrow 
the ruler, secede from his rule, or refuse to comply with an obligation. 16  A baghy is 
distinguished from a criminal on the basis that he or she has a just cause for resorting to force 
against the ruler even though such cause is believed to be unjust by the ruling authority.17 
Therefore, as long as a baghy believes that the cause for using force is just he or she must not 
be categorised as a criminal. 
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The word bughat is referred to a group of people who commit a khuruj (an act of rebellion) 
with a ta’wil (interpretation or reason).18 There is no agreement on the number of people 
required for the formation of a bughat (a group of rebels). However, the general proposition is 
that use of force by a single person or only very few people is unlikely to be from a bughat and 
thereby illegitimate.19 This is best viewed as a control factor; the ta’wil of a single person or 
very few people against the ruler is unlikely to be just as it is inconsistent with ijma (consensus 
of opinion) which is a source of Islamic law.20 Therefore, in order to qualify for the status of 
bughat there must be a considerable number of bughāh (rebels) who have agreed on a common 
interpretation or reason (taw’il).21 Seen in this way, the practical consideration of the concept 
of baghy and bughat is that the former can be treated as a criminal when his or her ta’wil has 
not gained consensus or support to form a group of rebels and hence illegitimate whereas, the 
latter cannot be treated as criminals because the ta’wil has gained consensus among a group of 
rebels and hence legitimate. Modern scholars have used bughat and bughāh interchangeably to 
describe a group of Muslim rebels. In this thesis, these terms have been used accordingly.  
Unlike the common belief among the vast majority of Muslim scholars at present, surprisingly 
the term bughāh does not carry any derogatory or negative connotations, as maintained by the 
Shaf’i jurists,22 nor does the act of rebellion constitute a sin, as believed by Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 
1328).23 But the jurists used the term bughāh for rebels because it referred to one of the 
conflicting parties in the Qur’anic text addressing the law of rebellion. The jurists of the four 
schools of Islamic law define rebels as: 
A group of Muslims that possesses some power and organisation (shawkah, manʻah, 
fay’ah) and that gathers, under the command of a leader, to fight against a just ruler 
                                                          
18 Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner 
Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western 
and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 155.  
19 Ibn Hazm, al-Muhala, vol 11 (Beirut: Dar al-hadith, n.d.) 98. 
20 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol 8 (Cairo: al-Sa’adah 1324Hijra) 536; see also al-Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubra, 
vol 8 (India: Da’erat al Ma’aref 1304 Hijra) 172.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Muḥammad al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj ilā Ma‛rifah Ma‛ānī Alfāẓ al-Minhāj, vol 4 (Beirut: Dār 
al-Fikr, n.d.) 124; Muḥammad ibn Abī al-‛Abbās Aḥmad ibn Ḥamzah al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muḥtāj ilā Sharḥ al-
Minhāj, vol 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr 1984) 402.  
23 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk, Min Rasā’il Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah in Ḥammād 
Salāmah and Muḥammad ‛Īwīḍah (eds), (2nd edn, Al-Zarqā’, Jordan: Maktabah al-Manār 1994) 89. 
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claiming, whether rightly or wrongly, that they have a ta’wīl (just cause, plausible 
interpretation) for their rebellion, secession or non-compliance with an obligation.24 
Despite the fact that the justification for rebellion is invalid from the perspective of the majority 
of Muslims, classical Muslim jurists explain that the bughāh are excused because, from the 
perspective of the bughāh, they think that their actions are justified.25 Whereas Ibn Taymiyyah 
has claimed that the term bughāh does not mean that rebels have committed a sin but fighting 
against them is permitted in order to prevent their harm to security and stability26, the Hanafi 
position maintained that the rebels are sinners.27 There are also disagreements among Muslim 
jurists about whether anyone would qualify for their status as bughāh for rebellion against a 
just ruler or unjust ruler.28 This uncertainty has also worked well for rulers in refusing to 
recognise the status of rebels in Islamic law.29 However, this uncertainty does not have any 
significant role to play in identifying the rebels because both rebels and rulers are keen to justify 
themselves as just and legitimate in one hand and accuse their opponents as unjustified and 
illegitimate on the other.30 Hence, as long as the rulers and rebels believe that they are just and 
legitimate respectively then they are entitled to use force against each other.31  
The law of rebellion (ahkam al-bughāh) in Islamic law is constructed on the doctrinal and 
historical precedents which must be understood through a historical continuum.32 Therefore, it 
is important to review such precedents in historical context out of which the law has been 
formulated. The historical precedents displayed by Caliph Ali during his time as the 4th Caliph 
                                                          
24 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 150; see also ‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Awdah, 
Criminal Law of Islam, vol I (Zakir Aijaz tr, New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, reprint 2005) 113; F.A. Klein, The Religion 
of Islam (1st paperback edn, London: Curzon Press, 1985) 182. 
25 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011)150; 
see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James 
Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in 
Western and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 158. 
26 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khalifah wa al-Mulk (Jordan: Makhtab al-Manar 1994) 89. This position has also 
been supported by Hanbal’i jurists.  
27 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 238. 
28 Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner 
Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western 
and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 156; Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, al-Hawi al-Kabir Sharh 
Mukhtasar al-Muzani (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya 1994) XIII: 97; see also Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic 
Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 151.  
29 Jeffrey T. Kennedy, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt (OUP 2006) 52. 
30 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 369; see also Orla Marie Bucklay, 
‘Unregulated Armed Conflict: Non-State Armed Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and Violence in 
Western Sahara’ (2012) 37 NCJ Int’l L & Com Reg 793, 804.  
31 Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner 
Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western 
and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 158. 
32 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2006) 33. 
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of Islam have been recognised as the best by numerous sources.33 Conversely, the conducts of 
A’isha bint Abu Bakr (d. 58/678), ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan (d. 35/656), or Muʽawiya b. Abu Sufyan 
(d. 60/680) were mostly excluded or not cited. 34  It has also been reported that Ali was 
purportedly acting in compliance with the divine command.35 These precedents, in the course 
of time, are selected, co-opted and channelled in order to develop a body of laws which regulate 
the right of rebellion and the treatment of rebels in Islam.36  
In addition to these historical precedents, the scriptural basis for the Islamic law of rebellion 
reads: 
And if two parties of the believers fight each other, then bring reconciliation between 
them. And if one of them transgresses against the other, then fight against the one who 
transgresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. But if it returns, then bring 
reconciliation between them according to the dictates of justice and be fair. Indeed 
Allah loves those who are fair.37 
The above discussion suggests that historical precedents and the Qur’anic text together has 
formed the foundation of Islamic law of rebellion. In this foundation, the Qur’anic verse (49:9) 
dictates to adopt peaceful approach in resolving conflicts with rebels and the precedents show 
how the Muslim rulers especially the 4th Caliph Ali approached the rebels in resolving conflicts 
during his reign.38 
                                                          
33 Ahmad al-Rahbi Al-Simnani, Rawdat al-udah wa Tariq al-Najah (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risala 1984) 11:1214; 
see also Al-Muwaffaq al-Makki, Manaqib Abi Hanifa (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-ʻArabi 1981) 345; Abu al-Hasan 
al-Marghinani, al-Hidaya Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi n.d.) 11:171; Abu 
Muhammad Mahmud al-Ayni, al-Binaya fi Sharh al-Hidaya (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1990) VI: 735; Abu Muhammad 
al-Husayn al-Baghawi, Sharh al-Sunna (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1994) VI: 169; Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, al-Hawi 
al-Kabir Sharh Mukhtasar al-Muzani (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya 1994) XIII: 104; see also Muhammad 
Hasan al-Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Shariʽa al-Islam (Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya 1377 AH) XXI: 
335; Muhammad al-Hurr al-ʻAmili, Wasa’il al-Shiʻa ila Tahsil Masaʽil al-Shariʻa (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath 
al-ʻArabi n.d.) XI: 58; Abu Bakr al-Sanʽani, al-Musannaf (Riyadh: al-Majlis al-‘Ilmi n.d.) X:124.  
34 Abu ‘Umar Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Ta’rikh Ibn Khayyat (Najaf: Matbaʽat al_Adab 1967) I:146; Abu Jaʽfar 
Muhammad Al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Umam wa al-Muluk (Beirut: Mu’assasat ʽIzz al-Din 1987) IV: 547; Abu Bakr 
al-Sanʽani, al-Musannaf (Riyadh: al-Majlis al-‘Ilmi n.d.) V:462; Abu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd I, al-Bayan 
wa al-Sharh wa al-Tahsil wa al-Sharh wa al-Tawjih wa al-Taʻlil fi al-Masa’il al-Mustakhraja (Beirut: Dar al-
Gharb al-Islami 1988) XVII: 559.  
35 Abu al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzi, Sirat wa Manaqib ‘Umar b. Abd al-‘Aziz al-Khalifa al-Zahid (BeirutDar al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyya 1984) 95.  
36 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 78. 
37 Al-Qur’an 49:9, Abu Yusuf tr.  
38 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 163; 
see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James 
Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in 
Western and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 151. 
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4.2 Historical overview of rebellion in Islam 
Rebellion in Islamic law has been dealt with in different ways by different classical jurists. For 
example, whereas the Mālikī and Hanbalī schools of thought treated rebellion under the chapter 
of Hudūd (prescribed punishments)39 the Hanafī school of thought dealt with the subject under 
the chapter of Siyar40 (or jihad). The position adopted by Shaf’i school is that, the baghi is the 
one who refuses to obey al-Imam al-‘adel (the just ruler).41  However, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 
728/1327-28) has accused Shaf’i and the jurists of Kufa (the jurists of Kufa eventually 
developed into Hanafi school of law) of inventing the law of rebellion as he insisted that neither 
the Qur’an nor any Sunna of the Prophet has expressly authorised use of force against rebels.42 
Equally, he claims that the Hanafi jurists have confused fighting Muharibun43, apostates and 
hypocrites with fighting the rebels.44 He also argued that, law of rebellion (ahkam al-Bughāh) 
was invented when, among other things, the Hanbali jurist al-Khiraqi (d. 334/945-46) relied on 
or borrowed from the Shaf’i jurist al-Muzani (d. 263/877-78), and al Muzani relied on the 
Hanafi jurist Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 189/804).45 It was entirely reasonable for 
Ibn Taymiyya to suspect that the discourse developed through a process of juristic borrowing.46 
However, law often develops through a process of borrowing or transplanting but this does not 
make the legal discourse artificial or any less authentic.47 
On the contrary, Shiʽa School focused on the legitimacy or justness of the ruler in contrast to 
or in relation to the legitimacy or justness of the cause espoused by the rebels: therefore, much 
                                                          
39 Ahmad al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12 (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1994) 206; see also Muhammad Ibn 
Yusuf, al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl: Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, Vol. 6 (2nd end, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1977) 229; 
Muhammad Ibn al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl li-Sharh Mukhtsar Khalil, Vol. 6 (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1977) 323; 
Ahmad al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabir, vol 4  Beirut: Dar al-Fikr n.d.) 237; see also Ali Ibn Sulayman al-Mirdāwī, 
Al-Insāf fi Maʽrifah al-Rjih min al-Khilaf ‘ala Madhhab al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Vol. 10 (Beirut: Dar Ihya 
al-Turath al-Arabi n.d.) 150; Mansur Ibn al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛ ‘an Matn al-Iqna‛, Vol. 6 (Beirut: Dar al-
Fikr 1981) 66; Mustafa al-Rahaybānī, Matālib Uli al-Nuha fi Sharh Ghayah al-Muntaha, Vol. 6 (Damascus: Al-
Maktab al-Islami 1961) 158. 
40 The meaning of Siyar as Islamic International law has been discussed in Chapter 3; see also Khaled Abou El 
Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner Johnson and John 
Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic 
Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 155. 
41 Muhammad Bin Edress al-Shafʻi, Kitab al-Umm, vol 4 (Beirut: Dar al-M’rifa 1973) 81.  
42 Abu al-‘Abbas Ibn Taymiyya, Majmuʻ al-Fatawa (Riyadh: n.p. n.d.) IV: 450. 
43 There are disagreements between scholars in regards to the accurate meaning of ‘Muharibun’. Some scholars 
prefer ‘terrorists’ over ‘bandits and brigands’ and vice versa. However, this thesis adopted ‘terrorists’ due to the 
similarities between ‘hirāba’ and modern day terrorism.  
44 Abu al-‘Abbas Ibn Taymiyya, Majmuʻ al-Fatawa (Riyadh: n.p. n.d.) IV: 451. 
45 Ibid, IV: 452. 
46 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (2nd edn, Edinburgh 
University Press 2011) 161; see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2001) 63.  
47 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press 1974) 21.  
117 
 
of their discourse focused on a qualitative assessment of the substantive base of the rebels’ 
claims.48 Abu Jaʽfar al-Tusi (d. 460/1067), one of the most important Shiʽa jurists of the 
fifth/eleventh century, emphasised the imperative of obeying the ruler and the prohibition 
against dissenting from the Jamaʽa (community).49 In addition he also supported the view that 
who rebels against a just ruler is an unbeliever.50 In this way the Shiʽa School has divided the 
legitimacy of rebellion on the basis of justness of the ruler. However, the Shiʽa discourses on 
the treatment of rebels are substantially similar to Sunni doctrines.51 The Shiʽa position has 
eventually become practically indistinguishable from Sunni discourses on the subject.52 
The above juristic positions suggest that, despite the accusation of invention by Ibn Taymiyya 
of the law of rebellion, among the positions of the schools of thought the best position has been 
developed by Sunni school. This is because the position is consistent with the divine guidance 
provided in the Qur’an and Sunna and thus ensures higher degree of source legitimacy. 
Whereas the Kharijites53 preferred to cut off the head of the Islamic body politic rather than 
tolerate a deviant leader, the Sunni orthodox settled for a religiously sanctioned realpolitik.54 
In other words, although the Kharijites chose to lead the Muslim community into social unrest 
and possible anarchy rather than compromise their pursing ideology, the Sunni orthodox opted 
for accommodation and social stability.55 The social image of the Kharijites was that they were 
incapable of living alongside anyone whose beliefs differed from their own.56  Sunnis, by 
contrast, made diversity of views a doctrine of faith: “Difference of opinion in the community 
is a token of divine mercy.”57 This view has also been recognised by the Qur’an itself in the 
following verse: 
O Mankind, we have created you male and female, and have made you nations and 
tribes that you may know one another.58  
                                                          
48 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 210. 
49 Abu Jaʽfar al-Tusi, Al-Mabsut fi FIqh al-Imamiyya (Tehran: al-Maktabah al-Murtadawiyya 1387 AH) VII:263. 
50 Ibid, VII:264; see also Abu al-Qasim ‘Ali Al-Murtada, Al-Intisar (Beirut: Dar-al-Adwa 1985) 233. 
51 Abu al-Qasim ‘Ali Al-Murtada, Al-Intisar (Beirut: Dar-al-Adwa 1985) 232. 
52 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 229. 
53 ‘Kharjiites’ is discussed in section 4.2.1 (below). 
54 Hamid Dabashi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise of the Muhammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads 
(New Bruswick, N.J. 1989) 32. 
55 Ibid, 125.   
56 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 171.                                                                                                        
57 A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (London: Frank Cass 1965) 104; see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-
Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), 
Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition 
(Greenwood Press 1990) 163.  
58 Al-Qur’an 49:13, Abu Yusuf tr.  
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In this way, the Sunni sect has been successful in distinguishing between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy and in dissuading the public from associating and sympathising Kharijite 
rebellion.59 As suggested above, other schools of thought have mostly agreed to the law of 
rebellion developed by Sunnis and eminent jurists like Shaf’i had borrowed Sunni principles 
of dealing with rebels. Eventually, Islamic law has developed the law of rebellion based on the 
process of ijtihad (exertion of intellectual efforts) 60  in the classical fiqh (Islamic 
Jurisprudence)61 thought.62  
4.2.1 Development of the Islamic law of Rebellion 
Rebellion (bughāh) in Islamic law regulates the circumstances in which use of force is allowed 
against the rulers of a Muslim state and the treatment of rebels by the rulers in such 
circumstances. In addition to the Qur’anic and Sunna resources referred above, Islamic scholars 
have argued legitimacy of rebellion against unjust rulers on the basis of their own exegesis.63 
They have come to this conclusion on the basis that ‘whereas it is obligatory for every Muslim 
to obey their rulers64 as they have the duty to maintain stability65 and order in the state, such 
obligation ceases and the Muslims have the right to disregard the rulers and fight them who 
give sinful commands to its people.66 These scholars also emphasise that the right to rebel 
                                                          
59 Jeffrey T. Kennedy, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt (OUP 2006) 37. 
60 Ijtihad has been discussed in Chapter 3, see section 3.1.1.  
61 Fiqh has been discussed in Chapter 3, see section 3.1.1. 
62 Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner 
Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western 
and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press 1990) 153; Sherman A. Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the 
Islamic Legal Tradition” (2001) 91 The Muslim World 295.  
63 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khalifah wa al-Mulk (Jordan: Makhtab al-Manar 1994) 12; Mohammad Rashid 
Rida, Tafsir al-Manar, vol 6 (Cairo: Matbaʽah al-Manar 1923) 367; Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Al-Jarimah wa al-
Qqubah fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi 1998) 130; Zahiri Ibn Hazm, al-Muhala, vol 11 (Beirut: 
al-Maktab al-Tujari n.d.) 98; see also James Turner Johnson and John Kelsey (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: 
The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press 1990) 
151.  
64 Al-Qur’an 4:59, Abu Yusuf translation; See also Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications 
and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 148; Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (5th edn, 
Lahore: Ashraf Press 1968) 184; Majid Khadduri, War and Pace in Islam (John Hopkins Press: Baltimore 1990) 
78; Abdulrahman Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad in Classical Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought”, PhD 
thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne (1998) 91. 
65 Al-Qur’an 49:9-10. Abu Yusuf translation; see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare 
and the Law of Rebellion in Islam’ in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: 
The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 152. 
66 Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khalifah wa al-Mulk (Jordan: Makhtab al-Manar 1994) 12; Mohammad Rashid 
Rida, Tafsir al-Manar, vol 6 (Cairo: Matbaʽah al-Manar 1923) 367; Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Al-Jarimah wa al-
Qqubah fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi 1998) 130; Zahiri Ibn Hazm, al-Muhala, vol 11 (Beirut: 
al-Maktab al-Tujari n.d.) 98; See also Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (5th edn, Lahore: Ashraf 
Press 1968) 184; Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East (London: Alcov 
Press 1973) 256; Ann Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic 
Political Theory: The Jurists, vol 36 (OUP 1981) 313; Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘Political Crime in Islamic 
Jurisprudence and Western Legal History’ (1998) 4 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 11, 14.  
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emanates from the Qur’anic command to ‘enjoin good and forbid evil’67 and this right has also 
been established in a Prophet’s sunna where he is reported to have said that: 
To hear and obey the ruler is obligatory, so long as one is not commanded to disobey 
Allah for if one is commanded to disobey Allah, he shall not hear or obey.68 
From the exegetical point of view, Islamic law of rebellion is founded and developed on the 
Qur’anic text as well as the Sunna of the Prophet. However, history of rebellion in Islam 
suggests that it began following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632CE.69 Therefore, 
the law of rebellion in Islam has been developed in precedents of the Caliphs, rulers and 
rebellions that took place during the early Islamic history.70 
The significance of historical events on the development of the law of rebellion is that these 
historical events have been constructed by Muslim jurists as precedents for their discourse on 
rebellion.71 The actions of the Kharijites against the Caliphs of Islam and vice versa are the 
most important source of historical events in matters of rebellion. The Kharijites emerged out 
of the period of Islamic history known as the first civil war or fitna (656 – 661 CE), a time 
marked by the murders of the third and fourth Caliphs, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali, the first killed by 
(Egyptian) Muslims disaffected with his socio-economic reforms and the second by a Kharijite 
seeking revenge.72 Historically, the importance of the Kharijites lies in the challenge they posed 
to Muslim ruling authorities throughout the Umayyad period and into the ‘Abbasid and in the 
political and theological debates to which the movement gave rise.73  
                                                          
67 Al-Qur’an 3:104, 9:71, 9:112, 22:41, 3:114, 7:157, 9:67, 31:17, Abu Yusuf tr; see also Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, 
Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil (Salim Abdullah Ibn Morgan tr, Al-Furqan: Fortress Publications Series 
2000) 11; Roel Meijer, ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The case of 
the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya’ in Roel Meijer (ed), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement 
(London and New York: Columbia University Press 2005) 196; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of 
Expression in Islam (Islamic Texts Society: Cambridge 2010) 28 for the concept of Hisbah see Mohamed Badar 
and Noelle Higgins, ‘Discussion Interrupted: The Discussion and Protection of Cultural Property Under 
International Law and Islamic Law the case of Prosecutor v Al-Mahdi’  (2017) 17 ICLR 11. 
68 Ibn Hajar al-Asqallani, Fath al-Bari, vol 13 (Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘aref, n.d.) 121. 
69 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 147. 
70 Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛: Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab in Maḥmūd Maṭrajī (ed), vol 20 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000) 337; ‛Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Māwardī, Al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr: Fī Fiqh Madhhab 
al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī Raḍī Allah ‛anh wa huwa Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Muznī in ‛Alī Muḥammad Mu‛awwaḍ and ‛Ādil 
Aḥmad ‛Abd al-Mawjūd (eds), vol 13 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah 1999) 104; see also Ahmed Al-
Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 149. 
71 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 35.  
72 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (2nd edn, Edinburgh 
University Press 2011) 16; see also Jeffrey T. Kennedy, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism 
in Egypt (OUP 2006) 4; Nelly Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries (Routledge 
2005) 58; Montegomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oneworld Publications 1998) 13.  
73 Gerhard Bowering (ed), The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought (Princeton University Press 
2013) 294; Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (2nd edn, 
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In the medieval period the label Kharijite could be applied to anyone who rebelled against the 
legitimate leader whether or not an Islamist.74 This is because the symbol of Kharijites is firmly 
rooted in the Islamic past where both Muslims and non-Muslims resided and Kharijites were 
the only known rebels who took arms and killed the fourth Caliph of Islam for political 
reasons.75 They also began to commit a series of bloody attacks against fellow Muslims who 
refused to demonstrate agreement with their views.76 They, hold, too, that those who commit 
grave sins are unbelievers (Kufr), and that rebellion against an imam who opposes Sunna is a 
duty and an obligation.77 This position was based in part on a loose reading of a number of 
verses in the Qur’an, such as 5:48, which reads: 
Whosoever judges not according to what Allah has sent down, they are the 
unbelievers.78  
Until the mid-second/eighth century there was no jurisprudence on rebellion, but only reports 
which constitute primitive, undeveloped attempts at jurisprudence; however, they lack the 
systematic argumentation of jurisprudence. 79  They make a point but do not explore the 
implications of the point, and they do not categorise or classify acts according to a consistent 
or coherent scheme.80 In many ways, reports are raw materials that is co-opted and constructed 
in the service of jurisprudence. 81  Abu Bakr al-Shaybani has quoted an array of reports 
attributed to the Prophet on the necessity of obeying those in power and a genre of these reports 
counsels that a Muslim should obey whosoever in power, even if the one in power is a 
“mutilated Abyssinian or Ethiopian slave.”82 A typical form for this genre is the following: 
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It is reported that the Prophet said, ‘listen and obey, in hardship and in good, in what is 
pleasant or unpleasant, and prefer them [the rulers] over yourself even if they usurp 
your wealth, or strike your backs’.83 
On the contrary, regarding the right of rebellion against rulers, while the Qur’an does not 
explicitly command rebellion against unjust rulers, the following Qur’anic verse creates a 
powerful symbolic construct to justify rebellion: 
Would not you fight in the way of Allah for al-mustadafin (the oppressed socially weak 
Muslims) from men, women and children who pray: Our Lord! Take us from this city 
of the oppressive people and appoint for us from Your side a guardian and appoint us 
from Your side a protector.84 
In addition to the Qur’anic support for rebellion stated above, there are practice and conduct of 
many of the Prophet’s companions and several of the early jurists who took part, supported or 
sympathised with a variety of rebellions. These counter-traditions represent tendencies or 
trends in early legal opinions but are not developed systematic positions.85 For example, some 
versions of these traditions stated that a ruler should be obeyed as long as he implements the 
book of God, in some versions, as long as he leads Muslims in accordance with the book of 
God.86 Other reports make the duty of blind obedience applicable only in the time of the 
Prophet.87 A set of widely cited traditions explicitly states that a ruler should not be obeyed if 
he commands a sin, or that he should be obeyed only to the extent that he commands what is 
good and just.88 These traditions promote or encourage resistance to rulers in one form or 
another. A common form of this genre states that the best form of jihad is a word of truth 
spoken before an unjust ruler.89  Moreover, Caliph Ali reportedly to have said that if the 
                                                          
83 Ibid, 478; see also Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Musnad (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami 1993) II:501; Muhyi al-Din al-
Nawawi, Al-Majmuʻ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr n.d.) XII: 480.  
84 Al-Qur’an 4:75, Abu Yusuf tr.  
85 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 120. 
86 Abu Bakr al Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami 1993) 492; Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Musnad 
(Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami 1993) VI:451; Abu al-Husayn Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, Al-Famiʻ al-Sahih (Beirut: Dar 
al-Maʽrifa, n.d.) VI: 15; ‘Abu Abd Muhammad Ibn Maja, Sunan (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyya, n.d.) 
II:955; Abu al-‘Abbas al-Qastalani, Irshad al-Sari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr 1304 AH) X:170; 
see also Aksi Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi, Al-Majmuʻ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr n.d.) XII: 468.  
87 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Musnad (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami 1993) II:279.  
88 Sulayman Abu Dawud, Sunan (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith 1988) IV: 94; Abu Bakr Ahmad al-Bazzar, Al-Bahr al-
Zakhkhar (Medina: Maktabat al-‘Ulum wa al-Hikam 1988) II:204; Abu al-Husayn Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, Al-Famiʻ 
al-Sahih (Beirut: Dar al-Maʽrifa, n.d.) VI:15; ‘Abu Abd Muhammad Ibn Maja, Sunan (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Kutub 
al-‘Arabiyya, n.d.) II:956.  
89 Abu Isa Muhammad al-Tirmidhi, al-Famiʽ al-Sahih (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith 1987) IV: 409.  
122 
 
Kharijites rebel against an unjust ruler then Muslims should not fight them because in this 
situation they may have a legitimate cause of action.90  
In contrast to the reports emphasising on obeying the rulers, oppression or persecution (fitna) 
has been one of the fundamental principles of use of force in Islamic law.91 In chapter 3 it has 
been concluded that fitna means ‘oppression or persecution’ rather than ‘unbelief’. Thus, it is 
incumbent on Muslims to fight any oppression or persecution. As spreading fitna is prohibited 
in Islam,92 any rebellion which has the potential of causing fitna within the community is 
prohibited and this is consistent with the prohibition of rebellion against the rulers.  
The prohibition against fitna suggests that, it is not limited to particular conflicts that took place 
in Islamic history, but extends to prohibit any situation that might result in a fitna.93 Likewise, 
it is not the Kharijites, as a specific historical entity, that is reprehensible, but any other group 
that follows in its footsteps. 94  This principle justifies use of force to end oppression or 
persecution caused by rebellion.95 However, if the ruler spreads fitna then it is incumbent on 
Muslims to end that fitna, if necessary, by rebellion. Furthermore, from the Qur’anic exegetical 
viewpoint ‘use of force’ is allowed to end persecution96 and such persecution can come from 
the ruler as well as the rebels. Therefore, in Islam both the rebels and rulers have reciprocal 
right to use force to end oppression or persecution.  
The above findings suggest that Islamic law of rebellion is structured in accordance with the 
juristic discourses based on the Qur’anic text and the precedents that took place during the 
reign of the fourth Caliph. As stated above, as there was no rebellion in the lifetime of the 
Prophet, the Sunna referred above by the scholars, rulers and Kharijites are not directly related 
to any incidence of rebellion. Moreover, there are controversies among the scholars about the 
authenticity and relevance of the Sunna to be a part of the juridical discourse of Islamic law of 
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rebellion. Therefore, it is the Qur’anic textual guidance and the precedents are the key sources 
of the Islamic law of rebellion.  
4.2.2 Expansion of use of force by rebels 
Prior to its usage by the Kharijites, the term “unbelief” (Kufr) was reserved for non-Muslims 
who lay outside the boundaries of the Muslim community.97 By pronouncing ‘Ali and the 
Umayyad caliphs unbelievers (takfir), the Kharijites introduced this notion into the discourse 
and social life of early Islam.98 In this way the Kharijites have extended the scope of use of 
force in rebellion to Islamic rulers on the basis of the latter’s ‘unbelief’. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to call the Kharijites as the expansionists of the notion of unbelief (Kufr) and 
declaration of such unbelievers (Takfir) in Islam. However, this expansion is not recognised in 
Islamic law and the Hanafi jurists have specifically prohibited takfir.99 
For a group of Muslims to be legally identified as rebels, they must use actual force against the 
state (khurūj), according to the majority of the jurists.100 But for Abū Hanīfa, a group of 
Muslims could be treated as rebels once they assemble to use force against the state, because – 
practically speaking, Abū Hanīfa argues that – if the state waited until actual force is used then 
it would not be able to mount a defence.101 However, according to the practice of the Caliph 
Ali rebels cannot be attacked before they started attacking first.102 The interesting point here is 
that any non-violent opposition to the state cannot be identified as rebellion.103 Hence, Abu 
Hanifa’s point of view is similar to that of the expansionists in international law who are 
claiming the expansion of use of force beyond the stipulations of Article 51 of United Nations 
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Charter.104 However, like international law, although such view has strong support it lacks a 
legal basis in Islamic law on the use of force.  
The above discussion suggests that both the Kharijites and the scholars like Abu Hanifa have 
endeavoured to extend the Islamic law of rebellion by stretching the scope of use of force by 
and against rebels. These endeavours have resulted in the occurrences for violent use of force 
by both the rebels and rulers which is opposed to Islamic law. The rebels have often labelled 
the rulers as ‘oppressors’ when the latter used excessive force and denied the basic rights of 
rebels. For example – the arrests, execution and prosecution of the members of Muslim 
Brothers in Egypt in 1960s and following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.105 
Similarly, the rulers have often labelled the rebels as ‘terrorists’ who used violence against the 
rulers and even civilians and on that basis, they were denied any rights which were otherwise 
available to rebels. For example, The Ottoman Empire’s description of Wahhabis as the 
Kharijites of the modern age106, and the description of Muslim Brothers as Kharijites by 
consecutive Egyptian governments.107  
It has also been evidenced in the history that the rebellion which eventually became the ruling 
power denied the rights of rebels under Islamic law despite their claim of the same right at the 
time of their rebellion. For example, a Muʽtazila leader al-Ma’mun denied such rights to 
‘Abbasid rebels.108 As a result, the controversy that exists between the rebels and the rulers is 
not related to legal or theological uncertainties but a conflict of interest which is mainly based 
on political gain, which is to be able to gain political power and authority. Whereas political 
wars (which is likely to result in fitna) are prohibited in Islam, theological wars are legal and 
even recommended.109  
Had the Islamic law of rebellion been politicised there would not have been any law of rebellion 
as the rulers would never have wanted to recognise the basic rights of rebels in Islamic law by 
giving up their political interests. Caliph Ali had given up his biased political interest and used 
political power to recognise the basic rights of his opponents, such as rebels, under Islamic law. 
Therefore, it is necessary to keep politics out of religion as long as development of legal norms 
are concerned. However, this separation is not always possible especially when the person 
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(rulers or rebels) and body of persons (government or group of rebels) who can contribute in 
the establishment or development of legal norms are unwilling to give up their purely political 
agenda. For example, rebels and governments are unwilling to give up their political aim to 
gain the governmental authority in Syria.110  
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that, rebellion in Islamic law arose out of the 
context of the persistent rebellions in the first two centuries of Islam. 111  Muslim jurists 
selectively treated historical and textual precedents to construct the discourse on rebellion.112 
While Muslim jurists were not willing to endorse or legitimate all rebellions without limits, 
they also were not willing to give rulers unfettered discretion in dealing with rebels.113  
4.3 The potential of Islamic law of Rebellion to complement Public 
international law on the use of force 
Political interest in territorial integrity and state sovereignty has always been to the fore in 
decisions made by governments faced with those who rebel.114 Thus, rebellion has been placed 
as an integral part of internal armed conflict rather than expanding it as part of external or 
international armed conflict. In this way, Public international law has not only limited the scope 
of application of international legal framework but also failed to provide an effective 
framework for rebels who are not categorised as a party to international armed conflict.  
Despite several attempts to regulate use of force by and against rebels by international legal 
framework,115 it has not been successful to provide an effective legal framework so that rebels 
can exercise their right on the one hand and are bound by the respective legal responsibilities 
on the other. The political interests based on ‘state sovereignty’ were unable to take a course 
towards providing an effective solution to the use of force issues on rebellion. The political 
power has always triumphed over the necessity to recognise the right of rebellion and this has 
resulted in the under-development of this area of law. Furthermore, the rebels have denied their 
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accountability for asymmetrical use of force against state authorities based on their 
disadvantageous position under international law on the use of force.116 This unequal position 
between rebels and state authorities has created a ‘gap’ in the current legal framework provided 
by Public international law.  
In order to scrutinise the issues identified above, it is expedient to examine the application of 
the current international legal framework applicable to rebellion. In the process of the 
examination this section focuses on the international law provisions which regulate the right of 
rebellion and the treatment of rebels by the ruling authorities and their effectiveness in dealing 
with rebellion. Furthermore, this section also endeavours to identify the barriers that 
international legal framework is facing in its way to providing an effective legal framework.  
4.3.1 Historical overview of Rebellion in Public international law 
The right of revolution was accepted by several societies from ancient Greece and Rome and 
was also accepted by early international law scholars such as Grotius and Vattel.117 The issue 
of rebellion gained further attention from the Second Scholastica. 118  One of the strongest 
proponents of the right of rebellion was the Spanish theologian Fr Jean de Mariana. Indeed, as 
is seen in his work De Rege et Regis Institutione119, Mariana was in favour of tyrannicide in 
situations of political repression.120  The use of force to overthrow tyranny could be considered 
a type of ‘Just War’, or justifiable war.121 Thomas Aquinas stated that there is no sedition in 
disturbing a government which is not directed towards the common good. 122  While 
multifarious examples of what constituted a ‘Just War’ have been propounded from the Early 
Christian period onwards, 123 Aquinas, in the 13th century in his work Summa Theologiaie 
proposed a number of just war criteria. According to this criteria, a war was just if (1) it was 
                                                          
116 Lee McConnell, Extracting Accountability from Non-State actors in International Law (Routledge 2017) 141-
142. 
117 Jordan J. Paust, ‘The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Norms of Social Violence:  
Testing the Limits of Permissibility’ (1983) 32 Emory LJ 561. 
118 R. Ariew and D. Gabbay, ‘The scholastic background’ in D. Garber and M. Ayers (eds), Cambridge History 
of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, ed. (Cambridge University Press 1998) 15. 
119 This text is available at: 
<https://books.google.ie/books?id=Whk8AAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=
0#v=onepage&q&f=false> accessed 14 March 2017. 
120 Johannes Dillinger, ‘Tyrannicide from Ancient Greece and Roman to the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century in 
Randall D Law (ed), The Routledge History of Terrorism (Routledge 2015)15; see also Harald E. Braun, Juan de 
Mariana and Early Spanish Political Thought (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate: 2007) 44.  
121 Thomas Aquinas, Selected Political Writings (J.G. Dawson tr, Oxford:  Basil Blackwell 1948) 159. 
122 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Treatise on the Theological Virtues) Quest 42, Art 2; see also James 
Turner Johnson, ‘Historical Tradition and Moral Judgment: The Case of Just War Tradition’ in Alex J. Bellamy 
(ed), War: Critical Concepts in Political Science, vol IV (Routledge 2009) 23.  
123 Inis L. Claude Jr, ‘Just Wars: Doctrine and Institutions’ (1980) 95 Political Science Quarterly 83, 87.  
127 
 
waged under a proper authority, (2) it had a just cause, and (3) the belligerents had the right 
intention, which is that they must intend to promote good and subdue evil.124  Historically, 
however, international law was slow and hesitant to engage with the issue of rebellion.125  
This, more positive, view of rebellion gained more support with the rise of the sovereign state 
system, in tandem with the emergence of the theories of the social contract and natural law.126 
For example, Locke, proposes an argument for legitimate rebellion in his work Second Treatise 
of Government.127 Locke distinguished between legitimate governments, who seek to promote 
and preserve the rights of their citizens and illegitimate governments who do not. Legitimate 
governments, therefore, deserve that their citizens behave well and remain peaceful. Because 
illegitimate governments violate the rights of their citizens they put themselves in a state of 
nature and a state of war with its citizens. In this situation rebellion is legitimate. 128 
Concerning this right of revolution, United States’ President Lincoln stated: 
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.  Whenever they 
shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right 
of amending, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.129 
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The principle ignited by the American Revolution spread throughout Europe during the late 
18th and 19th centuries130 as a revamped version of the ‘Just War’ theory,131 whereby it was 
claimed that a state that denied the rights of the peoples it purported to rule was not fit to rule, 
and that certain actions of the state could give its citizens a just cause to revolt.132 States 
continued, in the nineteenth and twentieth century, to use the rhetoric of justice and justness 
when they went to use force against rebels but the justification produced no legal 
reverberations. 133  The newly borne states following imperialism and colonialism were 
confronted with the challenge of legitimate government who govern the people for common 
good. The people were often subject to tyranny and denial of their rights by the government. 
In these circumstances, the right to rebellion was at its highest pick.134 On the other hand, the 
governments were also claiming their right to suppress rebellion on the basis of their sovereign 
power and legitimate authority.135  
4.3.2 The Modern legal framework of rebellion: The Post-Charter 
arrangements of international law 
Following the collapse of the League of Nations and the end of the Second World War, the UN 
Charter took the leading position to promote and protect international peace and security.136 
The first post-Charter provision which officially recognised the right of rebellion is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. It states 
that “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion 
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rules of law”.137 
This position of right of rebellion on the basis of human rights was further developed during 
the 1960s and 1970s.138 The issues of colonialism and self-determination were linked together 
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at the fore of the UN's agenda, with both the General Assembly and Security Council adopting 
various resolutions on the topic, both general and country-specific in nature.139  However, this 
type of Resolution is too ambiguous to gain consensus.140 The types of constructive ambiguity 
in Resolutions are also evident in other UN resolutions on the issue of self-determination.141  
While, on one hand, General Assembly instruments do not go so far as to legalise the use of 
force by rebels, the Western powers always voted against such resolutions142 and so their value 
as a valid interpretation of international law is doubtful, as the votes against would hamper the 
creation of customary international law, on the other hand.143 It should be emphasised that while 
the right of a tyrant ruler was in serious denial in the international legal framework, the right to 
use force to halt that tyrant ruler, in the form of a right of rebellion, has not been universally 
accepted.144 While the use of force to overthrow tyranny has utilised a ‘Just War’ argument to 
support their claims and their wars, such use of violence has regularly been condemned by 
Western states.145 Therefore, it is difficult to state unequivocally that, in international law, rebels 
have a right to use force to overthrow a tyrannical or despotic government.146  
While support for the right of revolution under international law has waxed and waned over the 
years, it has never been fully and definitively codified as a legal principle.147 In some contexts 
there is support for the legitimate use of force in rebellion in the context of fighting tyranny or 
serious human rights abuses and in furtherance of the right to self-determination.148 However, 
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these have never been fully endorsed by the international community by means of a legal 
instrument, although there are, as evidenced above, some scholarship and state practice to 
support this view. Therefore, the issue of jus ad bellum about rebellion is filled with 
uncertainty149, and indeed, the rights and protections which attach to those who seek to rebel 
against the government were, as we shall see below, vague and amorphous.  
4.3.3 The status of rebels in Public international law 
Rebellion involves mere sporadic and isolated challenges to the government.  The criteria of 
rebellion are vague and uncertain and the term can cover many instances of minor violence 
within the borders of a state from violent protests to an easily quelled uprising. 150 Assistance 
from a third state is regarded as unlawful intervention and a third state is bound to respect the 
measures taken by the parent state for the suppression of the seditious party, such as prohibition 
on the importation of war material bound for the rebels.151 Rebellions fall within the exclusive 
remit of the sovereign state and no rights or duties accrue to the rebels who can legally be treated 
as criminals under domestic law and do not enjoy prisoners of war status if captured.152 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is a special branch of Public international law, 
deals with rebellion. This branch of law regulates the treatment of rebels from an international 
perspective and determines the extent of the right of the ruling authorities to use force to 
suppress rebellion. The following section makes an endeavour to examine the efficiency of this 
special branch of law in regulating rebellion.  
4.3.3.1 The Status of rebels under the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols 
International Humanitarian Law distinguishes between international and non-international 
armed conflicts and a different protective regime applies to each.153 Common Article 3 of the 
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Geneva Conventions 1949 is the only provision of the Conventions which deals with non-
international armed conflicts. 154  This provision ‘marked a fundamental change in that the 
automatic applicability of the legal protection for rebels has been recognised by international 
legal framework.’155 This is because prior to the adoption of Geneva Conventions, rebellions 
were defined by their limited duration and domestic suppression, without resort to military 
intervention.156 This protective regime of International Humanitarian Law concerning non-
international armed conflicts was further extended in the form of Additional Protocol II.157 
However, the protection offered by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are not 
sufficient for the protection of rebels. Moreover, these provisions have created a ‘gap’ in the 
legal protection for rebels involved in any conflict which does not meet the requirement of an 
‘armed conflict’.158 The ‘gap’ that has been created by these legal provisions is outlined below. 
It is quite apparent that Common Article 3 has provided international bodies like ICRC with a 
right to intervene in situations of non-international armed conflict but the rights and obligations 
of the parties involved in the armed conflict, such as the state authority and the rebels, are very 
limited.159 There has been no change in the rights and status of the rebels provided by Common 
Article 3 which is commonly regarded as the price demanded by the delegates for the Article’s 
adoption, easing the fear that a government’s capacity to suppress internal revolt would be 
interfered with.160  Moreover, the application of the Article does not therefore constitute any 
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recognition by the government that the rebels have any authority, and rebellions may be 
suppressed and tried accordingly.161  
 
Another weak point of Common Article 3 is that neither the means of warfare nor the conduct 
of hostilities are limited.162 In the absence of such limitation, it is difficult to ascertain at what 
level of violence this Article will trigger application and the extent of such application.163 The 
ICRC’s Commentary states that Common Article 3 should be applied as widely as possible,164 
but the level of violence needed to trigger the application of the provisions is still unsettled.165 
In this situation, it is very unlikely that this Article will trigger to violence which does not meet 
the requirement for ‘armed conflict’.166 For example, People caught up in incidents of violent 
and sustained riots, may fall outside of the protection remit of IHL. This issue has been 
identified in Prosecutor v Tadić where the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia has aptly emphasised: 
 
The low threshold of violence required to trigger Common Article 3 was underscored 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the La Tablada case (Juan 
Carlos Abella v Argentina (Case 11.137, 18 November 1997), at paras 155-156), where 
the Commission affirmed the applicability of Common Article 3 in situations of attacks 
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by an armed group on Argentine military personnel, despite the very brief duration of 
the attacks. Rather, the Commission focused on the extensive planning behind the 
attacks and the nature of the violence. In determining that the armed confrontation at 
the La Tablada base and its recapture by the Argentinian army constituted an internal 
armed conflict and not mere ‘internal disturbance or tensions’ the Commission 
excluded the following situations from the definition of armed conflict as they fall 
below the threshold: riots, that is to say, all disturbances which from the start are not 
directed by a leader and have no concerted intent; isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence, as distinct from military operations carried out by armed forces or organised 
armed groups; other acts of a similar nature which incur, in particular, mass arrests of 
persons because of their behaviour or political opinion.167 
 
 This ‘gap’ has been identified later and in the Turku Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards was adopted in 1990 it has been decided that a document containing minimum 
humanitarian standards, applicable to people in all situations of violence, regardless of 
threshold, should be drafted.168 However, this Declaration is not binding and has not had a 
significant impact on the treatment of individuals in situations of violence. Since its adoption 
follow-up work has been undertaken in the United Nations on this issue but no binding 
instrument on the issue has been drafted as yet.169  
 
Since the adoption of Geneva Conventions in 1949, the face of conflict changed over time and 
non-international armed conflicts began to increase in number it was realised that the laws of 
war were in need of review and revitalisation.170  Negotiations on how to amend International 
Humanitarian Law took place during the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and 
Development of IHL Applicable in Armed Conflicts which was convened between 1974 and 
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1977.171 During drafting negotiations of Additional Protocol II, it was clear that States did not 
want to grant status and rights to rebels who were threatening their authority. Indeed, Cassese 
comments that: 
To grant rebels international rights and duties means that the divide between insurgents 
and the legal government has reached such a point that the former has a standing, albeit 
limited, in the international community.172 
To acknowledge that rebels are entitled to invoke international rules implies that they are outside 
both the physical and legal control of the national authorities. By contrast, to suggest that 
insurgents cannot rely on international law means that the only body of law applicable to them 
is domestic criminal law and consequently that the government in power is free from 
international constraint and can treat them as it thinks best.173 Similarly, as correctly argued in 
the Commentary to the Additional Protocols-  
Governments are reluctant to assume treaty obligations which require them to extend a 
licence to domestic enemies to commit acts of violence against their personnel and 
objects which could be described as military objectives.174  
From the above discussion, it is apparent that despite having identified the ‘gap’ the Additional 
Protocol II has not only failed to reduce it but also made it wider, and thereby made the matter 
worse. This is because the threshold to trigger Protocol II was further raised up rather than 
taking it down. During the Geneva Conference, it was decided that the threshold of Protocol II 
should actually be raised from that of Common Article 3 because of a fear of an infringement 
on state sovereignty.175 The Protocol only applies if the dissidents control some territory and if 
they have the ability to implement the Protocol.176  If, during the conflict, the rebels lose this 
control or ability, the Protocol is no longer applicable.177 In this way, Protocol II provides for 
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the very unsatisfactory position that ‘the question of applicability of Protocol II might be 
answered varyingly, according to the prevailing circumstances.’178   
In addition, Protocol II does not clearly state how much territory must be under the control of 
the non-government party to the conflict or what constitutes ‘implementation’ of the Protocol 
by the rebel forces.179 It is clear that ‘much is left up to the discretion of the State, which is not 
a very acceptable position as states will be reluctant to compromise their state sovereignty, 
even for serious humanitarian concerns.180 As observed by Leslie Green, Protocol II ‘has a 
threshold that is so high...that it would exclude most revolutions and rebellions, and would 
probably not operate in a civil war until rebels were well established and had set up some form 
of de facto government’.181  In this respect, it must also be noted that Additional Protocol II 
does not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature, as not being ‘armed conflict’.”182 
Unlike Protocol I, Protocol II does not confer either combatant or prisoner of war status on 
rebels.  The Commentary to the Additional Protocol clarifies why this is the case: 
It seems unrealistic to establish combatant status for persons who have participated in 
hostilities and have been captured in non-international armed conflicts.  In fact, such 
status would be incompatible, first, with respect for the principles of sovereignty of 
States, and secondly, with national legislation which makes rebellion a crime.183 
Consequently, government authorities can still prosecute and sentence anyone who is found 
guilty of any offence which relates to the conflict, leading Rwelamira to comment: 
Protocol II has in effect restated the general rule of international law relating to the status 
of belligerency.  Before a situation assumes such a status, the conflict is to be considered 
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as a purely domestic affair. The fighters are not regarded as combatants and they are not 
entitled to the prisoner of wars status if they fall into the hands of the enemy.184 
From the above discussion it is apparent that ‘there is arguably little in the nature of the 
protections accompanying combatants and prisoners of war status that can be applied to 
participants in non-international armed conflicts.’ 185  There have been valiant efforts of 
International Tribunals by providing extended interpretation and application of the Article and 
Protocol II, 186  National Governments by granting amnesties to those involved in non-
international armed conflicts and indeed in situations of violence which do not reach the 
threshold of ‘armed conflict’, 187  and ICRC 188  by extending the protective regime of IHL 
applicable to international armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts. Despite these 
efforts, there was not enough provisions and arrangements to form the basis of uniform 
combatant immunity for all persons who participate in non-international armed conflicts.189 
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The ‘gap’ that has been created by the IHL framework itself has been widened rather than 
filling it. In a modern world where rebellion is so frequent that it is likely to affect international 
peace and security, the post-Charter framework has failed to deal with it effectively. Moreover, 
the ‘gap’ has awarded the state authorities to use force and prosecute the rebels as they think 
best, and without any accountability. By allocating rebellion within the sole authority of the 
state the rebels have been put in jeopardy in terms of their rights and treatment in the hands of 
their opponents without any measures for oversight or accountability.190 In addition to be 
subjected to use of excessive force by the governments, the rebels are susceptible to face 
prosecutions for their use of force against the former but the same is not the case for the 
governments and this has put the rebels in a more disadvantageous position. In consequence, 
the current legal position is favouring the state authority at the expense of the legitimate right 
of rebels to challenge tyrannical and despotic governments.  
4.3.3.2. The categorisation of rebels as combatants, non-combatants, and 
unlawful combatants 
A recent trend among the state authorities has been witnessed whereby they tend to invent a 
new category of the parties in hostilities, such as unlawful combatant.191 Whereas International 
Humanitarian Law only categorised participants of warfare as either combatants or non-
combatants, this invention of state authorities or governments have put the rebels in further 
jeopardy. The key point of determination between combatant and non-combatant has been the 
‘direct participation in the hostilities’ which denotes that any civilian who do not participate 
directly in the hostilities must not be targeted.192 However, in recent non-international armed 
conflicts it has been witnessed that many civilians have been killed by state authorities and in 
order to justify such killings the latter have argued that those who are killed lost the civilian 
(non-combatant) status when they took arms in the disguise of civilians.193 That means, the 
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governments are treating them as neither combatant nor non-combatant but ‘unlawful-
combatants’ in order to justify their killings of civilians. The problem with this argument by the 
governments is that there is no evidence in support to uphold that the victims of the governments’ 
use of force were using counter force while enjoying the status of non-combatant.194  
The analysis and evidence of the nature and extent of use of force by governments against rebels 
suggest that the categorisation of ‘unlawful combatant’ has been unilaterally benefiting the 
governments. 195  This is because it has been a difficult but not impossible task for the 
government forces to identify the rebels who tend to take the disguise of civilians and carry on 
surprise attacks.196 In order to respond to this kind of threat from the rebels and to ease their 
task of identification of rebels, the government forces have resorted to use of indiscriminate 
force against civilians on the basis of their own assessment of such threat. The problem with 
such use of indiscriminate force is that the governments are not accountable for their action and 
this has resulted in rising number of civilian casualties in internal armed conflict. Moreover, in 
the existence of a legal framework where the government forces are not accountable for using 
excessive force against their opponents, such as rebels, the invocation of an invented category 
of ‘unlawful combatant’ by the former without any interference from international legal 
framework is likely to further widen the ‘gap’ between the legal position of the governments 
and the rebels as far as use of force is concerned.  
4.3.4 The Status and Treatment of rebels in Islamic law in contrast to Public 
international law 
As indicated in the Qur’anic text regulating armed rebellion and the precedents set by the fourth 
Caliph, a series of peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms must be followed before the state 
uses force against the rebels. The head of the Muslim state is to send an envoy to the rebels to 
listen to their justifications for the use of force and if their justification is found to be valid, 
then the state is to fulfil their demands.197 If the envoy finds that their justifications are not 
valid, then he should explain to them the validity of their justifications and remove any 
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misunderstanding that they have regarding the positions and/or decisions taken by the Muslim 
state.198 If these discussions fail, then the rebels should be called – according to some jurists – 
to a munāẓarah (public debate) between them and the state authorities so that the public can 
judge the justness of their cause.199  
If all these peaceful mechanisms, stated above, of resolving the conflict fail, then the rebels 
should be advised or warned to renounce their plans for the use of force.200 If the rebels still 
insist and start using actual force against the state authorities, then specific rules of engagement 
apply in this category of internal armed conflict.201 On the contrary, no such mechanism exists 
under customary international law, under which states are under no obligation to engage in any 
level of discussion with rebels, and can treat them as mere criminals, depending on the intensity 
of their challenge. This is an important aspect of Islamic law, a type of ‘preventive diplomacy’ 
which, if implemented generally, could help to avoid violent clashes between rebel groups and 
government forces. 
The Islamic law of rebellion guarantees a privileged status for the rebels during and, no less 
importantly, after the cessation of hostilities.202 At the outset, it is interesting to note that the 
rules of engagement put both the conflicting parties, the state army and the rebels, on equal 
footing and thus the same rules apply to both.203 This means that both of them are to be held 
equally responsible for any violation of the rules of engagement of this specific category of 
internal armed conflict. As a rule, the jurists make it clear that on the part of the state army 
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soldier, the aim of fighting is merely to force the rebels to stop their attack, radʻihim (to stop 
them) and not to kill them.204 In other words, the state army must not deliberately attempt to 
kill any of the rebels. By the same token, this means, on the part of the rebels, that their attack 
must be directed at, and limited to, achieving the objectives of their rebellion. 
In addition to recognition of Prisoners of War (POW) status and the prohibition of the use of 
indiscriminate weapons, among other protections guaranteed in international armed conflicts, 
there are a number of rules of engagement that apply particularly in the fighting against the 
rebels which include: 1) The rebels ‘could not be pursued if in rout’205 or when they are 
escaping from the battlefield.206 2) The rebels’ property could not be taken as spoils of war.207 
3) Their women and children cannot be enslaved.208 4) Their wounded cannot be killed.209 The 
instruction of the fourth Caliph reads: 
When you defeat them [rebels], do not kill their wounded, do not behead the prisoners, 
do not pursue those who return and retreat, do not enslave their women, do not mutilate 
their dead, do not uncover what is to remain covered, do not approach their property 
except what you find in their camp of weapons, beasts, male or female slaves: all the 
rest is to be inherited by their heirs according to the Writ of God.210 
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Furthermore, weapons confiscated from the rebels in the battlefield cannot be used by the state 
army in the fighting against the rebels unless in case of military necessity211 and after the 
cessation of hostilities all confiscated weapons must be returned to the rebels. 212  More 
importantly, the vast majority of the Muslim jurists agree that captured rebels must be set free213, 
but they disagree on whether they are to be released during or after the cessation of hostilities, 
or after the rebels no longer constitute a danger to the state.214 In addition to that, both rebels 
and state army soldiers are equally not liable for the destruction of life and property during the 
hostilities215 provided that, as referred to above, this was dictated by military necessity and was 
directed at, and limited to, achieving the objectives of using force in this category of internal 
conflict, as shown above.216 This proves without a doubt that rebels are not criminals and that 
there is no punishment for them under Islamic law.217 Moreover, the Islamic law of rebellion 
gives legal recognition to the rebels or secessionists for the sentences they pass and the 
executions they carry out during their control of a certain territory of the Muslim state provided 
that these sentences do not contradict Islamic law.218 
The existing legal regime offered by IHL is lacking in clarity and preciseness. The paucity of 
provisions in the Geneva Conventions dealing with non-state actors is a witness to the primacy 
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of state sovereignty over humanitarianism. The state sovereignty issue also impeded the 
extension of the IHL regime to non-state actors during the Diplomatic Conference 1974-1977. 
While some states may argue that granting rebels status would fuel and legitimise terrorism 
campaigns219 and while others may point to the problems that non-state actors would face in 
trying to implement treaty burdens which were created for states,220 the main argument behind 
the extension of the IHL regime concerning combatant and prisoners of war status both during 
the conference and since is that of ‘state sovereignty’. However, an effective solution of this 
‘state sovereignty’ problem has been proffered by Islamic law which does not distinguish 
between international and non-international armed conflict rather it makes universal 
application of the rights and status of rebels in the equal footing with the rights and duties of 
the rulers.221  
Furthermore, in practice a trend has emerged among both states and non-state actors to apply 
IHL provisions unofficially or voluntarily during a conflict, thus avoiding armed conflict 
categorisation issues.222  For example, Conventions on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa 
Convention/Treaty). 223  Indeed, this very notion arguably underscores the international 
obligations held by States, playing a dual role in inducing adherence and providing 
contractarian validation.224 This does not also affect ‘state sovereignty’ as non-state actors are 
not given official recognition and so is an acceptable compromise. However, the legal quality 
of the largely voluntary and unofficial initiatives is prone to uncertainty, given that armed 
groups could, at any point stop unofficial application or breach their agreements without facing 
formal legal consequences.225 
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While the question of the permissibility of rebellion under Islamic law seems to be unsettled, 
the issue of combatant and prisoner of war status under the Islamic system226 seems to be much 
more protective of captured rebels than international customary law and IHL and could inform 
judicial interpretations of the status of those captured in a rebellion situation. Furthermore, the 
Islamic law of rebellion guarantees the right of political opposition to tyranny or the violations 
of the rule of law by the regimes and provides a series of mechanisms to resolve the conflict 
peacefully through discussions, negotiations and arbitration. No less importantly, the strict 
rules on the use of force peculiar to armed rebellion equally applicable to both the rebels and 
the state army soldiers considerably humanise this kind of internal armed conflict.  
In fact, protection of peaceful opposition to the regimes in most of the Muslim countries is 
lacking at present, let alone the resort to armed rebellion. No Muslim country at present applies 
the Islamic law of rebellion no matter how much these regimes claim adherence to Islamic 
law.227 For example, both Saudi Arabia and Sudan, which claim to apply Islamic law as a whole, 
adopted the laws of banditry and apostasy into their legal systems but omitted, without 
comment, law of rebellion.228 Obviously for the regimes in the Muslim world the application 
of aḥkām al-bughāh (law of treatment of rebels) will be impractical, excessively lenient and 
give a green light to every opposition group to take up arms against the state. But what is indeed 
regrettable here is that Muslim countries do not develop Islamic modalities of post-conflict 
justice229; they even do not adopt the Islamic conflict resolution mechanisms in the case of 
armed rebellion as pointed out in the Qur’anic text 49:9 and developed by the classical Muslim 
jurists over thirteen centuries ago.230    
This is to conclude here that the recent violence committed in the Arab world either by the state 
against innocent civilians during peaceful demonstrations, or by insurgents against both the 
state authorities and/or innocent civilians, is in stark contradiction to Islamic law. This Islamic 
law of rebellion has been largely compromised by the political authorities in the Arab world. 
The incursions of politics into the development and implementation of the Islamic law of 
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rebellion has been witnessed by the current practice of the governments which often accused 
rebels for treason, terrorism and crime, and such accusation are opposed to Islamic law of 
rebellion.231  
The nature of rebellion is an opposition to political abuse of power and this should have 
received more attention and treatment by international law but it has not been the case.232 The 
above examination of the legal framework of Public international law suggests that it does not 
put the rebels and the governments in equal footing but instead favours the already powerful 
governments against their opponents, such as rebels. If the right of rebels are not recognised 
and the powers of governments for using force against rebels are not effectively regulated then 
the latter is likely to recourse asymmetrical methods of warfare against their opponents as they 
are in a much better position in the current legal framework.233 Therefore, if the rebels and 
governments are not in the equal footing in terms of accountability and legal protection the use 
of excessive and asymmetrical force is likely to carry on by both parties to the conflict, with 
the rebels knowing the fact that they will either be killed or prosecuted by their opponents who 
will not be held accountable in any way.  
In contrast, Islamic law has made a platform where the rulers and rebels are in equal footing. 
While Islamic law of rebellion is not endorsing or legitimating rebellions without limits, it is 
not also giving rulers unfettered discretion in dealing with rebels. In other words, Islamic law 
allowed rebellion if it is legitimate to use force against an unjust ruler and it has provided the 
criteria when a ruler can be classified as unjust and on the other hand it sets out the limitation 
on the use of force by the rulers against rebels. Therefore, it can be concluded that the status 
and protection offered by Islamic international law to rebels are much organised and advanced 
than what offered by Public international law. Hence, Islamic law has the potential to make a 
positive contribution in the development of Public international law in providing an effective 
legal framework to deal with rebellion which is an oft-occurring situation in modern world.  
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4.4 The dividing line between jihad, rebellion, and terrorism 
If the state practices, of both Islamic and non-Islamic countries,234 do not endorse the Islamic 
law in the treatment of rebels then a serious question arises that is ‘on what basis the Public 
international law would be benefited in adopting it’. In other words, why Public international 
law would adopt certain principles of law which are not only alien to it but also declined or 
abandoned by those states which should be regulated by it, such as Muslim majority states. 
Whereas based on theoretical analysis Islamic law has the potential to complement Public 
international law by filling an existing grey-hole,235 in practice it is difficult to see the legal 
support and political willingness in such complementation process. Theoretically recognised 
of the ‘common benefit’ aside, there is no plausible state practice from Muslim countries. In 
these circumstances, Islamic law of rebellion can, at the very least, play a vital role by defining 
the fine line between the highly-contested terms jihad, rebellion and terrorism. The distinction 
between these terms will not only configure a groups’ identity but also their treatment by state 
authorities and post-conflict justice especially in Muslim countries.  
As discussed above, despite the heavy emphasis on the prohibition against rebellion, the 
Islamic traditional trend does not criminalise the act of rebellion. The early traditions did not 
clearly distinguish between rebellion and terrorism.236 Furthermore, the modern jurists have 
confused jihad with rebellion and terrorism. Jihad has also been identified as the reason behind 
most use of force including rebellion and terrorism.  
Both scholars and state authorities have used these terms, which have different meaning and 
significances, in similar words and in such a way that all sounded the same. The early juristic 
culture was searching for concepts that would distinguish the treatment of rebels from other 
elements who violated the law, but that culture was insufficiently developed to be able to do 
so with systematic precision.237 This lack of precision in the use of the terminology reflects on 
the fact that legal discourses, at that time, had not yet fully co-opted terms and rendered them 
into technical terms of art. In fact, the full co-optation of the terms did not take place until well 
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after the fourth/tenth century, and in a few sources, the lapsing and confusing of ‘hiraba’ with 
‘baghy’ continues up to the ninth/fifteenth century.238 Since then, as the confusion became 
fairly settled, the linguistic practices and formulas of the field were consistently repeated in 
Islamic juridical discourses.  
4.4.1 The role of 9/11 terrorist attacks in stimulating the confusion between 
jihad, rebellion and terrorism 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks almost every action, at domestic and international level, based 
on religious ideology, has been categorised as terrorism without giving appropriate account of 
such categorisation.239 As a result, this has created a barrier which is hindering to demonstrate 
the Islamic law of rebellion from a broader perspective. For example, a rebellion based on 
religious ideology is being conveniently identified as a potential terrorist threat rather than a 
political matter with its likely effect at international level. In this way, this matter is not being 
given the necessary consideration in order to secure long-term resolution but being dealt with 
as a short-term fix.240 Therefore, it is expedient to understand the dividing line between jihad, 
terrorism and rebellion so that both the root causes of terrorism and the position of Islamic law 
to deal with it can be understood.241 Furthermore, in the absence of any legal definition of 
terrorism242, the drawing of a dividing line between jihad, rebellion and terrorism is likely to 
be of paramount assistance at the task of identifying terrorism from other similarities.243 
Drawing such dividing line from the viewpoint of Islamic law is ideal because a comparative 
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see also Frank E. Vogel, ‘The Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law’ (2000) 43 Harvard International 
Law Journal 53.  
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study of terrorism in international law and Islamic law suggests that there are similarities 
between terrorism and hirāba (banditry, highway robbery, piracy).244 
Confusing rebels with terrorists is a major mistake, regrettably found in many examples of 
classical and modern literature.245 Certainly the legal recognition and status guaranteed for the 
rebels under Islamic law would be unthinkable for the terrorists. The rules of engagement with 
rebels do not apply in the fighting against terrorists. During the hostilities, state forces could 
aim to kill terrorists and follow them even when they are escaping. More importantly, after 
they are captured, the severest punishments under Islamic law await convicted terrorists. 
Therefore, it is expedient to draw the fine line between Jihad, rebellion and terrorism. 
Furthermore, the dividing line is necessary because the rebels are to receive treatment different 
from terrorists both during and, more importantly, after the cessation of fighting.246 But the aim 
is to regulate the recourse to use of force among Muslims by ensuring that there are specific 
legitimate grounds and not to give a blank check for any citizen to use force against the 
government.247 
4.4.2 The distinguishing features of jihad, rebellion and terrorism 
4.4.2.1 Jihad  
‘Jihad’ is a dynamic term which may denote a plethora of meaning and significances depending 
on the circumstances in which it is invoked.248 ‘Jihad’ can very conveniently be applied to any 
use of force by a person or group of persons and this is very likely to happen when such 
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application is made without giving the necessary considerations as to the context and 
circumstances of the use of force.249 The dynamic nature of the term ‘jihad’ has also been found 
in its application for use of force against unbelievers and a total war against non-Muslim 
territories.250 Jihad provides the Qur’anic basis of legitimate use of force and for this reason its 
invocation by both state and non-state actors alike is very tempting and frequent.251 The only 
point where jihad and rebellion overlap is that both of them are collective duty as far as use of 
force is concerned. However, the main characteristic of jihad which is unique to its 
distinctiveness is that it must be for the God’s sake (fi sabilillah) even when it comes to use of 
force.252 
4.4.2.2 Rebellion  
Unlike jihad, rebellion does not have a direct Qur’anic basis of use of force. The only verse 
that the scholars refer to from the Qur’an in order to demonstrate the right and treatment of 
rebels is 49:9, and it has been argued that this verse was not actually revealed to denote 
rebellion. The exegetes agree that the occasion of revelation of this verse is related to either 
one of two small quarrels or brawls between a few individual Muslims over family and non-
political issues which resulted in no casualties.253 It is arguable that the Islamic law of rebellion 
has developed from the spirit of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet but the focal point of its 
development has been indebted to the practices of the Caliphs and Muslim leaders.254 
While use of force in jihad does not have to be against a tyrant or unjust ruler who ignores 
Islamic law while ruling the state, at the same time jihad can be against such ruler as well. So, 
what is the difference between jihad and rebellion? In other words, under what circumstances 
use of force would trigger jihad and rebellion? Rebellion, in Islamic law, has developed a 
special branch of law which regulates the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.255 The 
origin of the term ‘Kharijite’ and its use by state and general Muslim population has also a very 
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special significance in the law of rebellion. It is the special nature of this branch of Islamic law 
that distinguishes itself from jihad. The status of rebels is protected in this special branch of 
law as they are not criminals and should not be punished under the criminal code.256 
4.4.2.3 Terrorism  
The use of violence in Islamic law has been divided into three categories. The first category is 
known as ḥurūb al-riddah (apostasy wars) which refers to a series of battles waged after the 
Prophet’s demise by the first caliph Abū Bakr (r. 632-634) against several Arab tribes who 
refused to pay zakāh (compulsory religious dues) or renounced Islam.257 The second category 
is the war against al-khawārij (roughly, violent religious fanatics), a group of Muslims who 
emerged during the reign of the fourth caliph, ‛Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (r. 656-661).258  The third 
category of internal hostilities treated by classical Muslim jurists is the crime of ḥirābah 
(banditry, highway robbery, piracy). The importance of identifying the elements of this crime, 
at least for the purpose of this chapter, is that these are the elements which distinguish terrorism 
from armed rebellion. 259 
4.4.2.3.1 The hirāba-terrorism relationship 
The hirāba-terrorism relationship has a vital role to play in determining the nature and identity 
of the third category mentioned above. This relationship is very complex and as such requires 
further clarification in order to determine the nature and extent of the relationship in terms of 
use of force. There are differences among the Muslim jurists as to whether terrorism 
corresponds to hirāba.260 The common question emanates from such differences is that, to what 
extent terrorism is attributable to hirāba in terms of use of force?  
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There are two main approaches to the hirāba-terrorism relationship. One view is that modern 
terrorism corresponds in its most salient features to hirāba.261 The other view is that there is 
little or no relationship between modern terrorism and hirāba.262 In the circumstance of this 
disagreement, this section scrutinises the definition of hirāba followed by the juristic positions 
held by different schools of thought to assess any similarities and dissimilarities of the elements 
of hirāba to that of different positions held by Muslim jurists.  
Hirāba is derived from the words haraba (to despoil someone’s wealth or property) and harb 
(war).263  The Qur’an refers to both words in 2:279 and 5:33. 264  Whereas 2:279 refers to 
‘fighting those who deal in usury (riba) and keep its outstanding dues’, 5:33 refers to 
‘disobedience when they rebel against ordinances of Allah and His Prophet’.265 Thus, the 
lexical meanings of hirāba refers to disbelief, banditry, striking terror among the passers-by 
and spreading corruption in the land.266  
In addition to the etymological meanings of hirāba, Muslim exegetes have also considered the 
legal meanings of hirāba in order for discharging their role as the conveyors of the overall 
meaning of the Qur’anic text.267 This preference of the exegetes lies on the fact that the Qur’an 
does not contain either the word hirāba nor the root verb haraba268, and this has given rise to 
the necessity to recourse into other resources, such as juristic or legal meaning of hirāba. The 
legal meaning, as opposed to spiritual meaning, of hirāba is based on 5:33 rather than 2:279.269 
The Qur’an, in 5:33, provides that- 
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Those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption 
in the land should be punished by death, crucifixion, the amputation of an alternate 
hand and foot, or banishment from the land.270 
The above Qur’anic provision provides for two elements of hirāba namely, waging war and 
spreading corruption. These two elements must be present in order to impose punishment for 
hirāba because these two elements are combined by the conjunction ‘and’.271 However, mere 
presence of these two elements does not satisfy the imposition of punishment for hirāba 
because these elements will have to satisfy an additional caveat, which is against Allah and His 
Messenger. Therefore, punishment for hirāba cannot be imposed merely by waging war against 
anyone except Allah and the Prophet.272 This Qur’anic requirement has paved the way for the 
special branch of rebellion which is distinct from hirāba. This is because the Qur’anic 
requirement has allowed use of force against anyone except ‘Allah and the Prophet’ and on this 
basis use of force against the Caliphs as well as other rulers has been allowed. This position 
supports legitimacy of use of force by rebels because, as stated above, rebellion only began 
after the death of the Prophet273 and following Prophet’s demise use of force against any rulers 
could not amount to hirāba.274 That means, rebellion and hirāba are not same but two separate 
branches of Islamic law. As a result, rebels cannot be punished for hirāba crimes.  
If hirāba and rebellion are not in the same category, as stated above, then the nature and extent 
of the relationship between hirāba and terrorism depend on the implication of hirāba verse, 
which is 5:33, in modern day terrorism. From the above discussion, it is apparent that although 
punishment for hirāba is unlikely to be imposed after the prophet’s demise, however, there is 
still a scope where such punishment can be imposed on those who wage war against Allah and 
spreads corruption in the land. This is because the prophet has died in 632CE but Allah’s 
existence and status, as proclaimed in the Qur’an and unequivocally believed by all Muslims, 
is still a Qur’anic requirement and the Qur’an itself reflects on the status of Allah and the divine 
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revelations which provide for source-oriented legitimacy.275 In other words, hirāba punishment 
can be imposed on those who use force in opposition to the Qur’anic proscriptions which 
specifically prohibits such use of force.276 For example, non-state actors cannot recourse to 
extraterritorial use of force due to lack of both ‘right authority’ and ‘just cause’ which are 
Qur’anic requirement of waging war against another state.277 Therefore, extraterritorial use of 
force by non-state actors is punishable under hirāba punishment.  
From the Qur’anic requirement stated above, hirāba punishment can be imposed on those who 
spread corruption in the land by opposing the Qur’an and its rule. The circumstances that satisfy 
this requirement and as such trigger the imposition of hirāba punishment are described by 
Muslim jurists in different terms. The Hanafi jurists have described hirāba as highway robbery 
and the great theft (al-Sariah al-Kubra).278 On the other hand, the Shaf’i jurists emphasised on 
the requirement of a ‘communal act’ as opposed to an ‘individual act’ and referred them as 
‘corrupt people’.279 The latter view provides a similarity between hirāba and modern day 
terrorism as it emphasises on the gravity and serious consequences of the act.280 Furthermore, 
the Hanbali jurists differ in their positions as to the crime of hirāba. Whereas Ibn Qudamah 
restricts hirāba to acts committed in isolated areas than cities281, al-Buhuti stresses that it does 
not matter whether the act of hirāba is committed in isolated areas or in cities.282 These see-
saw position of Hanbali jurists do not bear any similarities between hirāba and terrorism. 
However, the Maliki jurists have identified an act of hirāba when it spreads corruption and 
violates sanctity what Allah made unlawful.283 This Maliki position corresponds not only to 
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the Qur’anic requirement stated above, such as spread corruption in the land by opposing the 
Qur’an and its rule, but also broadens, unlike other schools of thought stated above, the concept 
of hirāba to include all acts that lead to terrorising people. Therefore, the Maliki position is the 
most comprehensive, among the schools of thought, in corresponding hirāba with terrorism.284 
However, the Qur’anic requirement, stated above, is common in the all four schools of Sunni 
jurisprudence.285 
A comparison between the exegeses of 5:33 and legal definition of hirāba reveals that all 
classical and modern exegetes cite the various juristic definitions of hirāba without presenting 
new or adapted definitions providing any additional guidance to the extent that can be said to 
have been added or taken away from the classical definitions.286 This approach has resulted in 
the lack of effective legal framework to deal with modern day terrorism by Islamic law. 
Therefore, it is expedient to widen the concept of hirāba beyond the limitation of classical 
theory.287 In the classical theory, terrorising people and spreading corruption are the common 
denominators of both hirāba and terrorism.288  
In addition to the classical theory, there is a modern element of terrorism which distinguishes 
it from hirāba and that is the link between the perpetrators and the victims of terrorism. In 
modern day terrorism, there is a very little or no link between the perpetrators and the victims 
as the former does not commit an act of terror to gain anything directly or indirectly from the 
latter. In the course of terrorising people, the perpetrators do not have any dispute or cause with 
the victims but with the people who are holding responsible positions for the victims, such as 
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2014) 134; see also Sherman A. Jackson, ‘Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition’ (2001) 91 
Muslim World 303. 
287 Muhammad bin ‘Abdullah al-‘Umayri, Musqitat Hadd al-Hirabah wa Tatbiqatiha fi al-Mamlakah al-
‘Arabiyyah al-Su‘udiyyah (Riyadh: Akadimiyyat Nayef al-‘arabiyyah li al-‘Ulum al-Amniyyah 1999) 19; see 
also Muhammad Tal‘at al-Ghunaymi, Qanun al-Salam fi al-Islam (Alexandria, Egypt: Munasha’at al-Ma ‘arif 
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Legal Tradition’ (2001) 91 Muslim World 295. 
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governments.289 The use of force by terrorists is usually associated with political or ideological 
aims as opposed to material gains.290 There are differences between a criminal (mujrim) and a 
terrorist (irhābi). For example, criminals usually commit their crimes out of personal interest 
whereas terrorists commit their actions primarily for political reasons, with the aim of subduing 
a more powerful authority.291 Therefore, hirāba and terrorism are similar but not the same thing 
as Khaled Abou El Fadl maintains that: 
Some scholars have invited me to adopt the word ‘terrorism’ as a faithful translation of 
the term hirāba. I decline to do so largely because I believe this to be an anachronism. 
Terrorism, as a concept, accompanied the emergence of the notions of political crime 
and national liberation in the modern age. Although hirāba does share many similarities 
with contemporary conceptions of terrorism, but in order to preserve the historical 
flavour of this work, I have used the terms bandits and brigands as synonymous with 
hirāba.292   
The above scholarly positions suggest that terrorism is more of a political crime recognised by 
the state authorities and conversely acts to stimulate national liberation movement as claimed 
by the perpetrators. Furthermore, terrorism is a modern term of art which denotes many 
similarities with historical hirāba but very sharply differs from it.293 Historically, hirāba is the 
key provision of Islamic law to punish the muhāribun who are found guilty of hirāba but it 
does not carry the same legal implications as terrorism does. Terrorism is a species of political 
crimes which have become a serious problem in modern world due to its destructive effects on 
the victims. Because of such destructive effects, the political nature of the crime always 
remains overlooked and the use of force, whether justified or unjustified and proportionate or 
excessive, by the authorities and governments become more necessary and appears legitimate 
at least in its face value.  
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4.4.2.3.2 The distinguishing features of terrorism in Islamic law 
According to some jurists, terrorism, in Islamic law does not solely depend on the basis of 
‘right authority’ and ‘just cause’ but to a certain extent the means and methods of use of such 
force.294 For example, whereas the majority of Muslim jurists agreed that Kharijites had the 
‘just cause’ to rebel against the 4th Caliph Ali, a few jurists also argued that since they 
advocated the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims they were apostates rather than rebels.295 
For their violent use of unjustified force the Qur’an has also provided for harsh treatment of 
terrorists.296 The Qur’an prescribes: 
Indeed, the retribution for those who yuharibun (make war upon) Allah and His 
Messenger and strive to make fasad (destruction, damage) in the land is that they be 
killed or gibbeted or have their hands and feet amputated from opposite sides or they 
be banished from the land.297 
There is also a hadith which reportedly have stated that: 
There will come a time when zealots with little understanding of the religion will shed 
the blood of Muslims. If they are found, the reports assert, they must be killed wherever 
they may be found.298 
However, the problem with this approach is that the rebels often adopt identical means and 
methods of using force as terrorists and this has made it difficult for the jurists to distinguish 
between these two on the basis of means only.299 For example, Kharijites are categorised as 
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rebels despite they targeted civilians, adopted non-conventional means of warfare and spread 
terror.300 This is because rebels, in Islamic law, are identified by their cause which they believe 
to be just in Islam.301 In other words, the justness of the cause of rebellion is based on theology. 
Therefore, the means test is not likely to be a deciding factor between rebellion and terrorism. 
However, the ends test can be of assistance here.302  
It is one thing to rebel based on theological belief and another thing to fight for overthrowing 
the state authority. The former is based on theology and the latter is based on political and 
material gain. Whereas the former uses force to alter the foundation of law and order upon 
which state authority is established, the latter challenges the state authority itself irrespective 
of its legal foundation. Therefore, the key difference between rebellion and terrorism is not the 
means they use but the basis of their use of force. Where the basis of the use of force is solely 
founded on political gain rather than theological belief then such use of force is terrorism.303 
On the other hand, where the basis of the use of force is founded on theological belief rather 
than political then such use of force is rebellion.304 Hence, Mongols who invaded ‘Abbasid 
caliphate and committed indiscriminate slaughter are categorised as ‘terrorists’ rather than 
rebels despite their conversion to Islam.305 This is because, Mongols desired to achieve certain 
political objectives, such as overthrowing the caliphate, which, unlike Kharijites, are not 
theologically motivated. That means, politically motivated use of force in the name of rebellion 
is terrorism because such use of force is fitna. Whereas political wars (fitna) are prohibited in 
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Islam, theological wars (rebellion) are legal and even recommended.306 However, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to evaluate whether a rebellion is based on theological ground or political. 
To ease this difficulty, the application of a ‘purpose test’ and ‘social factor’ can be useful.   
In certain circumstances, both the political and theological basis in the use of force can exist.307 
For example, where the use of force is to alter the legal foundation of the ruling authority but 
in doing so it would ultimately result in the change of regime due to the unwillingness of the 
ruling authority to alter or amend the legal foundation. In such circumstance, the task of 
drawing the dividing line between terrorism and rebellion can be huge and problematic. In such 
situation, the best option would be to apply the ‘primary purpose’ test, namely ‘if the primary 
purpose of such use of force is political or material gain then it is terrorism but if the primary 
purpose is not so then it is rebellion.308 This is one of the situations when Islamic law and 
politics cannot be completely separated from each other.  
Another factor that could play a key role in drawing the dividing line between terrorism and 
rebellion especially in situations where the political and theological purposes cannot be 
separated, namely the social factor of ‘hatred’.309 This factor makes a substantial difference 
between use of force by terrorists and rebels. The use of force by terrorists is often carried out 
from hatred against their opponent, such as Al-Qaeda’s hatred against Western authorities.310 
On the other hand, use of force by rebels is carried out with an aim to alter the ideological basis 
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on which the authority is ruling.311 The rebellion ends as soon as the ruling authority adopts 
the ideology of the rebels unless the former has an ulterior motive of overthrowing the ruling 
authority in which case it would be terrorism as stated above.312 However, the act of terrorism 
does not end when the ruling authority accepts the demands of the terrorists or when they gain 
power by overthrowing the ruling authority but such act of terrorism escalates and 
stimulates.313 This is because unlike rebellion, the social factor, hatred, is instinctively attached 
to terrorism.314  
If acts of terrorism are motivated by enmity or a contest over power or government, the 
offenders are not to be treated as rebels but are to be held liable for their crimes under the 
regular criminal laws.315 On the contrary, few Muslim jurists, who had the benefit of French 
education, tried to Islamise the French doctrine of political crime by claiming that law of 
rebellion (ahkam al-bughah) is the equivalent of political crime in Europe.316 In this way these 
jurists have endeavoured to protect rebels from being responsible for their politically motivated 
violence, namely terrorism. These Muslim jurists have defined political crime as the non-
violent or violent opposition to a government as long as the motivation is political and the 
target of the crime is governmental.317 As shown above, the targets of terrorists are not only 
government personnel but also civilians.318 Therefore, political crime and terrorism are similar 
in effect but different in nature. For instance, disseminating fear and alarm among people is a 
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feature common to both political crime and terrorism but the targets are different.319 ‘Abd al-
Qadir ‘Udah has rightly observed that: 
The difference between political crime and terrorism is the targets and victims of the 
crime. Although political crimes are committed against political persons or body of 
persons, acts of terrorism are committed against anyone irrespective of their non-
involvement, personal or derivative, with the rulers or governments whom the terrorists 
aim to subdue.320 
Islamic law does not permit use of force by state or non-state actors to terrorise.321 Any act of 
violence to terrorise the people or to achieve personal or collective interests of any group, party 
or organisation are prohibited. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Shaykh of al-Azhar, has 
condemned the terrorist act of September 11, 2001 in the United States.322 The Chief Mufti of 
Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al al-Shykh, similarly declared in 2004 that: 
You must know Islam’s firm position against all these terrible crimes. The World must 
know that Islam is a religion of peace … justice and guidance … Islam forbids the 
hijacking of airplanes, ships and other means of transport, and it forbids all acts that 
undermine the security of the innocent.323 
Furthermore, Seyyed Hussein Nasr also added that: 
Those who carry out terrorism in the West or elsewhere in the name of jihad are 
vilifying an originally sacred term, and their efforts have not been accepted by 
established and mainstream religious authorities as jihad.324 
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Therefore, the primary legal element that distinguishes terrorism from rebellion and jihad is 
that terrorists spread terror and render their victims helpless by denying them the possibility of 
rescue.325  
As stated above, the lifeblood of terrorism is hatred; and this hatred is often in turn the 
disfigured expression of grievance—a grievance that may be legitimate. In the present day, few 
doubt that the ongoing injustices in Palestine and other parts of the Muslim world give rise to 
legitimate grievances, but there is nothing in Islam that justifies the killing or injuring of 
civilians, nor of perpetrating any excess as a result of hatred, even if that hatred is based on 
legitimate grievances.326 The pursuit of justice must be conducted in accordance with justice; 
as the Qur’an proscribes - 
O ye who believe, be upright for God, witnesses in justice; and let not hatred of a people 
cause you to be unjust. Be just—that is closer to piety.327 
The distinguishing features of jihad, rebellion and terrorism are articulated in the following 
table: 
Jihad  Rebellion  Terrorism 
Killing and attacking people 
by surprise is prohibited in 
jihad. 
Rebels can kill and attack 
people by surprise as long as 
in the course of rebellion and 
not primarily for political or 
material gain.  
Terrorists kill and attack 
people by surprise.  
Jihad does not require mere 
submission of bodies to 
Islam but the real surrender 
of hearts. 
As rebellion is purely in 
opposition to Muslim rulers, 
forced conversion is not an 
issue here.  
Terrorism promotes forced 
conversion if it is necessary 
to terrorise the non-Muslims 
Jihad forbids killing of 
civilians including women 
and children. 
Civilians must not be 
attacked by rebels unless 
Terrorism does not exclude 
anyone from killing 
including Muslims. 
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attacked in the course of 
rebellion. 
 
Table 1: Distinguishing features of jihad, rebellion and terrorism.  
The above discussion suggests that, terrorism does not come close to fulfilling any of the many 
conditions which are necessary for a just jihad or legitimate rebellion. Moreover, rebels have 
potential just cause and some degree of popular support and these differentiate rebels from 
terrorists.328 Such popular support was recognised by Al-Shaybani who stood strongly against 
an ‘Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid. Al-Shaybani challenged the Caliph’s accusation of one of 
his political opponent (al-Daylami) for treason and distinguished his action and behaviour from 
that of terrorists.329 However, despite having some degree of popular supports among Muslims 
for the expressed motives of revolutionary movements, terrorist activity remains opposed to 
both the spirit and the letter of Islam.330  
Confusion between jihad, rebellion and terrorism has played a vital role in hindering the 
development of Islamic law.331 Therefore, it was necessary to clearly draw the dividing line 
between these closely identical terms which are prone to abuse by the users of these terms in 
order to serve their own purposes. Islamic law has provided specific meaning and significances 
of these contested terms and stipulated guidelines for drawing dividing lines between them. 
These dividing lines, enshrined with distinguishing features between these contested but 
closely identical terms, shall be able to protect just jihad or legitimate rebellion from the 
negative impact of terrorism and promote Islamic law’s potential complementary role to 
international legal framework. Blurring the dividing lines between jihad, rebellion and 
terrorism from Islamic legal viewpoint is a serious mistake that in itself could lead to 
catastrophic consequences, especially in a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected 
and interdependent. This mistake may also endanger the relationship between Islam and the 
West.  
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4.4.3 The criminalisation of rebels in Islamic law 
Historically, different groups fought against their rulers and in doing so few groups had used 
violence against the civilians in order to terrorise the rulers and the population.332 The rulers 
had also very conveniently labelled them as terrorists or Kharijites due to the nature and violent 
consequences of their action. For example, there is evidence that the Umayyads and early 
‘Abbasids attempted to invoke the hirāba verse in the context of dealing with rebels.333 From 
majority classical exegetical point of view, as most of the Muslim jurists have maintained that 
a group must be recognised as rebels even if they fight against the ruler and his army as well 
as Muslims and civilians334, such group must not be categorised as terrorists to deny their rights 
as rebels.  
However, in practice they have not been recognised as rebels but as terrorists and had been 
tried under respective criminal laws.335 For example, the trial and sentence to death of those 
accused of assassination of President Anwar Sadat were in accordance with the Egyptian 
Criminal Code without considering Article 2 of the Constitution which has made such 
sentencing unconstitutional. 336  In 1982, the attorneys representing those accused of 
assassinating President Anwar Sadat argued that according to Article 2 (as amended on 22 May 
1980) of the Egyptian Constitution, a sentence pronouncing the death sentence on political 
criminals would be unconstitutional. 337  The argument was that those who assassinated 
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President Sadat were bugha, and since Article 2 provides that “the principles of the Shari‘a are 
the main source of legislation in the Arab Republic of Egypt” the court could not assess the 
death penalty without contravening the Shari‘a.338 However, the military tribunal ignored this 
argument in passing the death sentence on certain defendants.339 Furthermore, the Egyptian 
Criminal Code does not use the term bugha to adopt the meaning emphasised in Islamic law; 
article 101 describes those who conspire or plot to overthrow the government as bugha, but 
otherwise no substantive aspect of law of rebellion is adopted.340 
Similarly, several defendants accused of terrorism were denied their status as rebels under 
Islamic law and tried as well as sentenced under Kuwaiti Criminal Code in 1989.341 The 
attorney for the defendants argued to the court that according to Islamic law his clients were 
bugha and therefore should not receive death sentence.342 After pronouncing death sentence on 
several of the defendants, the judge chided the attorney for arguing outside his brief; then the 
judge noted that he was bound by the Kuwaiti Criminal Code and not Islamic law.343 Of course, 
this course of actions is inconsistent with the classical juridical position but few modern 
Muslim jurists have supported this. At this point, classical Islam comes into clash with modern 
Islam.  
The language, symbolism, and boundaries of the two categories (crime and rebellion) were 
often diluted and mixed, not just in historical practice, but in legal discourse as well.344 
Therefore, it is expedient to settle the disagreement between the modern and the classical jurists 
about the status of rebels in Islamic law. As stated earlier, both the classical and modern jurists 
have been divided on this point as both maintain that rebels are criminals on the one hand and 
not on the other.345 If fine lines can be drawn between jihad, rebellion and terrorism then why 
this disagreement cannot be settled in the light of these fine lines.  
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Certain jurists insist that baghy is an offence that results in the greatest corruption because it 
results in the destruction of life and property.346 Maliki and Hanbali jurists have maintained 
rebels as criminals and advocated imposition of hudud (capital) punishment.347 Hanafi and 
Shaf’i schools have maintained that rebels are not criminals348 and so did Ibn Taymiyyah.349 In 
addition, majority of the modern Muslim jurists have maintained that rebels are not 
criminals.350 On the contrary, very few modern Muslim jurists have maintained that rebels are 
criminals and should be punished for crimes committed by them.351  
Maliki and Hanbali schools have failed to draw a dividing line between rebellion and terrorism 
and have focused more on the superior right of the ruler to suppress disorder (fitna) and 
maintenance of stability in the state. So did the Shafʻi School as it focused on the legitimacy 
of the ruler rather than the rebellion. This is due to the circumstances during classical period 
where conflict of interests between the rulers and the ruled were very acute than ever. On the 
other hand, Hanafi School has maintained a two-phased stance where it recognised the right of 
rebels and the rulers to use force.352 Furthermore, where some other Hanbali jurists and Ibn 
Taymiyyah have maintained that rebellion is not a sinful act and some Shafʻi jurists argued that 
it is not a derogatory term and it makes the position of the right of the rebellion stronger than 
the right of the ruler to suppress rebellion.  
On this account, it can be concluded that, the majority scholarly view, both classical and 
modern, recognises the right of rebellion and in opposition to criminalisation of any actions 
carried out in the course of rebellion.353  
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4.4.3.1 The Assassination of political leaders by rebels  
As stated above, politically motivated use of force with a desire for private gain354 rather than 
religiously motivated act with a desire for ideological gain is likely to be a crime. The extension 
of the nature and scope of use of force in rebellion by certain non-state armed actors in Muslim 
countries have triggered the criminalisation of such use of force.355 It was their extended use 
of force which is not allowed in Islam. Caliph Umar al-Khattab executed six or seven men who 
killed someone through ghila (by deception or stealth which could be an assassination) as he 
tried these men for the crime they committed. 356  Effectively, Murder through ghila is 
considered an aggravated crime which necessitates that the offender be executed, and that the 
option of blood money or pardon is not be allowed.357  
The majority Muslim jurists have also held the view that political assassination is an act of 
terrorism and the perpetrator should be punished for committing crime.358 Shayakh Abu Zahrah 
(1898-1974) has suggested that assassination of political leaders is terrorism.359 Moreover, Ibn 
Taymiyya noted that a political assassin should be treated as a terrorist because of the public 
corruption that such a person carries.360 Ghanim has also linked President Sadat’s assassination 
with political gain and suggested that the killing of Sadat was an act of terrorism that had its 
roots in the sectarian splits that marked early Islamic political history, specifically the bloody 
conflict between the factions of ‘Ali and Muʻawiya.361  
The above scholarly positions suggest that the scholars denote assassination of political figures 
as terrorism due to the nature of the act. However, Islamic law draws the dividing line between 
terrorism and rebellion on the basis of contextual circumstances rather than on the nature of 
the act.362 Like terrorism, rebellion could take the form of an assassination attempt against a 
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famous religious or political figure.363 But Islamic contextual treatment of the criminality of an 
act would appear to show that the dividing line between terrorism and rebellion can be drawn 
on consideration of the context and circumstances in which it is committed. As shown above, 
if the context is solely political or material gain then it is likely to be an act of terrorism. On 
the contrary, if the context is solely ideological or a mixed of both political and ideological but 
the primary purpose was the former than the latter then it is likely to be an act carried out in 
the course of rebellion.364 For this reason, the assassination of the then Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat by “jama’a al-Islamiya” was an act of terrorism rather than rebellion. 
4.4.4 The Criminalisation of rebels in the West 
Throughout the history, rebels in the West were treated as criminals because they were seen as 
a threat to the political order and stability.365 The pre-nineteenth century Western world treated 
rebels with extreme hostility.366 Only after the French Revolution, and under the influence of 
theorists such as Francois Guizot, did political rebels become entitled to preferred treatment as 
a special brand of ‘honourable’ criminals.367  
In the Western systems rebels are also often viewed as traitor in the eyes of law which showed 
little tolerance for those who defied the political order. For example, The Qing Code has 
classified rebellion as one of the ten great wrongs (Article 2(1)) and no distinction has been 
made between rebellion and treason (Article 255).368  The customary law of Scotland denotes 
that rebellion against the King is treason.369 Treason was later extended to include conspiracy 
and rebellion against the nation’s sovereign and city councils.370 In England, an aggravated 
punishment applied to traitors until 1790s.371  
The above examples show that the labelling of rebels as criminals and trying them under 
criminal law had been a universal practice in the Western legal systems. Public international 
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law is primarily based on the Western system of laws and thus the law of rebellion has not been 
developed in the light of Islamic law. Another reason for its underdevelopment is the lack of 
state practice in the Muslim states. In an international legal framework, which itself does not 
distinguish the rights of rebellion, and in the absence of state practices from Muslim countries 
in this respect have immensely contributed to the underdevelopment of this special branch of 
law.  
However, Public international law has not only denied its scope of application to rebels, as 
discussed above, but also has become a barrier for Islamic law to complement it. This is because 
in Islamic law rebels are not held criminally responsible for any killings or destruction of 
property directly linked to the rebellion372 but Public international law does not interfere if a 
state holds the rebels criminally responsible for their action. This barrier has resulted into denial 
of legitimate rights of rebels especially in the territory where majority of the populations are 
Muslims. Such denial of legitimate rights has also resulted in giving rise to a ‘just cause’ 
argument for rebels to commit violence. For example, arbitrary arrests and execution of the 
members of Muslim Brothers in Egypt in 1960s.373 In addition, state practice of inventing new 
categories of parties to armed conflict like ‘unlawful combatant’ has also given rise to 
unjustified treatment of rebels.374 
It has been argued by some scholars that rebels can bind themselves, by Public international 
law in general and International Humanitarian Law in particular, through commitments in the 
policy statements, codes of conduct and unilateral declarations.375 For example, the rebel group 
‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) made a 
unilateral declaration on 21 June 2015 to become an adherent of the Geneva Conventions 1949 
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and its Additional Protocol I. 376  However, these statements, codes and declarations are 
voluntary in nature and weak in effect.377 The ICRC has faced challenges of rejection from 
rebels and other non-state armed actors in terms of extracting compliance of previously agreed 
IHL provisions.378 Furthermore, there are notable examples of rebel groups’ outright rejection 
of any obligation of IHL provisions. For example, the express rejection by the Algerian group 
Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) to be bound by Geneva Conventions in terms of protection 
of war victims379, the refusal of NLM of Vietnam to apply Common Article 3380, and the 
refutation of any binding effect of any treaty by the Colombian Group Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in which it was not a party.381 These examples suggest 
that Public international law has been unsuccessful in becoming an effective legal framework 
to deal with rebellion as opposed to Islamic law which, albeit theoretically, have developed 
legal principles to recognise the right of rebellion in the one hand and the treatment of rebels 
in the other. 
Conclusion 
The political unwillingness of state authorities to recognise the right of rebellion and use of 
force by rebels have resulted in the lack of effective international legal framework to deal with 
rebellion. UN Charter encompassed internal armed conflict as ‘international peace and security’ 
issue but failed to deal with this issue by providing effective legal framework.382 The existing 
legal framework of international law, namely the Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
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Protocols, is not effective to meet the challenges posed by the nature of the conflict between 
the rebels and the rulers.383 This framework provides illegitimate advantage to state authorities 
over rebels in the recognition of right of rebelling and the treatment of rebels. This has resulted 
in an imbalanced platform of law and politics. This imbalanced platform has raised the question 
of legitimacy of Public international law which has not only widened the ‘gap’ between the 
legal protections of rulers and rebels but also failed to effectively regulate rebellion. In addition, 
this legitimacy question has also been raised in regard to the use of force by the authorities of 
Muslim states who are constantly ignoring the rights and status of rebels as recognised in 
Islamic law.  
Politically motivated use of force by rebels or rulers without taking into account the principles 
of Islamic law is likely to suffer from legitimacy-deficit. Due to the lack of legitimacy in such 
use of force, the rulers and rebels will fall within the category of tyrant or unjust rulers and 
terrorists respectively. The existence of necessary degree of legitimacy is a vital factor for 
determining the validity of use of force in any circumstance or context. The necessary legal 
standard required by legitimacy and the threshold that any legal principles must satisfy in order 
to obtain such standard are the issues for determination in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
The Legitimacy of International law and Islamic law in the use of 
force 
 
Some 30 years ago, Thomas Franck observed that no one seemed to be asking fundamental 
questions about the legitimacy of international law.1  He concluded that the legitimacy of 
international law is based on its voluntary pull of compliance.2 His observation, as referred in 
the first sentence, no longer holds true because currently international law’s legitimacy has 
become a central concern.3 In any society, but especially among states, the compliance pull of 
law is based on the expectation of each participant that most others, most of the time, will obey 
the law – all of it, not just some subsets, and not only when it is in their immediate interest to 
do so.4 The presence of so many crises in the regulation of use of force has inspired a great deal 
of reflection on the legitimacy of international actors, international norms and international 
legal system as a whole, particularly following such events as the NATO Bombing of Kosovo 
in 1999, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the intervention in Libya in 2011 and the paralysis of the 
Security Council to take action in Syria.5  
 
Furthermore, since the United States and the United Kingdom embarked on their war on terror, 
dragging along various allies with them and pressing the United Nations to grant their actions 
credibility, the balance between what is legal and what is legitimate has been affected.6 If 
during the nineteen eighties and up to the mid-nineties the legitimacy of use of force was reliant 
on standards of legality, especially since 2001, the relation has been reversed: what is presented 
as legitimate or justifiable in relation to the use of force becomes tolerated or implicitly 
legalised by international law, in spite of doubts about legality, as the cases of Kosovo and Iraq 
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demonstrate.7 The upshot of this appears to be that legitimacy is currently more important than 
legality in the international arena when it comes to applying force.8 
 
The above position suggests that, the claim that rule-based interaction exists among states is 
now being seriously debated, much to the surprise of those who had prematurely celebrated 
international law’s arrival at a post-ontological moment. 9  In recent decades, the term 
‘legitimacy’ has featured heavily in debates about international law and international 
institutions.10 Yet the concept of legitimacy, mercurial as it is, has remained under-scrutinised, 
leading to confusion and misuse.11 Justifications for the exercise of power in the international 
sphere, however, remain under-explored and under-scrutinised.12 
 
This chapter’s overarching theme concerns the articulation and defence of the legitimacy of 
international law on the use of force. The concerns, stated above, guide the assessment and 
development of international law towards a philosophical inquiry about legitimacy of the law 
on the use of force in descriptive sense. This inquiry addresses the question ‘is international 
law on the use of force facing a legitimacy crisis?’13 In the process of addressing this question, 
this chapter introduces the meaning and significance of legitimacy of international law on the 
use of force followed by an analysis of the legitimacy-deficits of the law in terms of its norms 
and the institutions which are entrusted with the governance of use of force.  
This chapter also focuses on the legitimacy of Islamic law on the use of force based on its 
shortcomings. The philosophical inquiry in this part is based on analysis of the nature and 
extent of the legitimacy deficits inherent in this legal system followed by an assessment on 
how these deficits can be overcome in the best possible ways. This assessment leads the chapter 
to draw a conclusion on the comparative position of Islamic law and Public international law 
on the use of force in terms of complementing each other through a recognition of the value of 
a pluralistic approach. This conclusion would lead the way to overcome the barrier of Public 
international legal system’s self-description of itself as universal, objective, and neutral. This 
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finding would enable the thesis to answer the third question, namely whether Public 
international law and Islamic international law can be compatible in modern world.  
5.1 The meaning and significance of legitimacy of Public international law 
on the use of force 
Legitimacy develops a ‘belief’ within an action, rule, actor or system that such action, rule 
actor or system is morally and legally legitimate.14 Legality, as opposed to legitimacy, is 
obtained when the legal requirements have been complied with by an action, rule, actor or 
system.15 This is because, the formal fact of legal validity engenders an obligation to obey the 
law on the basis of its legality, but not necessarily of its legitimacy.16  Seen in this way, 
legitimacy does not make a normative commitment to any relationship of power; it treats 
legitimacy as a social fact, not a normative goal. 17  Therefore, legitimacy is specifically 
concerned with what forms of power people believe to be justified.18 Those beliefs generally 
emanate from their cultural and religious values. For example, whereas the Western cultural 
values do not believe that the Security Council may retain its legitimacy when it struggles to 
confront threat of force directed to the West, the Muslim majority states and most third world 
states believe that the Security Council may retain its legitimacy by effectively regulating use 
of force as provided by the UN Charter, for instance all uses of force, whether individual or 
collection, must be authorised by the Security Council.19 As a result, an internal disconnection 
has occurred between the legitimacy of use of force between Public international law and 
Islamic international law. This disconnection has posed challenges to Public international law 
for its self-description of itself universal, objective, and neutral. This position of Public 
international law has questioned its input legitimacy for lack of inclusive approach of other 
major legal system, namely Islamic international law.  
 
Legitimacy, in this thesis, means to include the cultural and religious diversity of the subjects 
of international law. Seen in this way, legitimacy is based on the application of cultural values 
                                                          
14 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton University 
Press 2007) 7.  
15 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 53. 
16 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Instructions (OUP 1995) 26; see also Christopher Thomas, 
‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 729, 736. 
17 Christopher Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 729, 741. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid, 746. 
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of different societies in relation to use of force. On this basis, ‘legitimacy’ is a threshold value 
which provides higher standard of legitimacy to international law when it is inclusive of 
cultural diversity. 20  Therefore, legitimacy denotes the inclusion of the perceptions of the 
subjects of international law not only about its binding nature but also its general acceptability, 
and going beyond conformity to rules, such as conformity to the ‘spirit’ as opposed to the 
‘letter’ of the law.21 In this sense, use of force is legitimate when the cultural values of the 
subjects have been represented in the law-making process and the decision-making process has 
been transparent, in particular when those affected have had a chance to have their say.22 The 
point is, however, that the spirit of the law is incorporated in the international law on the use 
of force. From this perspective, legitimacy’s focal point of scrutiny, in this thesis, is an inquiry 
into the descriptive legitimacy of international law on the use of force.  
 
Legitimacy, in the descriptive sense, denotes the fact that a norm or an institutional 
arrangement is legitimate if it finds the approval of those who are supposed to live in this 
group.23 Legitimacy in this sense is simply the fact that the subjects of the norm or institutional 
arrangement believe that norm or arrangement to be legitimate.24 Therefore, legitimacy of use 
of force is primarily a question about how an actor is perceived as having a right to use such 
force.25 
5.2 Legitimacy deficits of Public international law on the use of force  
There are presently many active debates about what may constitute legitimate use of force.26 
The current challenges that international law on the use of force have been subject to are 
                                                          
20 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP 1990) 19; see also Gerry Simpson, The Nature 
of International Law (Dartmouth: Ashgate 2001) xxxi; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy 
of Global Governance Institutions’ in Lukas Meyer (ed), Legitimacy, Justice and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 38; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy in International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some 
Introductory Considerations’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law 
(Springer: Heidelberg 2010) 6. 
21 Carlo Focarelli, International Law as a Social Construct (OUP 2012) 245.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology in G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds), 3 vols. 
(New York: Bedminister Press 1968) 941. 
24 Lukas Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, ‘Introduction’ in Lukas Meyer (ed), Legitimacy, Justice and International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 2.  
25 Allen Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 80.  
26 Christopher Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 729, 730. 
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responsible for this debate. 27  Whereas legitimacy can overcome the challenges by 
implementing its power,28 it is not an easy task to determine how legitimacy can play this 
difficult role at its best. This is because, the disconnection between the cultural values of the 
subjects of international law leads the legal system towards a state where it not only lacks 
inclusiveness but also rejects the potential connectedness of such diverse values. In fact, these 
diverse values are intimately connected to each other. Although in short term these values 
operate independently, in the long run they operate through legal, moral, economic, social and 
cultural links between them to ensure that what affects one will often affect another.29 As a 
result, recourse to force, whether by a state or regional organisation, based on their self-
declared legitimacy and universal application is subject to scrutiny as it is likely to affect the 
cultural values of others who do not perceive such recourse to force as legitimate and 
accordingly denies their claim of universality as fake and materialistic.  
 
Current international law on the use of force is articulated in the United Nations Charter and 
the practices prevalent among states under the Charter system.30 An overview of the Charter 
system and the state practices under this system suggest that international law on the use of 
force is suffering from significant legitimacy-deficits, namely in the descriptive sense.31 This 
section of the chapter scrutinises legitimacy of certain acts or omissions of use of force, by 
state and non-state actors, the norm providing general prohibition of use of force, and the 
decision-making process of the Security Council. 
5.2.1 Legitimacy deficits in the descriptive sense 
Legitimacy, in the descriptive sense, is based on the belief of the subjects that the recourse to 
force is legitimate.32 However, this belief must be correct in order to profess such legitimacy. 
The correctness of the belief lies on the issue ‘whether a norm or institutional arrangement, 
pertaining to use of force, satisfies certain specified conditions for possessing legitimacy’.33  
Therefore, the focal point of legitimacy of international law on the use of force is the legitimacy 
of the rule itself, such as the index-legitimacy of the rule. In this regard, the inquiry would 
                                                          
27 See section 2.3 of chapter 2; see also Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, ‘Introduction’ in Samantha Besson 
and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 4. 
28 See section 5.1 of this chapter (above).  
29 Christopher Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 729, 746. 
30 See sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of chapter 2. 
31 See section 5.2.1 of this chapter (below).  
32 See section 5.1 of this chapter (above).  
33 Lukas Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, ‘Introduction’ in Lukas Meyer (ed), Legitimacy, Justice and International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 2. 
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include the challenges posed to the use of force provision of the UN Charter.34 The inquiry is 
advanced by scrutinising the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which 
is the central international institution entrusted with the responsibility of regulating use of 
force.35  
5.2.2 Index legitimacy deficit of International law on the use of force 
The use of defensive force in response to an armed attack has been claimed to be insufficient 
by the realists and expansionists.36 This is because it is unreasonable for a state to wait until 
being attacked first in order for using defensive force.37 Moreover, the nature and extent of the 
attack can be so severe that the attacked state might not get the chance to use defensive force 
due to being devastated by the attack.38 On this basis, the combined provisions of Articles 2(4) 
and 51 do not provide for the self-preservation of states which are under threat of an imminent 
armed attack. This is known as ‘index legitimacy deficit’ of international law on the use of 
force.39  
 
The problem that persists with the ‘index legitimacy deficit’ is that for the rule being 
indeterminate the normative standards not only make it harder to know what conformity is 
expected, but also make it easier to justify non-compliance.40 Although some rules are more 
determinate than others,41 the degree of a determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of 
its perceived legitimacy.42 The higher the degree of determinacy the higher the degree of 
legitimacy, and hence higher degree of rule-conforming behaviour.  
 
Index legitimacy deficit is an inherent problem of the law as it questions the effectiveness of 
the law in dealing with contemporary challenges of use of force.43 One way of overcoming this 
legitimacy deficit is by ascertaining and agreeing on the types of attack, in scale and effect, that 
                                                          
34 See section 2.3 of chapter 2. 
35 See section 5.2.3 of this chapter (below). 
36 See section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of chapter 2.  
37 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 292. 
38 See section 2.3.4.1 of chapter 2. 
39 Thomas Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 
705, 712. 
40 ibid, 714. 
41 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging’ (1986) 36 J. Legal EDUC 518; for contra 
see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (G.E. Anscombe trans, 1953) 81. 
42 Thomas Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 
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43 See section 2.3 of chapter 2. 
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can be categorised as ‘armed attack’.44 This could be done by ICJ through active involvement 
in its decision-making process. For instance, defining the term ‘armed attack’ when opportunity 
comes before it rather than being reluctant to do so.45 The development of an efficient and 
consistent jurisprudence in the ICJ is necessary to overcome the indeterminacy that exists in 
the categorisation of situations triggering ‘armed attack’ under Article 51.  
Although another way of overcoming this legitimacy deficit has been addressed by recognising 
pre-emptive self-defence within the Charter system in case of imminent armed attack46, the 
decision to determine if such an armed attack is imminent is left in the hands of the states. The 
problem with this approach is that states are prone to abuse this option against their opponents 
if there is no provision for scrutiny by an independent body.47 For example, the decision of the 
coalition force to attack Iraq in 2003 on their own assessment of imminent threat of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMS).48 In these circumstances, who or what institution, what judge or 
jury, should decide whether the norm’s requisites for pre-emptive action have been met.49 
In order to resolve this issue, the high-level panel has rendered a real service in drawing a 
distinction between an imminent threat, as to which states may take proportionate pre-emptive 
action when there remains no viable alternative, and what it described as non-imminent or non-
proximate threats, which may still be very serious and as to which action may, indeed, highly 
desirable but must be fully justified by the claimant before the Security Council acting as a 
global jury.50 However, this solution has not been very effective so far.51 
                                                          
44 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
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51 Christine Gray, ‘The Charter Limitation on the Use of Force: Theory and Practice’ in Vaughan Lowe, Adam 
Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War (OUP 2008) 96; 
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
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To secure higher degree of legitimacy, it is necessary that international law be amended to 
include an implied undertaking by states that ‘if they recourse to force in self-defence in 
response to an imminent armed attack then they will be automatically accountable to the 
Security Council for scrutiny’. 52  The Security Council may be able to refer the task of 
scrutinising the recourse to force to an independent body or institution, namely ICJ or ICC.53 
This measure of accountability is likely to control the use of force in an effective manner and 
hence promote legitimacy, both before and after using such force. This legitimacy can even 
achieve a higher degree if such undertaking includes criminal responsibility for abusing the 
state authority of using defensive force against imminent attack.54 
5.2.3 Procedural or Process Legitimacy deficits 
International law on the use of force is constituted not only by its substantive rules but also by 
those institutional processes that implement the rules.55 Procedural legitimacy is concerned 
with the mechanisms by which power is conferred and exercised.56  It prioritises the formal 
validity of power, focusing on secondary rules about the making, changing and destruction of 
laws.57 For example, the process to be followed in the Security Council for authorisation of use 
of force.58 As a result, the legitimacy of a rule, or of a rule-making or rule-applying institutions, 
is a function of the perception of those in the community concerned that the rule, or the 
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institution, has come into being endowed with legitimacy, which is in accordance with right 
process.59  
 
Legitimacy of international institutions derives from the procedures they follow in making 
decisions.60 The design and operation of international institution like the Security Council are 
often dominated by more powerful states and used to serve their ends, thereby resulting 
injustice and making it difficult to claim that the institutions were legitimate.61 For example, 
the domination of the permanent members at the Security Council by exercise or threat to 
exercise their veto power.62  
 
The decision to use force, at the international level, is entrusted to the Security Council which 
is an international institution established by the UN Charter to protect and promote 
international peace and security.63 Decision making at the international level by the Security 
Council lacks any direct electoral foundation since they have no direct source-oriented 
legitimacy.64 For this reason, the functioning of the Security Council in terms of making 
decision to use force is often generally considered to be illegitimate.65 In this lack of direct 
source-oriented legitimacy, the legitimacy of Security Council has been classically addressed 
through the way in which the functions were exercised, namely the decision-making process.66  
 
The UN Charter has recognised the principle of sovereign equality of its members.67 This 
principle has been implemented by the rule that each member state of the General Assembly 
shall have one vote.68 However, this principle has not been so implemented in the decision-
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making process of the Security Council.69 Most substantive decisions of the Security Council 
require not only the support of a majority of nine members but the concurring votes of the 
permanent members.70 This is known as the ‘veto’ system which has apparently disregarded 
the principle of sovereign equality and thereby undermined the consistency in the decision-
making process at the Security Council. Therefore, the legitimacy deficit is prevalent in the 
decision-making process of the Security Council. 71  Such deficit is likely to decline the 
necessary pull of compliance of any decision made or not made within the Security Council 
due to ‘veto system’.  
The legitimacy of the ‘veto’ system is questioned due to inconsistency of this system with the 
power of other member states. But the legitimacy of this system could be claimed as valid if a 
case could be made for such power to be rationally coherent.72 Such case of coherence has been 
made on the ground that the permanent members should have a greater say in the decision-
making process of the Security Council because they bear most of the costs of the organisation 
and are expected to assume the military as well as fiscal responsibilities for carrying out the 
Charter’s mandate.73  In addition, the power-five (permanent) member states could not be 
compelled in reality to any decision against their will.74  
This case of coherence could be a valid claim in past but does not seem to have a real prospect 
of persuasiveness in the current world. This is because most the peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement measures taken by the UN are supported by military and fiscal support of non-
permanent members like northern Europe and third world countries. 75  All the permanent 
members do not represent the powerful states in the world community any more. The emerging 
powers in the world community like Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and Nigeria now have a 
very good claim of being preferred states on economic, military, geographic and demographic 
grounds.76   
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It appears that the permanent members have focused on strengthening the military ability of 
their national or regional force rather than that of the United Nations.77 In addition, the way the 
veto power has been exercised by the permanent members does not reflect what has been 
agreed during the drafting negotiations. The permanent members agreed to exercise veto only 
in situations having the most serious impact on their basic interests.78 They also agreed that 
when the Security Council was considering measures for peaceful settlement of disputes they 
would abstain.79  But the veto power has been used in convenience of the permanent members 
than sparingly as agreed.80  For instance, The US did not abstain from vetoing a 1986 resolution 
calling on it to execute the International Court of Justice judgment on a case brought by 
Nicaragua.81 Therefore, the case of coherence to exercise veto power by permanent members 
is not persuasive in the current world.  
Furthermore, the nature of the Security Council could be defended on impartial utilitarian-type 
grounds by arguing that it would be paralysed with a large membership, or that the veto 
promotes stability and peace.82 This justification is based on the benefits of such a composition 
of the Security Council would generate (in theory) for all countries, namely the preservation of 
international peace and security. For instance, peace, stability and collective security are 
promoted when the states with power stand behind a resolution of the Security Council and 
weakened without that endorsement.83 However, if this justification is examined from non-
ideal institutional principle (practical perspective) aiming to create a fair political framework 
then the authority of the Security Council ought to aim at legitimacy. 
The question of whether a decision is made in conformity with the UN Charter and principles 
of international law, such as whether a decision is legitimate from the perspective of the 
exercise of functions, is incrementally being complemented by the question of whether the 
Security Council as an institution has the necessary legitimacy to make certain decisions.84 
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This interplay between process legitimacy and source-oriented legitimacy is relevant due to the 
impact of the decision of the Security Council on the world population.85 Former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan criticised the lack of legitimacy of origin of the Security Council by stating 
that: 
The Security Council has increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the 
end of the cold war, has enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its permanent members 
but has seen that authority questioned on the grounds that its composition is 
anachronistic or insufficiently representative.86  
Therefore, the Secretary-General suggested to make the Security Council more broadly 
representative of the international community as a whole.87 
5.2.3.1 Involving Regional Organisation 
Where the primarily responsible international institution, namely the Security Council, for the 
maintenance of peace and security fails to carry out its responsibilities then the international 
community can legitimately adopt different procedures which could enable them to restore 
such peace and security.88 Where a state fails to fulfil its responsibility to protect its people 
within its territory and the Security Council is paralysed then the regional organisation could 
be given the responsibility to restore peace and security within the region.89 The responsibility 
should be allocated in ascending order, which is the state, the regional organisation and finally 
the Security Council. 
In this way, a link can be established between state and the Security Council through the 
process of ‘regional integration’. 90  This integration process provides the states with an 
opportunity to participate in the use of force action through regional organisation. This 
integration process shall include, in the regional organisation, not only geographically 
proximate states but also states which are religiously and culturally proximate.91 For example, 
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Bangladesh and Pakistan are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
despite being geographically distant from the other members of the organisation. The 
integration between the states is very strong within the regional organisation.92 This is because 
such organisation tends to operate with small numbers and higher levels of interaction than 
global organisations, and is more likely to involve member states in the decision-making 
process.93 
If the state fails to fulfil its state responsibility to protect then the regional organisation can be 
given the option to legitimately intervene failing other alternatives to restore peace and security 
within the state territory.94 Although the principle of sovereign equality is not implemented in 
the decision-making process of the Security Council,95 there is nothing that could prevent this 
from being implemented at the regional level. This is because, achieving sovereign equality of 
every member state of the Security Council is not feasible,96  but equal representation by 
regional organisations is feasible. There should not be any option to exercise veto power at the 
regional organisation level as far as use of force is concerned. In addition, the regional 
organisation should be able to legitimately intervene, when necessary, into the territory of its 
member state without prior authorisation from the Security Council in circumstances when 
waiting for such authorisation would likely to result, in the decision of the regional organisation, 
serious consequences, such as genocide or severe human rights catastrophe.97 In such urgent 
situation, it is necessary that any intervention must be subject to later scrutiny by the Security 
Council or any other body referred by it.98  
However, this approach is not free from criticism as some of the most crisis-prone regions have 
no or only underdeveloped and underfunded capabilities and the regional organisation is but 
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little trusted by minorities or governments in that part of the world.99 For example, in 2011 the 
Security Council had authorised the peace enforcement operation to NATO in Libya. There 
had been evidence that NATO was involved in supplying arms and ammunitions to rebel forces 
to facilitate regime change thus violating the mandate of the Security Council. 100  Further 
example includes the intervention by African Union (AU) in Somalia in 2007 to support the 
weak Transitional Federal Government met with disapproval from many Somalis who regarded 
it as illegitimate on the basis that power state, which is Ethiopia, was directly shaping the AU’s 
position on the conflict to uphold their self-interest.101 In these circumstances, the legitimacy 
crisis can be overcome by ensuring accountability of the regional organisation involved in the 
use of force as suggested above.102 
Finally, the veto power in the Security Council should be abolished by agreement between the 
permanent members and a new veto system should be established.103 In the new system, a 
regional organisation should be empowered to exercise the veto only regarding any decision to 
use force within the territory of any member states of that regional organisation. For example, 
a majority decision taken in the Security Council to use force to restore peace and security 
within the territory of a state which is a member of the League of Arab States must go ahead 
unless vetoed by the regional organisation, which is ‘the League of Arab States’. However, 
exercising the veto power by the regional organisation should not prevent it from using force 
by itself within the territory of the member state.104 In this way, a more legitimate hierarchy 
can be created in the international legal framework on the basis of coherence.105  
The states which are unable to deal with the breach or threat to peace situation within its 
territory must seek assistance from the regional organisation first and then from the Security 
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Council. The Security Council should be able to refer breach of peace and threat to peace 
circumstances to the regional organisation for consideration and should be able to require 
explanation from the latter for any action taken in this regard. The Security Council shall only 
be able to intervene in the territory of the member state of a regional organisation only in the 
following circumstances:  
(a) when the regional organisation concerned invites the Security Council; or  
(b) when the majority of the members of the Security Council decide that the regional 
organisation has failed to fulfil its responsibility to protect; or  
(c) in circumstances which have been previously agreed by the regional organisation 
by treaty.  
If the regional organisation needs assistance, it must request other regional organisations 
through the Security Council. The Security Council should offer its resources to the regional 
organisation first rather than any state unless the Security Council decides by majority that the 
state has not been legitimately intervened by the regional organisation.106 However, in such 
situation the Security Council should promote dispute settlement mechanism between the state 
and the regional organisation. If it fails in resolving the dispute then it can intervene in the 
territory of the state directly by military forces, for example by peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement operations.107 
By adhering to the above procedure in the use of force decision making process at the regional 
organisation and the Security Council, a considerably higher degree of legitimacy will be 
achieved and accordingly a higher pull of compliance among the states.  
5.3 Legitimacy deficits of Islamic international law on the use of force 
Legitimacy plays a vital role in Islamic international law on the use of force. This is because, 
it not only validates the rule but also makes provisions for accountability of the rulers and their 
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right to rule. Therefore, legitimacy works as an assessment tool for scrutinising if any 
interpretation of law is Islamic and if the ruler is ruling in accordance with Islamic law.108 
Legitimacy in Islamic law includes both source-oriented and process legitimacy. Source-
oriented legitimacy is synchronic as it is based on already completed sources of the Qur’an and 
Sunna. On the other hand, process legitimacy is diachronic which is based on the sources, 
namely Qur’an, Sunna, Ijmā and Qiyās, through which the law may be derived following the 
processes required and hence on rule-justification. The legitimacy analysis in this section is 
confined to these sources. This is because, although there are alternative methods of reasoning 
based on considerations of juristic preference (istihsān) or public welfare and interest (istislāh), 
these were of limited validity and were not infrequently the subject of controversy.109 
The legitimacy of Islamic law on the use of force is mainly source-oriented. 110  Unlike 
international law, Islamic law’s legitimacy has always been determined by Shari‘a which is 
consisted of the Qur’an and Sunna.111 The principles of law have primarily derived from 
Shari‘a.112 Therefore, Shari‘a has been operating as a touchstone or guiding star in Islamic 
jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh). Shari‘a has been formed and developed from the Qur’anic 
provisions and Sunna during the lifetime of the Prophet. Sunna being ‘the actions and sayings 
of the Prophet’ its development continued following the death of the Prophet when his 
companions validated the Sunna through the chain of transmission (isnād).113 The compilation 
and validation of Sunna continued until 1000 CE, which is 4 centuries after the death of the 
Prophet.114 As soon as the compilation of Sunna had been completed, the formation of the 
Shari‘a had also been completed.  
However, the development of the Shari‘a did not stop there. This is because, Shari‘a had not 
provided guidance for each and every circumstances which, human being in general and 
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Muslims in particular, would encounter so long the world exists.115 As a result, there are 
circumstances when Muslims have to go beyond the periphery of Shari‘a to find out the 
solution of the issues but this action of ‘going beyond’ had to be within the spirit of or, in other 
words, consistent with, Shari‘a in order to be legitimate.116 Hence, the development of Shari‘a 
has been continuing through sources which represent either consensus of juristic opinion (Ijmā) 
or analogy (Qiyās).117  
Consensus of juristic opinion (Ijmā) is a process whereby the creative jurists, the mujtahids, 
representing the community at large, are considered to have reached an agreement, on a 
technical legal ruling, thereby rendering it as conclusive and as epistemologically certain as 
any verse of the Qur’an.118 On the other hand, analogy (Qiyās) involves a process whereby the 
mujtahids decide legal cases on the basis of similar legal cases together with its rulings which 
had been adjudicated earlier by Shari‘a or Ijmā. As a result, in both Ijmā and Qiyās, the 
mujtahids, authorised by divine revelation, are thus capable of transforming a ruling reached 
through human legal reasoning into a textual source by the very fact of their agreement on its 
validity.119 However, the overriding objective is to utilise the methods of interpretation and 
reasoning while maintaining the fundamental position that the law derives from the divine 
will.120  
By following these processes, the mujtahids have developed an Islamic jurisprudence which 
require a process legitimacy for any interpretation or view, to have legal effect, and to gain 
legitimacy. The legitimacy, in Islamic law, is decided on an affirmative or negative, which is 
either legitimate or illegitimate. In other words, legitimacy in Islamic law, unlike international 
law, is based on absolute value.  
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Juristic interpretation has been the key features of development of Islamic law on the use of 
force.121 This is because, since the closure of Ijtihād, only juristic interpretation has maintained 
its development in the course of time.122 However, the negative impact of this development is 
that diverse interpretations have developed in this subject area without any formal scrutiny to 
legitimate such interpretations.123 In this way, Islamic law in the use of force has not been free 
from legitimacy deficits. These deficits created by diverse interpretations have given rise to 
conflicting interpretations of not only the Qur’an and Sunna but also the juristic sources of 
Islamic law namely Ijmā and Qiyās. 
Islamic law on the use of force is heavily relied on authoritative interpretation and legal 
reasoning. 124  Whereas the Qur’an and Sunna provide the generality of the law, juristic 
interpretations (Ijtihād) represent its speciality. 125  In contradistinction to the first type of 
knowledge whose apprehension and performance is incumbent upon all Muslims, the second 
type entails duties for only a few. 126  These few are mujtahids (jurisconsults) who are 
responsible to fulfil their duties to follow the appropriate process of interpretation and legal 
reasoning on behalf of their community.127 However, when the texts provide only indications 
and signs, the jurists then must attempt to find out the divine intention, although there is no 
guarantee that the ruling he reaches will be identical with that which is lodged in God’s mind.128 
But such ruling must be accepted as legitimate in so far the appropriate process of interpretation 
is followed by a qualified person, such as mujtahid. In a field in which commentaries and 
interpretations are the norm, only the qualified jurists have the right authority to undertake such 
actions.129  
Mujtahids are under an obligation to determine the legal values governing their conduct, values 
that are hidden in the language of the texts.130 Although it is possible that consensus transmitted 
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or ruling arrived at by means of ijtihād by a Mujtahid are susceptible to error, it is objectionable 
to maintain on this possibility of error that no such transmission or ijtihād should be 
undertaken.131 
5.3.1 Source-oriented legitimacy deficit 
In the later part of the antiquity and during the Middle Ages the Islamic law, although not in 
the specific name of Siyar, governed the relationship between Islamic and non-Islamic states.132 
The Qur’anic provisions and Sunna of the Prophet had been at the apex of all rules as far as 
use of force is concerned.133 The divine law or natural law could not be altered but it had been 
possible to interpret the law by overtly ambitious politics with an expansive meaning.134 The 
politics ambitioned to expand the Islamic Empire and considered the rest of the world as abode 
of war (Dar al-Harb) until the whole world would become under the Islamic rule (Dar al-
Islam).135 In other words, the politics had ambitioned to Islamic Empire (Caliphate) consisting 
of the whole world. 136  However, this ambition is inconsistent with the scriptures of the 
Qur’an.137 No Qur’anic provision has recognised such an Islamic Empire. On the contrary, it 
has specifically emphasised about the diverse nature of the world population. 
Following the death of the rightly guided Caliphs, the later Caliphs, including the Ummayyads, 
considered themselves the deputies of God on earth, and thus claimed to have the right authority 
of interpretation from Shari‘a.138 However, the juristic authority of later Caliphs is in doubt as 
since the demise of the Prophet and rightly guided Caliphs the political and juristic authorities 
have been separated.139 That means, unlike the Prophet and rightly guided Caliphs, the later 
Caliphs were not entitled to exercise both political and juristic authorities but the political 
authority alone.140 For example, the Ummayyad Caliph Umar II (99-101/717-19) is said to have 
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resorted to the judges and jurists who were adept in knowledge (ilm) of Islamic law when in 
doubt.141 
Non-Mujtahids (muqallid; pl. muqallidūn) started interpreting and giving conflicting views on 
the Qur’anic provisions and Sunna.142 For example, in the process of providing a religious 
legitimation for the territorial expansionism of the Muslim rulers, they preferred on many 
occasions to overlook those passages of the Qur’an that point toward moral justifications for 
the jihad.143 Consequently, their rationalisation of the jihad as the means by which the world 
might be converted to the ‘sphere of Islam’ obscures the distinction between the Qur’anic 
concept of a ‘just war’ fought to stop aggression and a ‘holy war’ aimed at conversion to 
Islam.144 This method of interpretation by unauthorised person, such as non-mujtahids, are 
often identified as istihsān due its nature as juristic preference based on free human reasoning 
and without any textual basis.145 According to Imam Shaf’i, istihsān is a method of reasoning 
that is based merely on free human reasoning guided by personal interests and whims which 
amounts to indulging in base-pleasures.146 
It has been seen that the source-oriented legitimacy deficits of Islamic law in the use of force 
lie on the non-Shari‘a based interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna as well as the influx of 
politics in the course of such interpretation.147 The only way to overcome these deficits is to 
restrict legitimate interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna by qualified Mujtahids. This is 
because only Mujtahids are qualified to resolve any ambiguities of the Qur’an and Sunna 
whether textual or contextual.148  
For instance, in 8:39 of the Qur’an, the term ‘fitnah’ is utterly ambiguous as it could refer to a 
variety of meaning, such as ‘persecution’ or ‘unbelief’.149 Whereas, interpreting the word by 
adopting ‘unbelief’ promotes a perpetual ‘holy war’ against non-Muslims, ‘persecution’ 
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denotes legitimacy of use of force until such persecution ends.150 The adoption of ‘persecution’ 
is consistent with the underlying principle of Islamic law on the use of force, which is defensive 
war.151 In this way ‘persecution’ outweighs ‘unbelief’ by virtue of supporting evidence which 
is consistent with the fundamental principles of Islamic law on the use of force.152 
Furthermore, ambiguity is the result not only of the uses of vague language, as evidenced in 
the aforementioned verse, but also of homonymous noun the meaning of which is so general 
that they need to be particularised if they are to yield any legal content.153 For example, the 
difficulty in identifying the meaning of Jihad without the context.154 Jihad equally refers to use 
of force, struggle against one’s soul and other non-violent or spiritual manifestations.155 In this 
circumstance, it is necessary to particularise the true meaning of jihad and this is not possible 
without taking into account of the context the word has been used in the Qur’an and Sunna.156 
This identification and application of the right context is the task of Mujtahids who possess the 
necessary knowledge and expertise not only in Arabic but also in the rules of interpretation.157  
5.3.2 Process legitimacy deficit 
Ever since the formation of the geographical schools of law took shape during the first half of 
the 8th Century, the idea of consensus (ijmā) had played a significant role in sanctioning the 
doctrines developed by mujtahids.158 Consensus extended in theory to all countries, but in 
practice it had a local character. 159  Once a doctrine became subject to consensus it was 
considered by those who were party to it, final and immune from error.160 However, although 
consensus, in one form or another, had always been part of the make-up of the geographical 
schools of law, there was no attempt at first to anchor it in any authoritative text. With the 
growth in the body of hadīth and with the concurrently increasing tendency to ground all law 
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in the Sunna of the Prophet and the Qur’anic text, there were attempts at the end of the 8th 
Century to justify consensus based on Prophetic reports as well as the Qur’an.161 
The attempts to justify consensus, as stated above, were not free from controversies. Whereas 
the traditionalists advanced the thesis that nothing that the Muslim community says or does 
should escape the sanction of the Qur’an and Sunna, the rationalists maintained that the 
scriptures cannot be the exclusive foundation of the law. 162  These controversies further 
developed with the closure of Ijtihād as diverse interpretations had been emerging since then.163 
This diversity gave birth to different schools of jurisprudence, namely Hanafi, Shafī, Malīkī 
and Hanbalī.164 
The closure of Ijtihād was a dangerous move which failed to serve the purpose of the closure, 
which was to prevent influx of other cultural and religious principles and practices into 
Islam.165 It could have been better to control rather than completely close the Ijtihād.166 This is 
because, in this way the development of Islamic law could have continued in a controlled 
manner, such as interpretation and legal reasoning by qualified people only. However, the 
closure of Ijtihād did not completely stop the development of the law but only stagnated it. The 
practice of Ijtihād continued in an uncontrolled manner where both Mujtahids and non-
Mujtahids were participating in the intellectual efforts. As a result, the prescribed process of 
interpretation had not been universally adhered. 
Therefore, the process legitimacy deficits lie in the fact that the interpretation are offered by 
those who are not sufficiently qualified and if they are qualified to interpret they do not follow 
the right process of deciding on ijtihād. For example, ijmā represented consensus by scholars 
sanctioning authority which guaranteed the infallibility of those positive legal rulings and 
methodological principles.167 Therefore, it is a technical matter and laymen have no say in any 
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consensus reached.168 On the other hand, Qiyās represented by a case that is not directly 
covered by the text and hence there is a need for human agency to transpose the explicit degree 
in the texts to that case.169 Both Ijmā and Qiyas lead to juristic knowledge and hence require 
necessary qualification of the jurists.170 In addition, it is also necessary to follow the right 
process of interpretation and legal reasoning by those who are qualified jurists.171 Therefore, 
the process legitimacy deficits of Islamic law on the use of force can be overcome by specifying 
the qualities necessary for intellectuals to participate in the interpretation and the process that 
those intellectuals will have to follow.  
The jurists or jurisconsults who are capable of practicing Ijtihād is known as the Mujtahids.172 
The qualities of Mujtahids are categorised as legal and moral.173 This is because these qualities 
are necessary to undertake the task of verification of a particular case in the law.174 In terms of 
legal qualities, Mujtahids must have knowledge of the Arabic language, of the legal contents 
of the Book, of its particular and general language, and of the theory of abrogation (nāskh), the 
Prophetic Sunna, thorough knowledge of the cases that have become subject to consensus, 
knowledge and understanding of the entire range of the procedures of inferential reasoning.175 
The moral qualities include but not limited to just and trustworthy character, firm belief in God 
and Muslim faith.176 These criteria constitute a safeguard against arbitrary interpretation of law. 
If a person meets all these requirements, then it is his obligation to issue a legal opinion (fatwā; 
pl. fatāwā).177  
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The process that the Mujtahids will have to follow is known as Ijtihād.178 Thus, Ijmā and Qiyās 
must be consistent with the Qur’an and Sunna.179 That means, to achieve process legitimacy, 
it is also essential to ensure that source-oriented legitimacy has not been sacrificed. Both 
Qur’an and Sunna provide evidence for the authoritativeness of consensus.180 Therefore, it is 
essential that knowledge of the existence of consensus on a particular case is determined by 
looking to the past and by observing that the mujtahids were unanimous with regard to the 
solution of that case. 181  Armed with knowledge of hermeneutical principles, legal 
epistemology and governing rules of consensus, the mujtahids are ready to undertake the task 
of inferring rules.182 However, before embarking on inferential reasoning, the mujtahids must 
verify the meaning of the text they employ, and must ascertain that it was not abrogated by 
another text or repugnant to an established consensus.183 
The archetypal example overcoming the process legitimacy is the case of ‘jihād’, ‘qitāl’ and 
‘harb’. These are the properties of use of force in Islamic law. Whereas, the Qur’anic word 
‘jihad’ denotes different meaning in different contexts, its meaning denotes that of use of force 
in a state of war (harb).184 Therefore, ‘jihad’ can only be used to recourse to force (qitāl) in the 
context of war (harb). All these properties must create a chain to legitimate use of force in 
Islamic law. In this process of legitimation, the true meaning of jihad in terms of use of force 
is obtained through the application of the chain of legitimacy, which is justified by the revealed 
sources and their immediate product (consensus) whose authoritativeness is agreed.185 The 
great majority of Sunni jurists held the view that the evidence of the two primary sources, 
together with consensus, proves that this method (Ijtihād) is authoritative with certainty 
because the Qur’an, together with Sunna and consensus, the process sanctions and confirms 
the need for it.186 
Eventually, this can be said that the ideologies of the IS and al-Qaeda are not only lacking the 
qualities of fatāwās given by Mujtahids but also the required process to be followed. The 
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fatāwās given by the leaders of IS, al-Qaeda and similar non-state armed actors cannot attain 
the rank of Mujtahid and hence are not eligible to participate in interpretation and legal 
reasoning.187 These interpretations and legal reasoning emanates from people who are not only 
unqualified but also being dictated by personal desires and therefore leads to illegitimate results 
which have no place in the legal system.188 
5.3.3 Legitimacy of Islamic law of Rebellion 
Following the fall of Abbasid caliphate, the scholars of Islamic international law were forced 
to adapt their theories to the changing realities which resulted in the trend towards 
decentralisation of Islamic religious authority.189 As a result, the rulers of nation-states were 
under pressure for accepting the repoliticisation of Islam by accepting its sole religious 
authority. But such repoliticisation led the rulers to a desperate attempt to prevent the separation 
of religion and politics.190 This has developed a system where both Islamic and secular system 
of rules were meshed together. Therefore, both political and religious principles in the use of 
force were operating. The lack of willingness of the rulers to develop a solely Islamic religious 
authority within the nation-states led self-constituted groups, such as Kharijites (al-Khawarij), 
Nizari Isma’ilis (the infamous “Assassins”) and Wahhabi movement in Arabia in 18th century 
to use force within and beyond the nation-states.191  
These movements and the way they have been dealt with by Muslim rulers have developed 
Islamic law of rebellion.192 This is a very special branch of Islamic law which is based on the 
question of a ruler’s right to rule.193 Rebels are not allowed to use extraterritorial force in 
Islamic law.194 However, they are allowed to use force, in controlled manner, against a ruler 
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who persecutes them.195 Likewise, the ruler is allowed to use force that is necessary to restore 
peace and stability.196 The focal point here is that the rebels and the rulers often recourse to 
asymmetrical and unnecessary use of force respectively against each other.197 Moreover, the 
conflict between rebels and rulers also results in labelling rebels as terrorists and rulers as 
tyrants.198 In these circumstances, politics play a vital role in determining the rebels’ right to 
rebel and the rulers’ right to rule.199 The influx of political reasons for using force gives rise to 
legitimacy deficits in the use of force by rebels and the rulers.  
From the perspective of nature and extent of use of force by rebels, legitimacy deficits of 
Islamic law of rebellion are twofold, namely inter-state use of force and intra-state use of 
force.200 Islamic law does not recognise extraterritorial use of force as a legitimate means of 
using force by rebels. This is because rebels do not have the authority to do so.201 However, 
rebels have been claiming legitimacy of extraterritorial use of force based on Takfir 
(declaration of unbelief) by accusing the ruler of Kufr (unbelief).202 This accusation emanates 
from the very notion that the ruler has become a Kafir (unbeliever) for liaising with non-
Muslim rulers.203 This accusation often turned into violence resulting from conflict of interests 
between modern Islamic scholars, religious leaders, rebels and sometime terrorist groups.204 
The religious leaders who supported centralised Islamic political authority claimed legitimacy 
of use of force against those Muslims and non-Muslims who pose a threat to the existence and 
expansion of Islamic centralised states.205 This movement later was focused on expansion 
rather than existence. 206  On the other hand, the modern Islamic scholars who supported 
contemporary political and modern religious authority regarded that use of force can only be 
justified as a last resort and as a response to external military attack.207 The latter interpretation 
of use of force had been criticised on the basis that this interpretation does not represent an 
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authentic hadith (Sunna) of the Prophet and represents a deliberate attempt to weaken the will 
of Muslims in the struggle against European colonisers.208 The expansionists of Islamic nation-
states, however, intended to establish an Islamic world order. 
Islamic law could not establish a complete legal framework based solely on Islamic law but 
resulted in a mixed system composed of politically motivated secular state and religiously 
motivated Islamic state.209 This has eventually developed a conflict between the Muslim states 
in an international framework that includes numerous states claiming to be Islamic societies 
yet acknowledging no universal common authority and often engaging in conflict with one 
another.210 This conflict is often escalated in the method of rebellion against a non-Islamic 
government or ruler. For example, the Pakistani originated political group Jamaat-e-Islami’s 
rebellion against secular government in Bangladesh since the latter’s liberation from Pakistan 
in 1971.211 In these circumstances, the legitimacy-deficits can be overcome by recourse to 
Islamic law of rebellion which recognises the right to rebel against a government or ruler which 
is tyrant or unjust and reciprocal right to use force by the rulers to maintain peace and 
stability.212 In this way, Islamic law of rebellion will be implemented in its true potential and 
sovereignty of the lawgiver will be submitted to God,213 as the Qur’an aptly proclaims: 
They ask: “have we also got some authority?” Say: “all authority belongs to God 
alone.”214 
The above discussion suggests that legitimacy of Islamic law is dependent not only on the 
source of the law per se but also how that law has come into being. In other words, for a law 
to be legitimate Islamic jurisprudence looks not only into the law but also into the interpreter. 
That means, a rule will only be legitimate in Islamic law if it is either written in the Qur’an or 
established in the Sunna of the Prophet or developed through juristic interpretation or analogy 
of those who are authorised to do so, such as mujtahids.  
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5.4 The process of complementation: a proposal for overcoming the 
legitimacy deficits of Public international Law and Islamic international 
Law 
The prohibition of use of force, as contained within the UN Charter, is an agreement based on 
consent between the major power and the less powerful states not to use armed force to alter 
or to overturn the existing international order.215  However, the multilateral nature of this 
agreement has resulted in various interpretations and challenges to regulate use of force in the 
current world affairs.216 This thesis introduces a series of interpretations and state practices that 
demonstrate the legitimacy crisis of Public international law on the use of force.217 These 
interpretations and state practices lean on each other through conceptually similar but 
contextually conflicting provisions of international law, namely prohibition of use of force and 
self-defence in the UN Charter, the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty, the necessity 
to prevail justice and peace. These legal provisions are necessary to secure justice in an ideal 
world. But due to the dynamic nature of this world where people of different races, colours, 
languages, nationalities, ethnicities and religious beliefs live, represent their own identities and 
follow their own laws it is a very common scenario that the laws are often come into conflict 
when these people interact with each other at the international level. In these circumstances, a 
pluralistic legal system can only overcome the legitimacy deficits of international law on the 
use of force.218  
Islamic international law has often been labelled as a non-adaptive system and hence opposed 
to be effective in modern world.219 However, this contention is not based on strong evidence 
and scholarly findings. The intrinsic flexibility of Shari‘a has readily permitted Muslim states 
to adapt to the modern state system, characterised by sovereign territorial states, and to 
significantly revise their national laws and practices, and international policies pursuant to the 
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stipulations of the UN Charter.220 Moreover, enduring peace hinges, inter alia, on equitable 
participation of each civilisation in the governance of global matters. 221  Muslims, who 
constitute about 23 per cent of the world population,222 should have a significant position to 
participate in the formation and development of international law particularly on the use of 
force.  
5.4.1 The Power of Legal Pluralism in the complementation process 
Although legal pluralism comes in many guises, it seems to have found a whole new spirit 
within the realm of Public international law.223 Whereas empirical accounts of ‘legal pluralism’ 
consist of descriptive analysis of dual or multiple laws or legal systems in particular areas of 
the world, it has been identified and studied in relation to colonial and postcolonial societies 
where it is common for an imposed legal system to co-exist and interconnected with customary, 
indigenous and religious laws.224 In a modern world of sovereign states, it is also apparent that 
a single state-based legal system also interconnected with customary, indigenous and religious 
laws.225 As a result, when it comes to international law on the use of force it is also essential to 
develop a legal framework based on the diverse and pluralistic states and their legal framework.  
 
Legal pluralism illustrates the dynamic interconnections between normative orders and 
therefore reflects on disciplinary developments in politics, sociology and law as well as a 
greater sensitivity to globalisation.226 It also poses a challenge to positive conceptions of law 
which traditionally emphasise on the effectiveness and legitimacy of international law on the 
basis of its enforcement power.227 It denies the influence of hegemonic power and its influence 
in the decision making process on the use of force.228 Legal pluralism provides the structure 
for a coherent legal system at the international level without compromising the necessity of 
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consistency.229 However, ‘law’ in the contemporary West very strongly evokes the singular 
system of law tied to a nation state and for this reason the ‘fact’ of pluralism in the West is 
more difficult to discern.230 Similarly, Muslim states are not inclined to be influenced by 
Western legal systems and accordingly often refuse to adopt laws originated or emanated from 
the West.231 But it is interesting to note that, most of the Muslim states have adopted the laws, 
even after independence, which were imposed on them by their colonial power.232 
 
At the emergence of nation-state, most of the countries have removed the experience and 
knowledge of the law from the people and their communities.233 However, the approaches of 
the state authorities and scholars have recently been changed based on the multitude of 
overlapping and indeterminate types of law, regulation and control.234 The global perspective 
brings to the forefront the decentered nature of global normative influences, whether these stem 
from ‘official’ sources or from unofficial sources such as shared legal cultures, ethnicity, 
religion, nationality or geography, and transitional interested groups.235 As a result, “pluralism 
is produced by a more expansive notion of ‘law’ and therefore generating a multiplicity of 
legalities and if all of these heterogeneous normative influences are defined as ‘law’, then of 
course the perception that pluralism is legal and legitimate, becomes unavoidable.236 However, 
Public international law developed through the application of ‘legal pluralism’ is likely to 
overcome its legitimacy deficits if and when it can be bypassed with the law-society dichotomy 
and replace it with a critical account of the synergies and resistances between normative orders 
which create law-as-process rather than as object.237 
 
The operation of Islamic international law on the use of force and its relationship with Public 
international law is a contested question. Whereas Islamic international law on the use of force 
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is legitimate to operate among the Muslim states, it is not so in non-Muslim states.238 However, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim states are subjects of Public international law but the latter does 
not represent the values of the former to the extent to overcome the existing legitimacy 
deficits.239 
The main power of legal pluralism is that, it strengthens the rule of law and promotes higher 
degree of legitimacy.240 For example, the International Court of Justice has acknowledged the 
contribution of Islamic legal tradition in the development of modern international law.241 In the 
North Sea Continental Shelf case the International Court of Justice sought to demonstrate that- 
Islamic law had in fact provided contemporary international law with some substantial 
principles including equity, modalities of establishing statehood and territorial control 
through identities characterised by religion, and various techniques of legal 
interpretation.242 
Use of force has legal, political, moral, personal, human or psychological dimensions.243 
Searching for objectivity and overlooking its multifariousness produces self-restrictive 
arguments.244 Therefore, it is essential to approach every incident of use of force from inter-
subjectivity perspective. Inter-subjectivity materialises by appreciating our similarities as 
people who strive for self-creation, empowerment and happiness rather than being paralysed 
by our differences which emerge from diverse contextualises.245 
It is religion which brings about the necessity for a pluralistic international system based on 
territory and the principle of cuius regio, eius religio.246 The terrorism promulgated by a certain 
branch of Islamic fundamentalism has recently shown that the universal recognition of 
religious pluralism remains precarious even in the contemporary inter-State order.247 So, to 
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what extent international law on the use of force has recognised religious pluralism universally? 
The following section answers this question.  
5.4.1.1 The Extent of Legal Pluralism in the complementation process 
The role of legal pluralism in the complementation process must not exceed beyond what is 
necessary to overcome the existing legitimacy deficits of Public international law on the use of 
force. This is because, whether law is exclusively defined by the state or not, but there is no 
universally satisfactory position of law which can overcome the legitimacy deficits of both 
Islamic international law and Public international law. One kind of position gives monism as a 
fact, while the other gives pluralism as a fact: Confining ‘law’ to the state seems too narrow as 
an international legal framework. 248  Therefore, what is necessary is to have the greatest 
normative impact on the different states and non-state actors irrespective of their differences in 
the national legal systems.249  
In order to have the greatest normative impact, it necessary to apply the right metaphor.250 The 
metaphor one decides is important because of its normative impact as it interprets and judges 
the situation, and these judgments can in turn lead to a prescribed set of actions.251 These 
actions then bring the necessary normative impact. Therefore, application of the ‘semi-
autonomy’ metaphor can be useful in bringing the greatest normative impact.252 This metaphor 
is useful because it facilitates analysis of both interdependence with other systems and the self-
identity of a particular system: the idea has proved to be enormously useful in the study of 
normative pluralism in the modern context.253 
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5.4.1.2 The Bipolar division of the world into ‘Dar-al-harb’ and ‘Dar-al-
Islam’ and their effect in developing a pluralistic international law on the 
use of force 
Although it is true that Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-Harb is a categorisation coined by Muslim 
jurists,254 the tendency in studies to emphasise the primary role of law, especially in Sunni 
Islam, has until now narrowed down the field of research almost exclusively to juridical text.255 
Thus, it is essentially within juridico-political studies, mainly in the sections concerning jihad 
that the two notions are dealt with (such as in Khadduri, Lambton, Crone, Hallaq),256 still 
without being themselves the object of a thorough analysis.257 In these circumstances, it is 
essential to unveil the implication of this division of the world as far as use of force is concerned 
following a thorough analysis of the impact of this division in modern world.  
It is true that the bipolar division of the world into Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harb is no longer 
valid in modern world in the context that the former represents the ‘abode of Islam’ and the 
latter ‘abode of war’.258 This is because, modern division of the world has been made into 
nation-states. However, the relevance and true impact of the division between Dar-al-Islam and 
Dar-al-harb, in the modern world, can be unveiled from the purpose of such division. History 
suggests that, the main reason for this division was to determine the law applied to a particular 
part of the world.259 For example, by the term ‘Dar-al-Islam’, the region was identified to be 
under the rule of Islamic law and hence consisted of territories of different nations but under 
the Islamic rule. This facilitated the merchants to identify what rules of commerce applied to 
that part of the world, namely taxation, prohibition and restriction on imports and exports. This 
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division also developed the system of recognition of territories under the rule of Islamic law 
and as a result, a concept similar to modern day regional organisation.260  
Sovereignty is protected in Public international law by categorising internal and international 
armed conflicts. Islamic law can complement here as it does not categorise armed conflicts for 
the purpose of saving sovereignty of a state but of a region, which is dar-al-Islam. This concept 
has taken sovereignty to a higher level, which is at the regional level. To expand the sphere of 
the public order under Islamic rule, according to Islamic international law, the Muslim 
Community (ummah) is none but single, seamless entity, to whom laws apply equally 
irrespective of racial, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences.261 
This division of the world would not only apply the different legal systems at different parts of 
the world but also close the gap between the legal systems at international level. Dar-al-harb 
and Dar-al-Islam have systematically divided the world where Islamic law would only apply 
to the latter but not to the former. The fact that, within the territory where Islamic law applied 
the people who submitted themselves to the legal system were not only Muslims but also the 
followers and adherents of other religions, highlights the religiously plural character of 
societies to which Islamic law was historically applied.262 In this setting, the world is divided 
into regions where every region possesses some common features and singular political 
jurisdiction.263 Therefore, sovereignty of the member states of every region is exercised within 
a regional body which first decides ‘to what extent sovereignty of its member states would be 
interfered’. This is similar to the principle of Islamic international law which only permits 
Muslim countries to intervene into the aid of another Muslim country. 264  If the regional 
organisation fails, then the sovereignty of such member states would be subject to interference 
from an international body, for instance the Security Council. This principle is supported in 
Islamic international law by the precedent when the Prophet accepted military and logistical 
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aid from the Jewish communities in Medina when he had been persecuted and denied any 
assistance from his own community in Mecca.265  
This setting, at the international level, is likely to reduce tensions between powerful states and 
other states which are the likely subjects of the former’s geopolitical targets. This is because, 
the lack of proximity between the states would denote any interference as illegitimate. 
Therefore, the step by step process of intervention, based on proximity, as provided by Islamic 
international law can complement Public international law. This setting also represents higher 
degree of legitimacy for promoting justice at the regional level and peace at the international 
level. This combination of legitimacy and justice, at the regional and international level, is 
likely to reduce the costs of recourse to force and protect international peace. In this way, states 
are unlikely to use force against another state which is outside the region and if any state does 
so then it would be subject to sanctions from its own regional organisation. This model of 
regional justice and international peace is likely to overcome the legitimacy deficits of Public 
international law on the use of force.  
Legal pluralism, in Islamic international law, is developed through Islamic conception of 
universality.266  In order to comprehend this conception it is necessary to consider briefly the 
foundation concept of Islamic Ummah.267 This concept refers to a committed group of people 
sharing the same Islamic ideals, which form a common bond that ‘transcends national and tribal 
loyalties rooted in the accident of birth, and is a community of believers, bound together in a 
brotherhood more vital than that of blood.268 Therefore, the term ‘Islamic Ummah’ is used to 
refer to the worldwide community of Muslim believers, who aspire to create a universal Islamic 
nation, community or distinguishable political entity based on Islamic ideals,269 to which all 
Muslims belong regardless of where they reside physically,270 and to which ultimate loyalty is 
owed.271 It is evident therefore, that unlike the Westphalian system, the normal characteristics 
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of statehood, such as geographical location or fixed territory, are not relevant.272 Rather, under 
Islamic international law sovereignty resides with the God.273 Therefore, the current setting of 
OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) can be a starting point to implement this new 
community based conception of sovereignty.  
The OIC is founded on the concept and aspirations of the Islamic Ummah.274 One of its key 
Charter objectives is the attainment of unity, fraternity and solidarity within its membership.275 
There is not only a different Islamic conception of universality but also this has resulted in the 
existence of parallel and competing Islamic and UN universal legal orders. 276  The OIC 
membership states represent almost 30 per cent of the UN General Assembly’s voting capacity 
and as a result have a potential to influence the development of all General Assembly norms.277 
Furthermore, in the Security Council the OIC member states also liaise with the non-aligned 
movements to represent the interest of the Muslim Ummah. 278  The member states have 
accepted the legal status of UN Charter in the one hand, and their own constitutional law in the 
other.279 As a result, a parallel and competing legal order exists between UN Charter system 
and OIC system. Both of these systems run side by side when the provisions for use of force 
are compatible. On the contrary, when the provisions are incompatible then a normative 
conflict occurs between the two systems.280  
In these circumstances, it is necessary to apply an adequate legal theory to complement the use 
of force provisions in Public international law and Islamic international law to the extent that 
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both systems are interdependent on each other and the self-identity of a particular system is 
acknowledged at the same time.281 This can be best achieved, as shown above, by adopting the 
‘semi-autonomous’ metaphor. The legal framework developed in this method is likely to 
overcome the legitimacy deficits and secure justice, and this is because this method contains 
the legal theory adequate and necessary for the legitimacy and compatibility of use of force in 
Islamic international law and Public international law. As Margaret Davies rightly observed: 
Arguably, adequate legal theory will theorise not only the state law as such, but also 
the position of this form of law in a complexity of plural normative orders.282 
The aim of international law on the use of force as adopted in the United Nations Charter ought 
to be a powerful means of preventing conflict. However, the Charter system does not seem to 
have achieved this aim because at the very beginning of the 21st Century there has already been 
considerable number of inter-state conflicts, namely Iraq war, invading Afghanistan, 
intervention in Libya and Georgia, conflict in Syria.283 This suggests that the Charter system 
has considerably failed to prevent inter-state conflict and as a result suffering from major 
legitimacy deficits. This also suggests that the features and functions of legitimacy is absent in 
the state practices and hence legitimacy deficits are prevalent in the norm, institution applying 
that norm, and in the perception of the subjects. For example, the features of creating a limit 
on the use of force is absent in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.284 Similarly, the Security 
Council failed to maintain peace and security in the contemporary world, and its decision-
making process lacks consistency and coherence. Finally, the overall process has failed to 
secure voluntary pull of compliance by the subjects. 
Although it is true that most of the states in the world are the members of United Nations, in 
fact all the member states do not adhere to the same fundamental principles of inter-state 
policies. A state maintains its international relations in accordance with its own principles and 
such principles could come into conflict with each other based on diverse cultural and religious 
values.285 As a result, a conflict of values prevails between states which eventually threatens 
the legitimacy of Public international law on the use of force. In these circumstances, 
sustainable peace and security at international level can only be achieved if the existing 
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legitimacy deficits of Public international law can be overcome. This is only possible if 
recourse to force is regulated by a pluralistic legal framework which recognises the diverse 
cultural values, 286  and such decision is taken through a process which is consistent and 
coherent.287 
5.5 Overcoming the barrier of Public international law: achieving a higher 
degree of legitimacy on the use of force 
The above discussion, in chapter 2, on the origins of current international law in the context of 
colonialism, suggests that Public international law, is developed on the conception of its own 
universality. 288  This basis of development also questions the Western dominance on the 
development and application of Public international law on the use of force.289 Furthermore, 
the self-description of Public international law as universal, objective and neutral has also been 
untenable for its reluctance to include the cultural and religious values of other major legal 
systems. This position of Public international law has put itself under a barrier where it senses 
its own legitimacy from its purported universality. Therefore, it is expedient to overcome this 
barrier in order to achieving a higher degree of legitimacy and securing the competence of the 
legal framework in regulating use of force at the international level.  
Public international law on the use of force as enshrined in the UN Charter is not instituted in 
general for all the people within the World. It has been witnessed how powerful states have a 
greater stake in the decision-making process at the Security Council, how self-interest 
gratifications have disregarded the legal requirements and how the coalitions of willing and 
able have used extra-territorial force without following the legitimate process.290 Moreover, the 
UN Charter system does not represent the values of those who are required to comply with the 
use of force decision or affected by it.291 For example, there are 57 Muslim states which are 
members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as well as the UN and consisting 
of over 1.5 billion Muslims292 but their cultural and religious values have not been incorporated 
into the UN legal framework of use of force. This is known as ‘Parochialism’ in international 
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law.293 The manifestation of Western imperialism on the international law in the use of force 
has created a massive barrier in this framework.294  
If Public international law leaves a part of the world community’s legal system alone from 
being part of its framework then it is very likely that the people who are affected by the 
decisions of the institutions established by international law would not accept those decisions 
as legitimate. This is a barrier on Public international law which is based on ‘lack of justified 
authority’. According to Francisco Suarez (1548 – 1617), ‘only that precept is law which is 
instituted in general for all the persons included within a given community.’295 The legitimacy 
deficit of international law on the use of force can be found in his view of the law and even 
today such deficit can be witnessed.  
Besides, the question of how Security Council functions while making decisions to use force, 
enhancing public participation in the decision-making process forms an important part of the 
process. Participation by public overcomes the input legitimacy deficit of the Security Council 
because when public interests are at stake, only public decision making appears legitimate.296 
Any decision to use force must be taken by participation of the members of the international 
community to overcome the legitimacy deficits of any decision being taken and such 
community includes citizens of a state, people in a state’s territory, or adherents of a particular 
religion.297 The social phenomenon of non-coerced obedience can be witnessed in the notion 
of legitimacy as it operates as a dynamic social force through the rule which the society chooses 
to obey or to regard as obligatory.298  
It is true that a state will not comply with any international law on the sole basis of ‘legitimacy’ 
if it is not in the interest of the state. However, if systematic values are protected and promoted 
in international law as well as it is not biased against any state or regional organisation then 
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‘legitimacy’ can be a fundamental basis for compliance.299  Also, in this way a ‘chain of 
legitimacy’ could be maintained in order to overcome the barrier that is currently affecting the 
Public international law from achieving its true universality. If the ‘chain of legitimacy’ is 
broken then the entire system, authority and result are subject to critical question of 
‘legitimacy-deficit’. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the international community, which 
includes both states and regional organisations, to maintain the nexus of the ‘chain of 
legitimacy’ of international law on the use of force.  
The chain of legitimacy recognises the values of the people in the decision-making process.300 
This chain is essential for international law on the use of force to function effectively. The 
nexus of the chain of legitimacy becomes stronger by dismissing the claim of the expansionists 
to adopt an expansive use of force in self-defence beyond pre-emption, strengthening the 
regional organisations to deal with breach of peace and threat to peace situations and 
reformation of the veto system in the Security Council, and incorporation of values of the 
people of all member states into the corpus of international law. Here the people include those 
who are likely to be affected by such decision. It is very important to consider what the beliefs 
of the people are and how those beliefs are weighted by power. 
Conclusion 
Legitimacy of Public international law on the use of force is rooted in the classical natural law 
tradition. This tradition often said to have treated substantive moral justifiability, which is a 
concept of legitimacy for philosophers, as an essential element of legal validity.301 Thomas 
Aquinas, for instance, is often quoted as stating that “if in any point [human law] deflects from 
the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.” 302  Likewise, William 
Blackstone estimated that “no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to the law of 
nature.”303 This position held by natural lawyers suggests that moral justifiability constitutes 
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an inextricable aspect of legal validity which is likely to result in a higher degree of legitimacy 
of an action, rule, actor or system.304 
On the other hand, legitimacy of Islamic international law on the use of force is rooted in the 
source, such as Shari’a and in the process, such as Ijtihād. In addition to Qur’an and Sunna, the 
exemplary role that the jurisconsults play in society is explained in terms of Prophetic legacy. 
Muhammad was the first jurisconsult of the Muslim community, and later jurisconsults have 
continued to play the very role he played.305 Therefore, the legitimacy lies in the source which 
articulates the process to decide the legitimacy of Islamic law to keep pace with the time and 
social changes.  
Both Public international law and Islamic international law are based on values conflicting to 
each other. However, there are values in both systems which share a common platform, namely 
morality and justice. Whereas the legitimacy of Islamic international law is rooted in the 
Shari’a which is a body of moral principles and requires the Mujtahids to make decisions on 
moral grounds, the legitimacy of Public international law is rooted in morality as well. This 
common value, which is morality, will lead Public international law and Islamic international 
law together on the road to substantive justice.306 Morality and substantive justice are both 
principles of Islamic international law and International Human Rights law of which Public 
international law forms a part.307 However, such morality and justice must consist in a set of 
standards which, among other things, place restrictions on often self-interested conduct to pay 
proper tribute to the standing and interests of others.308  
Both Public international law and Islamic international law are originated from legitimate 
sources, namely natural law and divine law respectively. These systems have also developed 
and refined through processes which have provided the platform to overcome legitimacy 
deficits in the course of time. However, the processes that have been followed are not always 
perfect to overcome the legitimacy deficits. For example, decision-making process at the 
Security Council and abuses of the interpretation of divine law by unqualified agents. These 
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have been possible due to the lack of accountability of the international institution or the agent 
in respect to the decision it takes and interpretation it offers. Eventually, the necessary degree 
of legitimacy remains unobtained. What is required, as far as complementation between Public 
international law and Islamic international law is concerned, is a jurisprudence that draws on 
both cultures, to address the legitimacy deficits of Public international law on the use of force. 
The complemented framework will promote the principles of accountability and transparency, 
which are the basic principles of both liberal democratic states which profess to Public 
international law and Muslim majority states which profess to Islamic international law.  
This chapter concludes that the necessary degree of legitimacy cannot be obtained by 
overcoming the existing legitimacy deficits of Public international law and Islamic 
international law separately. Instead, it is necessary to find out how these systems could 
complement each other by filling the gaps created by the existing legitimacy deficits. This 
chapter has answered the second question of the thesis, namely ‘how the legitimacy deficits 
could be overcome?’ This answer has guided this study to the final stage where the final 
question of the thesis would be addressed, which is ‘whether use of force in Public international 
law and Islamic international law can be compatible in modern world?’  
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Chapter 6 
Compatibility of Use of Force in Public International Law and 
Islamic International Law 
 
The study in the previous chapter has shown that legitimacy is an attribute that needs to be 
earned rather than to be found. In the era of power disequilibrium powerful states and non-state 
actors may recourse to force arbitrarily but are unlikely to find the required degree of legitimacy 
unless they want to earn it. The best way to earn such legitimacy would be to recognise the 
diverse values of the subjects into the corpus of Public international law and maintain proximity 
among them in the decision-making process.309  
In order to promote legitimacy of Public international law on the use of force scholars have 
provided different models of the operation of the charter system in the current world. These 
models justify use of force by states and regional organisations on different grounds, namely 
coercive restraints from less powerful states (the relists model), 310  reciprocal restraints 
exercised by states in order to cooperate with other states that do likewise (the regimes 
model), 311  and communal obligation within the Security Council to produce a collective 
restraint on state action.312 These models, although make arguments for legitimate use of force, 
rely on a strict positivist view of international law in which actions are categorised 
dichotomously and there is no grey area.313 From this viewpoint, use of armed force, even in 
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self-defence, is subject to the control of the Security Council,314 and the Charter is an effective 
restraint only to the extent that it pushes states away from war and promotes peace.315 However, 
assessing the efficacy of the Charter in this manner misconstrues both its underlying purpose 
and its institutional form.316 Article 1(1) of the Charter expresses the purpose, which is to 
maintain international peace and security,317 and the institutional form that has been developed 
to serve this purpose is through a collective security system.318  
The Charter framework has been subject to huge criticisms and challenges for failure to 
regulate use of force in the current world affairs.319 A gap has been created in the Charter 
framework in which use of force has been subject to little or no control of the Security Council. 
Moreover, the practices of the states and regional organisations often give rise to the question 
of legitimacy, as opposed to legality, of use of force. As an attempt to fill this gap, the Security 
Council has devised new mechanisms and even legitimate actions which were repugnant to the 
Charter. For example, when the Security Council has legitimated uses of force implicitly and 
with retrospective effect which were not previously authorised by it.320 In addition, the Security 
Council, as a quasi-jury, has tried to bridge the gap, when it appears, between legality and 
legitimacy, so that the legal order is not seen to suffer from deficiency that arises when that 
gap becomes too wide.321  
This approach encounters its most difficult test when the legitimacy of use of force is lacking.322 
For example, when the Security Council acted like a judicial body by adopting resolutions to 
authorise use of force in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorists attack and the recognition of 
extension of use of force in the form of pre-emption by the UN Secretariat.323 This approach 
allows for consideration of how states’ interests affect their particular understandings of law 
and their actions, rather than implicitly assuming that states respond uniformly to particular 
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arguments and actions according to a collective decision regarding the legitimacy of such 
actions.324 This is also apparent in regards to the decision making process of the Security 
Council where decisions are being made cumulatively – not collectively – as is based on 
rational calculation.325 In these circumstances, it is a challenge for Public international law on 
the use of force to overcome the existing legitimacy deficits by promoting peace and justice. 
This challenge, however, rather consists in devising a legal order that allows for the expression 
of different legal systems, albeit each of them claims to present a comprehensive system.326 
This chapter is set to explore how the challenges could be overcome and this would enable the 
research to answer the final research question, namely ‘can use of force in Public international 
law and Islamic international law be made compatible in modern world’. Answering this 
question would also lead the way to conclude the thesis by answering the main question, which 
is ‘the extent to which use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law 
can be compatible and legitimate’.  
6.1 Legitimacy Revisited 
In chapter 5, it has been concluded that overcoming the existing legitimacy deficits on the use 
of force is likely to promote peace and stability in the modern world. However, when it comes 
to peace and stability ‘legitimacy’ is not the only criterion to satisfy. The states and regional 
organisations are often unwilling to overcome the legitimacy-deficits of Public international 
law on the use of force in order to promote their short-term interests.327 The main factors which 
influence the decision of the states and regional organisations for not overcoming the 
legitimacy deficits are national security and geopolitical interests.328 In these circumstances, 
why would states and regional organisations commit for overcoming the legitimacy deficits? 
The primary reason for overcoming these legitimacy-deficits should be to maintain sustainable 
peace and stability and this is for the long-term interests of all, namely non-state actors, states 
and regional organisations. 
While urging to promote peace and stability and hence the higher degree of legitimacy at state 
level and inter-state level, it has become apparent that conflicting claims of legitimacy have 
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been made by different legal systems. In other words, a use of force may not be considered 
legitimate on both sides simultaneously albeit both sides may have a certain degree of 
legitimacy on their sides. In similar fashion, whereas certain use of force is claimed to be 
legitimate in Public international law, the claim is quite the opposite in Islamic international 
law. These conflicting claims of legitimacy on the use of force have been made in respect of 
rebellion,329 extraterritorial use of force in self-defence,330 and humanitarian intervention by 
states and regional organisations.331 For instance, on the one hand Islamic international law 
permits extraterritorial use of force to protect people from persecution, on the other hand Public 
international law requires authorisation from the Security Council in such circumstances. 
Moreover, when a non-Muslim state uses force in the territory of a Muslim state then the latter 
sees this as an attack on their religion although this is not always the case. The argument that 
such use of force is legal in international law does not have any effect on the citizens of Muslim 
States due to the apex position of Islamic law in their belief and international law’s unjustified 
trespass into such belief. These conflicting claims are giving rise to complex legal issues 
surrounding legitimacy, peace and justice.  
6.2 The effect of incompatibility 
The effect of incompatibility between Public international law and Islamic international law is 
twofold namely, internal disturbance and external aggression. Any of these is sufficient to 
cause breach of peace and stability at the state level and inter-state level. Whereas incompatible 
use of force by non-state actors and state authorities within its own territory could give rise to 
internal disturbance,332 such use of force beyond the territory of a state could give rise to 
external aggression. Therefore, incompatible use of force creates tension in the world and gives 
rise to conflicts, both internal and external.  
Samuel Huntington has claimed that it is a ‘clash of civilisations’ which is responsible for these 
conflicts.333 This claim has occurred from the blatant decline of the Western legal system by 
the conservative scholars of Islam.334 This decline, however, was based on mere political 
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reaction against the West.335 The ‘clash of civilisation’ argument of Huntington was mainly 
based on the political response by the Western scholars of Mawdudi’s radical view rather than 
investigating the context in which the division between Darl-al-Islam and Dar-al-harb was 
made.336 This division was actually made to identify the territory in which Islamic law was 
applicable and sovereignty of such territory.337 
This claim is very strong in the context of a divided world where civilisations are in a race to 
triumph over each other but not in a world where Public international law must play a vital role 
in regulating such race so that civilisations do not use illegitimate force for their advantage. 
However, such role of Public international law must recognise the similarities of the different 
legal systems and accommodate the differences as well. The idea, as proffered by radical 
Muslim scholars, that decline of Islamic civilisations is attributable to Muslim States’ adoption 
of Western legal, cultural and political institutions is myopic in that it fails to thoroughly 
diagnose the root cause of the problem.338 Undoubtedly, Western colonialism and imperial 
disrespect for the sovereignty and independence of Muslim states are important reasons for the 
non-conformist attitude of radical Muslims. 339  However, the salient reason underpinning 
Muslim dissatisfaction lies in the encroachment of biased politics into Muslim leadership.340 
According to Falk, whilst Muslims occasionally entertain misgivings about the fairness of 
‘Western-emplaced’ structures and processes of international order, they nevertheless invoke 
the equality of nations discourse with a view to advancing ‘the quest for peace and justice in 
the relations among the peoples of the world’.341 However, it has been seen, in chapter 5, that 
sovereign equality in the decision-making process of using inter-state force does not play a 
vital role in the Charter system. 
In this circumstance, an alternative system can develop from the approach of multipolarity. 
This approach does not rule out the inequality of sovereign states at the international level and 
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the concept of hegemony as such: it opposes the notion of global hegemony but is not inimical 
to regional hegemonies that give rise to regional sphere of influence.342 Multipolarity thus 
implies the distribution of political, economic and military power as between power centres in 
ways precluding the domination of one power centre over others.343 One traditional way of 
achieving this has been the system of the balance of power in Europe from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries under which no state was to become as strong and powerful as to dominate 
others. 344  This balance of power is sometimes seen as a law of nature. 345  Therefore, the 
existence of a balance of power as a political institution is necessary for international law on 
the use of force to exist, operate and survive. According to Oppenheim: 
Law of Nations can exist only if there is an equilibrium, a balance of power, between 
the members of the Family of Nations. If the powers cannot keep one another in check, 
no rules of law will have any force, since an over-powerful State will naturally try to 
act according to discretion and disobey the law.346  
Therefore, incompatibility between Public international law and Islamic international law is 
likely to give rise to continuing clash of civilisation scenarios as highlighted by Samuel 
Huntington. However, this clash could be overcome by securing compatibility between these 
two systems with an aim to achieving a multipolar hegemonic system where power will be 
decentralised to regional organisations which can keep one another in check. This system 
would also allocate the core states’ domination in what can become their spheres of influence. 
Whatever the conceptual and ethical concerns this option raises, it still remains the case that in 
political terms the agreements between core states to respect each other’s spheres of influence 
is much more likely than general political, still less legal, agreements between power centres.347  
Multipolarity can be difficult to achieve but it essentially accords with the nature of Public 
international law and keeps the clash between states on the basis of sovereign inequality to a 
minimum. Moreover, in the settings of the Security Council where veto power can be exercised 
by five permanent members only which do not share the same values, such as liberal versus 
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illiberal, important policy decisions can only be adopted on the basis of a multipolar 
approach.348 A unipolar world has never existed and is conceptually impossible as far as 
international law on the use of force is concerned.349 As Hurrell explains: 
States need international law and institutions both to share the material and political 
costs of protecting their interests and to gain the authority and legitimacy that the 
possession of crude power can never secure on its own. All major powers face the 
imperative of trying to turn a capacity for crude coercion into legitimate authority … 
Power is not self-justifying; it must be justified by reference to some source outside or 
beyond itself, and thus be transformed into ‘authority’. For this reason, it is a mistake 
to view ‘law’ as something that is, or can be, wholly separated from some completely 
separate thing, e.g., ‘political interest’.350 
Unipolar or hegemonic power indisputably matters, but it is often spread in such a way that 
puts limits on either the power wielder’s ability to project power, or the effect of the projected 
power, or causes the power wielder to pay a higher political price than it foresaw.351 For 
example, the US-UK led intervention into Iraq in 2003 ended up with higher political price 
being paid by the power wielders.  
6.2.1 Why compatibility of Public international law and Islamic 
international law is necessary? 
In the absence of any settled and agreed threshold of an ‘armed attack’ which trigger right of 
self-defence both at Public international law and Islamic international law, various threshold 
have been offered to legitimate use of defensive force.  Therefore, it is necessary to agree on a 
threshold to trigger defensive use of force in both Public international law and Islamic 
international law. The modern world has witnessed both extra-charter state practices by states 
and extra-Shari’a practices by state and non-state actors. Moreover, there are discrepancies on 
the grounds and circumstances in which legitimate force can be used to protect people from 
human rights violation and persecution. While the post-World War II era altered the trend of 
excluding the non-European world from the sovereign equality discourse,352 aiming also to 
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curb hegemonic and aggressive conduct, Public international law has not yet acquired a fully 
impartial character detached from power politics.353 Therefore, if Public international law is to 
be more effective, it must use force in a way which is not only legitimate but also compatible 
with legitimate provisions of use of force of other systems, namely Islamic international law.  
Islam, as a religious belief, has become universal as there are so many Muslims that live in 
non-Muslim majority countries where Islamic law does not regulate the affairs of states. If the 
provisions of Islamic international law and Public international law cannot be compatible with 
each other, particularly in terms of use of force, then the adherents of these systems would 
continue to question the legitimacy of each other’s legal system based on incompatibility. 
Moreover, compatibility between these two systems would also maintain harmony and peace 
between the adherents followed by the necessary provisions for justice. In order for the 
Muslims to practise their religion anywhere in the world and enforce the Islamic legal 
principles at the state level and inter-state level there is no alternative but to complement Public 
international law and there are potentials for such complementation. Likewise, for the rest of 
the world to secure peace, stability and the minimal requirement of justice it is essential to 
complement Islamic international law. However, in order for such complementation process to 
begin, use of force in Islamic international law has to obtain the highest degree of legitimacy 
and so the Public international law.  
Since legitimate use of force can bolster peace and justice, legitimate provisions for using force 
in both Islamic international law and Public international law can further not only the objectives 
of the UN Charter, which are peace and stability, but also the element which is absent from the 
Charter system and necessary to bolster sustainable peace and stability, which is justice. For 
example, on the one hand legitimacy (in the descriptive sense)354 of use of force in Kosovo 
brought peace and ended injustice at the state and inter-state level, on the other hand legitimacy 
of use of force in Libya not only failed to promote sustainable peace but also brought injustice 
when the NATO force supplied arms to the rebels.355 As enduring peace requires justice and 
due to lack of effective provision to secure justice, the UN Charter framework has failed to 
promote sustainable international peace in the contemporary world where regulating use of 
force has become a contentious issue and challenge to the charter based system of international 
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law.356 As a result, it is essential for Public international law and Islamic international law to 
complement each other by promoting peace and justice respectively as the former judge of the 
International Court of Justice C.G. Weeramantry highlighted that: 
If a meaningful international dialogue is to be achieved, it is imperative that 
intercommunication between Islamic and other legal traditions be progressively 
strengthened, and efforts be made to raise awareness about Islam’s overall involvement 
in the development of international law.357 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that, in order to secure enduring peace, it is essential 
to secure global justice. That means peace is to be obtained through justice but not at the 
expense of it. Although both justice and peace often come into conflict with each other, it is 
the requirement of legitimacy to obtain both justice and peace at the same time. For example, 
justice and peace can be compatible by enforcing rights accrued by harm being caused.358 
Therefore, it is necessary to obtain justice through juridical coercion to obtain peace.359 In other 
words, justice here means substantive justice, which is a standard of moral evaluation that it 
would be justifiable to coercively impose on those who partake in a shared activity.360 
The reason for securing justice is that legal norms are not only clear and certain, but also they 
are perceived as being legitimate and fair in order to be regarded as just and consequently 
implemented.361 In the existence of challenges and innovative interpretation of legitimate use 
of force by non-state actors, states, and regional organisations it is expedient for the 
international legal framework to secure higher degree of legitimacy and hence peace through 
justice. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice observed: 
Justice is very seldom achieved by directly aiming at it: rather it is a by-product of the 
application of legal rules and principles, a consequence of the general order, certainty 
and stability introduced into human and international relationships through the regular 
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and systematic application of known legal rules and principles, even if these rules and 
principles are not always perfect and do not always achieve ideal results in every 
case.362 
Islamic international law is sourced in the Qur’an, Sunna and scholarly contributions to Shari‘a. 
Even the scholars’ views are subject to jurisprudential and spiritual richness rather than ‘their 
own personal views’. Custom can change the Public international law but it can only fill the 
gap in the development of Islamic international law as long as this is consistent with the Shari‘a. 
On the other hand, Public international law, through the Charter system, is promoting peace 
and stability without actively promoting justice. Seen in this way, Islamic international law is 
promoting justice363 and the Charter-based international law on the use of force is promoting 
peace. In these settings, these two systems can collectively promote both peace and justice by 
complementing each other. In addition, this would arguably not only bring into question the 
sweeping assumption that Public international law has its roots in Western Civilisation alone, 
but also promote the universality and legitimacy of international norms and standards with a 
possibility of ensuring further compliance therewith.364  
6.2.2 The promotion of peace and justice: a dilemma in Public international 
law on the use of force  
Whereas at San Francisco, proposals for renunciation of state-to-state violence and the 
substitution of collective security were widely welcomed in principle, at least some states 
understood that political considerations might prevent the Council from using its new powers 
effectively and impartially and hence raising the question of justice in the decisions of the 
Security Council regarding use of force. 365  For example, the Netherland’s representative 
warned of future political temptations to buy peace at the cost of justice: 
That price might well seem unreasonable to many; such a settlement could not be 
expected to command respect and therefore to endure, and if another and better 
settlement were not found, the prestige of the Security Council and of the organisation 
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generally, would suffer accordingly. In other words, it does not seem possible to leave 
everything to mere opportunism.366 
In these circumstances, as stated above, the Netherland’s representative proposed to appoint an 
independent body to decide the decisions of the Security Council on the basis of justice because 
he acknowledged that it is unjust to allow the Security Council to sit in judgment of its own 
proposals and also impractical to be left to the General Assembly due to the arbitrary 
appreciation of individual member-states.367 Although the Netherlands stood no chance of 
succeeding with its proposal for a council of wise and independent elders to represent the cause 
of justice in the system’s operation, the issue to which this solution was directed remains 
important and still essentially unresolved.368  
After overcoming the legitimacy deficits of Public international law and Islamic international 
law, as discussed in chapter 5, there are still circumstances when even after achieving higher 
degree of legitimacy, the use of force provisions failed to deliver peace and justice. For example, 
legitimacy requires foreign intervention in situations when use of force by tyrants enjoins 
protection under the political shield of sovereignty and such intervention is also a requirement 
of justice. However, foreign interventions often result in breach of peace within the territory 
intervened and also can lead to threat of international order. In this circumstance, human rights 
violation is a breach of peace and justice requires use of force to end such breach of peace.369 
However, justice often comes into conflict with peace and it is difficult to impose both.  
Justice, as far as use of force is concerned, denotes the first virtue of any social contract. If 
there is no justice in any social contract regulating use of force among the contractors then the 
operation of such contract is likely to fail due to illegitimate use of force.370 Therefore, justice 
is secured through legitimate use of force under the terms of a social contract. Michael Walzer 
has rightly stated that ‘the only remedy against tyrannical regimes is revolution through the 
domestic process, not foreign intervention, as otherwise the citizens’ rights to rebellion and to 
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self-determination is curbed. However, in the absence of necessary armed power to exercise 
such right of rebellion and self-determination it is just for foreign powers to intervene in 
accordance with social contract theory. But such intervention is not legitimate if there is a lack 
of proximity between such foreign powers and the intervened states. As justice is to be secured 
through legitimacy, it is necessary that a proximity can be established between the intervening 
and intervened states in order to overcome the legitimacy deficits of Public international law 
and as such justice in accordance with social contract. As a result, Rawls’s theory of justice 
lacks proximity whereas Walzer’s theory of ‘just war’ does not.371 Here, Walzer’s ‘just war 
theory’ resembles the social contract theory of that of Grotius which conceptualised the 
requirement of necessary proximity between the states to secure justice. On the contrary, 
Rawl’s aim in international law is peace which a comprehensive concept of justice would 
threaten.372  In order to facilitate peace, at the expense of justice, ‘state sovereignty’ was 
invented as a shield against a comprehensive concept of justice.  
States, which are themselves unjust, cannot intervene into another state due to lack of 
legitimacy and hence justice.373 In commensurate to the requirement of legitimacy and justice, 
it is also essential that the necessary degree of neutrality is maintained.374 This is because, the 
external source of legal arguments from distantly located states, which do not have any social 
economic and political proximity between them and the other states, are susceptible for being 
the subject of use of force.375 Moreover, unjust states follow the principle of individualism, 
which is opposed to the principle of altruism, and the latter includes a belief in shared values 
which are not arbitrary but the distillation of societal functions.376 In an altruistic environment, 
where the power of individuals is transformed and vested in the state, use of force is legitimate 
to secure justice is a primary requirement of social contract entered into by the sates at  the 
international level on behalf of the individuals or group of individuals which they represent.  
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The social contract theory was the device used to legitimate use of force by authority of secular 
entities and to provide a premise for evaluating social organisations and questioning their 
justice.377 Hence, the right of non-interference with internal sovereignty and recognition of the 
external sovereignty of a state is the right guaranteed by social contract under the condition 
that such rights must be transferred to the political community. However, such right can be 
forfeited by the community where there is a breach of that contract, for instance breach of peace, 
and justice requires to restore peace by legitimate use of force. Therefore, if there is a breach 
of peace on the territory of any member state of the UN then the Security Council may authorise 
legitimate use of force in that territory and restore the full operation of the contract. The 
legitimate use of force includes the priority right of the regional organisation to intervene in 
order to promote peace followed the exercise of such right by the Security Council if the former 
fails to restore the condition of the social contract, and after all other alternatives than actual 
use of force have been extinguished, for instance as a last resort. Both Public international law 
and Islamic international law (if the members of the society of the territory are the subjects of 
Islamic law) do not, expressly or impliedly, hold that such use of force lacks the required degree 
of legitimacy.  
Both sovereignty (in the name of peace) and justice (in the name of humanity) cannot be an 
absolute priority. This is because injustice may occur in a sovereign state and similarly peace 
may be promoted in a territory where sovereignty has been sacrificed by foreign intervention, 
such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. In this circumstance, it is advisable for sovereignty 
and justice to be reconciled, if possible.378 However, it is often impossible to reconcile these 
two conditions as both are not inclined to be encroached by the other. As a result, it is expedient 
to promote a new concept of sovereignty where justice could be accommodated. This can be 
achieved by obtaining higher degree of legitimacy which is compatible with substantive justice. 
This is because justice is linked inseparably with legitimacy, including in terms of law-making, 
not least as only the exercise of power and authority that is based on Islamic values is perceived 
as being just.379 Although, as with justice, no general agreement exists as to the exact nature 
and meaning of legitimacy, it is accepted by most that a strong link exists between the 
legitimacy of a norm and its ultimate acceptance and compliance, including those of 
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international law.380 This concept of substantive justice is linked to Islamic value of legitimacy 
and justice.381 Therefore, such Islamic conception of legitimacy and justice have potentially 
significant implications in terms of UN law-making, not least in the development of substantive 
norms which generally do not reflect Shari‘a values or principles, and which procedurally have 
been produced by a non-Islamic system.382 
6.2.3 Sovereignty revisited: perception of sovereignty and its limit 
The concept of sovereignty which was introduced by Jean Bodin to the political and legal 
lexicon appealed to national unity and allowed the state to consolidate its power. 383  The 
antagonism between natural and positive law precepts to appropriate sovereignty has since then 
marked the legal architecture.384 Moreover, the influence of Positive laws as man-made and 
emanating from sovereign’s will were gradually becoming unquestionable.385 Eventually, in 
the process of consolidating state power sovereignty becomes a predominantly political notion 
which enable the states to interact with each other regarding their external affairs, which is 
external sovereignty, without sacrificing interference in the internal affairs of states, which is 
internal sovereignty.  
State sovereignty is based on the notion that no sovereign state shall interfere in the internal 
affairs of other sovereign states.386 On this basis, state sovereignty can be of two types, namely 
internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. These two types are interrelated to each other as 
if these are the two sides of the same coin. Whereas internal sovereignty entitles a state to be 
free from intervention, external sovereignty denotes its recognition as a sovereign entity at the 
international level.387 As a result, the former is the right of the state to use force in dealing with 
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its internal affairs and the latter is the right to be recognised as a sovereign entity in the capacity 
of being a member of international system consists of other sovereign entities. However, the 
failure of its internal aspect would affect the sovereignty as a whole and this is of particular 
interest to use of force.388 
The membership of a state at the international system provides the internal as well as external 
sovereignty. Such membership also gives rise to correlated responsibility of every member 
state to respect the entitlement of other members. For example, article 48 of the International 
Law Commission’s Restatement of the Law of State Responsibility gives rise to every state to 
be responsible for internationally wrongful acts which are committed not only against any 
particular state but also a group of states or regional organisation, such as genocide.389 In 
addition, article 49 permits countermeasures against a state which is responsible for the 
wrongful act in order to induce that state to comply with its obligation.390 These provisions 
have, in effect, provided for suspension or extinction of internal sovereignty for any state which 
is responsible for certain internationally wrongful acts. However, there is no provision in the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility or elsewhere providing the extent to which internal 
sovereignty can be interfered with on the basis of suspension or extinction. In the absence of 
such provision, it is necessary to articulate the extent to which interference with internal 
sovereignty is legitimately permissible.  
Article 2(7) does indeed guarantee states’ freedom of choice as a guard against dictatorial 
interference by the UN organisation.391 However, since the Charter’s primary objective is the 
prevention of war, freedom of choice is a welcome but far from exclusive ordering principle.392 
Therefore, international organisation like the UN is entitled to take collective measures and as 
such intervene in the internal sovereignty of a state in certain circumstances. This is because 
states are not anthropomorphic, enjoying an autonomous moral standing, but are composed of 
individual human beings.393 However, the question is to what extent such sovereignty can be 
interfered? State sovereignty has been recognised by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. It provides 
that: 
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Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter Vll. 
Despite the prohibition of intervention in the internal or domestic affairs of states, there have 
been circumstances where the UN forces intervened. For example, in Congo, Yemen, Iraq, 
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone. 394  From practical perspective, such 
interventions were claimed to be legitimate on the basis of invitation from the governments of 
such states.395  However, such claim of legitimate intervention by invitation has not been 
authorised by the Charter.396 Moreover, the only circumstance that would trigger forceful 
intervention into the sovereignty of a state is on the ground of ‘breach of international peace 
and security’ as provided by Article 39 of the Charter.397 However, if state legitimacy is viewed 
in contractual terminology as protecting the basic human rights to liberty and life of its citizens, 
any aberration from this course may invite intervention because sovereignty is overridden 
through de-legitimation.398 In other words, the ultimate justification of the existence of states 
is the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens’ otherwise it forfeits not 
only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as well.399 
The threshold for triggering use of force on the ground of ‘breach of international peace and 
security’ has been gradually lowered in the practice of the UN’s principal organs.400 In its 
decision in the Tadic appeal, ICTY, referring to evidence that “the practice of the Security 
Council is rich with cases of civil war or internal strife which it classified as a ‘threat to peace’ 
and dealt with under Chapter VII” concluded “that the ‘threat to peace’ of Article 39 may 
                                                          
394 See S. Res. 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 (Rhodesia); S. Res 418 of 4 November 1977 (South Africa); 
S/RES/940 (1994) of 31 July 1994; S/RES/1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998; S/RES/1199 (1998) of 23 September 
1998; S/RES/1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998; S/RES/1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.  
395 See section 2.1.4.3 of chapter 2. 
396 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University 
Press 2002) 41. 
397 Article 39 UN Charter, available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> accessed 13 December 2017. 
398 Phillip Montague, ‘Two Concepts of Rights’ (1980) 9 Philosophy and Public Affairs 160; see also Michael 
Walzer, ‘The Theory of Aggression’ in S. Luper-Foy (ed), Problems of International Justice (Boulder, Westview 
Press 1988) 151.  
399 Fernando R. Tesόn, Humanitarian Intervention: AN Inquiry into Law and Morality (2nd end, Dobbs Ferry 
Transnational Publication 1997) 15. 
400 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University 
Press 2002) 41. 
228 
 
include, as one of its species, internal armed conflicts.”401 On this basis, in 1999, the then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has invited the states to redefine the parameters of sovereignty 
from the perspectives of globalisation and international cooperation.402 In addition, in some 
instances the United States and United Kingdom as well as regional organisation, such as 
NATO, have intervened in the domestic affairs of different states.403 This course of action has 
given rise to a necessity to revisit the concept of sovereignty in the current world.  
‘Peace’ within a territory is often left within the sovereign territory of a state where a state 
government or ruler is responsible for the maintenance of peace. However, what if the 
government or ruler is not legitimate due to being a usurper or tyrant? It is not just for the 
people to be ruled by a tyrant or a ruler who came into power by illegitimate or illegal means, 
for instance by using force rather than democratic or constitutional means. There may be peace 
in that territory as the new government or ruler might have been able to extinguish all rivalry 
movements by use of force but what about the status of the government or ruler and the means 
they are using to maintain such peace within the territory? This question gives rise to an inquiry 
into whether such government or ruler and their use of force are legitimate. The answer to this 
inquiry reflects on the view of Hans Kelsen who has stated that “the overwhelming interest that 
those in power, as well as those craving for power, have in a theory is pleasing to their wishes, 
that is in a political ideology.”404 This political ideology can be successfully implemented 
under the shield of sovereignty and hence suffers from legitimacy deficit as well as injustice.405  
Justice requires the restoration and establishment of a new government or ruler and it may 
result in breach of peace, at least in short-term. Although it is true that the instances of 
international armed conflict are decreasing, but it is also true that the instances of non-
international armed conflict are rising.406  Moreover, the complexity of the internal armed 
conflict and its frequent occurrence have given rise to not only breach of peace, either in short 
or long term, but also long-term injustice. It is understandable if the UN Charter promotes 
negative peace at the expense of short-term injustice,407 but it is not legitimate to maintain such 
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peace at the expense of long-term injustice. This is because long-term injustice can lead to 
long-term breach of peace, which is positive peace.408 For example, the interventions in Syria 
and Libya have caused not only reoccurrence of breach of peace situations but also long-term 
injustice within the respective territories. In these circumstances, it is necessary to determine 
‘is peace more precious than justice’? Is peace, conscionable, or even possible, without justice?  
These questions lead the way to the most important as well as controversial condition of peace 
as designed in the Charter system, which is sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty emerged 
in order to stabilise and incarnate a political order, national or international, against the 
entanglements of personal predilections and individual moralities. 409  The extrapolated 
international rules, in particular the rule on the non-use of force, reflect this purpose.410 
International law on the use of force is designed primarily to promote peace at international 
level by leaving the states to control ideological differences within the territory under their 
sovereign power so that these ideological differences do not transform into breach of peace at 
international level.411 That means, an international organisation, like the Security Council, 
which is responsible for a system of collective security can leave any state alone to sacrifice 
the lives of its subjects if doing so protects peace and security at the international level. In the 
words of Koskenniemi:  
Statehood functions as precisely that decision-process which tackles the problems of 
multiplicity of ideas and interpretative controversy regarding their fulfilment. Its very 
formality intends to operate as a safeguard so that these different (theological) ideals 
are not transformed into a globally enforced tyranny.412 
The existence of statehood under the shield of sovereignty often cause injustice and this 
injustice begins at the state level and may escalate at inter-state level with a legitimate cause, 
for instance to obtain justice. For example, rebellion against any tyrant and despotic 
government or ruler may give rise to internal armed conflict and eventually result in 
international armed conflict by transformation of such rebellion into right of self-determination. 
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In these circumstances, use of force by rebels is likely to be legitimate against the tyrants as a 
requirement of justice. The peace, therefore, has been breached to pursue justice. In other words, 
justice may require breach of peace in the current setting of international law on the use of 
force. As a result, sovereignty (in the name of peace) and justice often come into conflict with 
each other as the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan rightly stated that: 
Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty 
are principles that must be supported. Alas that does not tell us which principle should 
prevail when they are in conflict.413  
6.2.3.1 How sovereign is sovereignty?: A comparative analysis of the 
sovereign power distributions in a divided world  
Although sovereign equality has been stated in the UN Charter as its underlying principle in 
regards to the status of states at international level, the states have not achieved such equality 
as far as their role in the use of force is concerned.414 This is consistent with the notion, as in 
Islamic international law, that the sovereignty belongs to the God only.415 In practice, it is not 
possible to obtain sovereign equality in the power relationship and decision making process in 
terms of use of force. As a result, the conceptual differences between sovereignty in Islamic 
international law and Public international law actually in the same position from practical 
perspective. In addition, the nation state principle has been embraced by the Islamic world, 
largely out of economic, political, historical, self-determination, post-colonial and security-
related necessity.416 Therefore, the principle of nation-state is not repugnant to the interests of 
the modern Islamic world.  
 However, in the absence of sovereign equality there has been an unequal distribution of power 
in the decision-making process of the Security Council as well as in the use of extraterritorial 
force by the states. This situation has given rise to the revival of different principles of 
legitimate use of force on the basis of religion, political opinion, philosophical and ideological 
position.417 Despite the modern division of the world into nation states has been agreed and 
accepted by both the adherents of Islamic law and other secular legal systems, there has been 
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disagreements as to the extent of the sovereign powers. As a result, it is necessary to secure 
consensus on the extent of legitimate use of force by sovereign powers in a modern world. As 
previously concluded that sovereignty is no longer an absolute political shield that can be used 
by states within its territory, a new concept of sovereignty is necessary to accommodate 
legitimate use of force to secure peace and justice at the same time.  
Restricting the use of armed force entails high sovereignty costs.418 It places external authority 
over some of the most significant decision that states make, thus in effect operating as a trade-
off Westphalian sovereignty419 and invoking international legal sovereignty.420 International 
agreement, like the UN Charter, provided the platform for boarding in a train of international 
sovereignty. However, it has proven to be an incomplete contract that lacks centralised means 
of interpretation.421 As a result, states have been acknowledging the binding character of the 
Charter prohibition of use of force on the one hand and successfully managing to recourse to 
auto interpretation of this prohibition on the other hand. In these circumstances, the Charter 
system dampens concerns of uncertainty and mitigates sovereignty costs.422 However, this 
institutional form is operating in exchange of high price for legitimacy and justice. How high 
a price in justice could be exacted for the sake of preserving the primacy of peace? And how 
well was peace being preserved by permitting such injustice? 
In the practice of UN political organs, the distinction between what is justified (exculpated) 
and what is excusable (mitigated) is so fine as to be of pure (yet also considerable) theoretical 
interest.423 Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, Taiwan, East Timor, Iran 
and Iraq loomed large as cases where coercive diplomacy could make a difference.424 However, 
the practice and preference of use of force over diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes have been 
unsuccessful. 425  While the dictate of 1945 had been ‘peace over justice’ under all 
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circumstances, the notion of ‘justice over peace’ had now clearly gained momentum and 
weakened claims that the eventual use of force was unlawful.426 However, in this wake of the 
necessity to secure justice it is essential that positive peace is secured and in addition, the 
realisation of justice.427 The process of such interlacing can begin by complementing the 
legitimate rules of use of force of Public international law and Islamic international law as the 
former promotes peace and the latter promotes justice. This is because, without justice there 
can be no solid foundation for enduring peace.428  
Both justice and peace promote higher degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a value system in 
which human rights uphold the values of legitimacy (legitimacy in the descriptive sense)429 
and sovereignty upholds the value of political legitimacy. However, political legitimacy has 
become the subject of huge criticism due to its reluctance to recognise the values of legitimacy 
in the diplomatic affairs of state.430 In the current world, where use of force has become the 
subject of various interpretation, coercive diplomacy has often triumphed over the requirement 
for legitimacy. As a result, political legitimacy has been sacrificed to protect the interests of 
the powerful states by recourse to coercive diplomacy.  
However, blatant preparation for the use of force can hardly become lawful once coercive 
diplomacy has failed and the promise of force is implemented.431 The Charter’s primer on 
peace preservation and war preclusion, in this case, complements the concept of coercive 
diplomacy and hence the necessity of justice in securing such coercive diplomacy is of vital 
importance. This is a genuine reading of the Charter and for this reason, it is said that ‘extreme 
peace is war’ and extreme justice is injustice.432 
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6.3 The compatible and incompatible provisions of use of force in Public 
international law and Islamic international law  
Most Western scholars have often associated Islam with destruction and violence. 433  As 
concluded in chapter 3, this association is not based on any logical interpretation of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Therefore, insights into the profound spiritual and jurisprudential richness of the 
Muslim traditions are required to overcome existing preconceptions and prejudices towards 
Islam and Muslim States. For instance, Islamic law on the use of force, by qualifying use of 
force through norms in the Qur’an and Sunna, 434  neatly corresponds with the general 
prohibition of use of force in Public international law that are, among others, geared towards 
the mission to prevent nations from using aggression in furtherance of their political, economic 
and religious objectives. 
Whereas the general prohibition of use of force corresponds to both Public international law 
and Islamic international law, there are provisions of use of force which are incompatible with 
each other. The incompatibility of these provisions is mainly based on the claims of legitimate 
use of force. Use of force without the authorisation from the Security Council or defensive use 
of force not later approved by the SC is a serious concern in this regard. It lacks legitimate 
authority and is inconsistent with international law. Whereas Islamic international law requires 
any state to use legitimate force in accordance with Siyar, Public international law failed to 
secure compliance with such legitimacy requirement particularly when states and regional 
organisations recourse to force without authorisation from the Security Council. 435  The 
national law may require certain procedures to be followed before use of force decision being 
taken but such procedures are not subject to scrutiny at the international level. In Islamic 
international law, the Siyar provisions are scrutinising legitimate authority and just cause but 
‘what is scrutinising the same in Public international law’? In this circumstance, the Siyar 
provisions may work as a guideline for the Security Council to impose some requirements of 
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legitimate use of force and just cause requirements on the states before using force against 
another state. 
6.3.1 The compatible provisions of use of force 
Despite the strong claims of legitimacy deficits of Islamic international law and Public 
international law by the opponents of these legal systems, there are compatible provisions 
between these two systems. For example, both these systems legitimate use of force only as a 
last resort and respect the just war theory. 436  Both Public international law and Islamic 
international law prohibit use of force to retaliate or take revenge and limit such use of force 
only to repel any further attack.437  
In addition, both systems concurrently agree that defensive force can be used against state as 
well as non-state actors at the state level and inter-state level. Like Public international law, 
Islamic international law also prohibits aggressive and permits defensive use of force.438 Both 
these legal systems recognise the principles of non-intervention and have developed principles 
for systematic intervention on humanitarian reasons.439 However, despite these similarities 
these two systems often come into conflict with each other. 
6.3.2 The incompatible provisions of use of force in Public international law 
and Islamic international law 
The argument for defensive use of force has been made on numerous occasions by states and 
regional organisations to legitimate their use of force.440 However, the arguments for such 
legitimate use of force were made despite the Charter has narrowed it down to defensive force 
in the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’.441 These extra-Charter uses of force were facilitated by 
the lack of specific criteria for triggering an ‘armed attack’ and as such strong claim for 
legitimate right of self-defence. 442  This lacking of specific criteria and strong claim for 
legitimate right of self-defence have also resulted in both expansion and restriction of the right 
of defensive use of force by innovative interpretation from scholars, politicians and non-state 
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actors.443 In these settings, Islamic international law, on the other hand, provides for defensive 
use of force without needing the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ but to protect the people from 
persecution.444  
6.3.3 The compatible versus incompatible: a comparative analysis  
Imposing any system of law on any population to whom such law is alien is prone to be violated 
very often than to be followed.445 For example, prohibition of use of force except in self-
defence, the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty are principles of Public international 
law which are primarily based on Western legal systems and to certain extent alien to Islamic 
legal systems. Therefore, the dominance of the Western legal systems in the formation of 
Public international law results in conflict with those other parts of the world where the legal 
systems are not similar. Hence, those other parts of the world do not hold the provisions of 
international law on the use of force as contextually legitimate even though most of these 
provisions being conceptually similar. The conceptual similarity loses its force in the 
acceptance of the alien legal systems or provisions as law due to the label that has been affixed 
with such law, namely Public international law and Islamic international law. 
6.3.3.1 Use of force in self-defence  
Both Public international law and Islamic international law allow use of force in self-defence 
but in different circumstances, namely Public international law allows defensive use of force 
in response to an ‘armed attack’ and Islamic international law allows proportionate use of force 
in self-defence even if the attack does not occur in the threshold of an ‘armed attack’. As there 
is no set threshold to trigger an armed attack, Islamic international law can complement to 
develop a general right of self-defence in response to any attack which does not reach the 
threshold of an ‘armed attack’. For example, proportionate use of force in self-defence.  
Pre-emptive self-defence is readily available in Islamic international law when such force is 
necessary and there is no other alternative. Islamic international law invokes the ‘necessity’ 
requirement to use force but subject to obtaining higher degree of legitimacy. In other words, 
it feeds the ‘necessity’ requirement in accordance with law, such as by fulfilling the Islamic 
legal requirement of use of force, for instance jihad and harb. On the other hand, the state 
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practice under Islamic international law suggests that the necessity requirement often triumphs 
over the legal requirement. For example, Turkey’s use of armed force in January 2018 in Syrian 
border territory which is under the control of Kurdish community which the former claims to 
be terrorists and on that basis, uses force in pre-emptive self-defence.446 
6.3.3.2 Double Standards of Islamic international law in the decision-making 
process 
In Islamic international law, ‘Jihad’ requires religious authorisation whereas ‘harb’ requires 
political authorisation and direction.447 These requirements ensure a double standard in the 
decision making process. Islamic international law can also maintain a double standard in the 
use of pre-emptive force in self-defence to promote higher degree of legitimacy. However, 
‘post-use of force’ scrutiny by an independent body is necessary to ensure that such decision 
making has not been subject to abuse and post conflict justice is recognised by Islamic 
international law.448 
6.3.3.3 State responsibility for use of force by non-state actors 
Islamic international law does not hold a state responsible for extraterritorial force being used 
by non-state actors. Rather this system promotes use of force for law enforcement purposes, 
for instance as a requirement of justice, by specifically using force against the non-state actors 
which has used such extraterritorial force. For example, punishing Banu Qurayza tribe for 
treachery rather than the whole Jewish community.449 On the other hand, Public international 
law, although in limited circumstances, attributes responsibility to state for the extraterritorial 
use of force by non-state actors and therefore permits defensive use of force against the 
responsible state. Islamic law will only allow intervention to defend the state from aggression 
perpetrated by the non-state actors who are harboured in foreign countries. Although this is 
against the general prohibition of use of force, the necessary degree of legitimacy is achieved.  
6.3.3.4 Intervention by invitation 
Intervention by invitation is allowed in both Public international law and Islamic international 
law but the difference is that in the former system only legitimate government can consent or 
                                                          
446  BBC News Desk, ‘Syria war: Turkey denounces US 'terror army' plan for border’ (15 January 2018) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42687958> accessed 20 January 2018. 
447 Shawki Allam, The Ideological Battle: Egypt's Dar al- Iftaa Combats Radicalization (The Grand Mufti of 
Egypt 2016) 20. 
448 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Shari‘a and Islamic Criminal Justice in the Time of War and Peace (Cambridge 
University Press 214) 249. 
449 John Glubb, A Short History of the Arab Peoples (Hodder and Stoughton: London 1969) 46. 
237 
 
invite whereas in the latter system both government and people can give consent or invite to 
intervene. Islamic international law can complement where such intervention is necessary to 
protect the people against tyranny especially when collective security system does not respond 
to such crisis. In this way, Islamic international law allows use of force to promote justice.450 
For instance, in Islamic international law force (both defensive and offensive) can be used to 
root out oppression, persecution, and other forms of injustice.451 Public international law, on 
the other hand, confines the lawful exercise of unilateral force to the single case of self-
defence.452 However, even such narrowed down lawful exercise of self-defence often lacks 
legitimacy and makes claim for its expansion.453  
6.3.3.5 Protections of Nationals Abroad  
In Public international law, the principle of responsibility to protect allows states to use force 
to protect their nationals abroad.454 On the other hand, Islamic international law requires states 
to use force not only to protect the nationals but also foreigners (Musta’min) and non-Muslims 
(dhimmis) indiscriminately.455 The recognition of the status of Musta’min and Dhimmis was a 
reminder of the Universalist mission of the Islamic faith, and Roman legal concepts of 
sovereignty had been erased since the early Islamic conquests, which did away with all traces 
of communal jurisdiction.456 Therefore, Islamic international law promotes justice by allowing 
use of force to protect everyone living within the jurisdiction.457 Hence, Justice is the supreme 
and quintessential Islamic value in relation to legal, political and social issues especially.458 
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6.3.3.6 Judicial scrutiny of use of force  
As the states and regional organisations are claiming legitimacy of defensive use of force 
beyond the charter framework, the nature and extent of such defensive force have become 
subject of dynamic interpretation and covering different circumstances. For example, use of 
force in the gap between Articles 2(4) and 51.459 Uses of force in this gap are claimed to be 
legitimate on the ground of necessity to enforce the law and thus resulted in claims of 
legitimacy of such use of force based on diverse grounds. In these challenging circumstances, 
it is necessary to agree on the legitimate extent of such use of force in different circumstances. 
Islamic international law can complement Public international law in this regard by adopting 
the Islamic principle of proportional use of defensive force, which is subject to judicial 
scrutiny.460 In this way, all the extra-Charter claims of legitimate use of force would be subject 
to accountability and scrutiny.  
6.4 Crime of Aggression and its compatibility with Islamic international law 
on the use of force 
Following the trial of military personnel, who were responsible for unlawful resort to major 
military force after the First and Second World Wars, ‘aggression’ was declared to constitute 
the supreme international crime.461 Today, the prohibition on aggression is widely considered 
a jus cogens norm – a standard of international law that may not be changed by a contrary 
treaty provision or the development of a new rule of customary international law.462 
6.4.1 The definition of aggression in the Charter system 
The United Nations Charter has provided for the maintenance of international peace and 
security by prohibiting aggression. However, due to the challenges posed on the charter system 
in relation to use of force, in certain circumstances, ‘aggression’ has been claimed to be 
legitimate.463  For example, humanitarian intervention, fighting international terrorism and 
promoting national security. This claim of legitimate aggression has been inconsistent with the 
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definition of ‘aggression’ adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 which aimed to protect 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. The General Assembly definition of 
aggression is based on Resolution 3314.464 Aggression is defined, in broad terms, as:  
The use of armed force, against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political 
independence of a state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.465 
Whereas the Resolution strongly prohibited any justification for aggression,466 such prohibition 
has not been absolute as it has allowed use of armed force which is without prejudice to the 
United Nations Charter including its provisions on the lawful use of force.467 This arrangement 
has permitted ‘aggression’ as a legitimate use of armed force to self-defence as provided in 
Article 51 of the Charter and Collective action taken by the Security Council according to 
Article 39 of the Charter. However, this definition has not explicitly limited aggression to the 
exceptions provided by the Charter.468 For example, the Resolution’s annex did not directly 
equate all uses of force that violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter with ‘aggression’.469 As a 
result, this definition of aggression remains open-ended to include use of armed forces which 
is not permitted in the UN Charter.  
6.4.2 The definition of aggression in the ICC 
Despite the open-ended nature of the definition of aggression, the aspiration to prosecute and 
punish governmental leaders who initiate use of force in aggression continued since the 
prosecution of major political leaders at the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals.470 
Throughout most of the 20th century, that aspiration remained unfulfilled, but 120 states 
adopted the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC).471 The ICC 
Statute was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002.472 Article 
5(1) (d) of the Statute provides that the ICC has jurisdiction over, among other crimes, the 
crime of aggression.473 Because the state parties were not able to reach agreement as to what 
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constitutes the crime of aggression during the Rome Conference, it was decided that the ICC 
would not have authority to exercise jurisdiction over the crime until after amendments to the 
Statute defining the crime of aggression were adopted.474 
Following the proposal of Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA), a 
definition of aggression has been adopted at the Kampala Review Conference.475 The gist of 
the General Assembly definition was followed by the parties of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) at Kampala in 2010, with a view to defining aggression. 476  The Kampala 
amendment defines both ‘act of aggression’ and ‘crime of aggression’. Under Article 8bis(2), 
‘act of aggression’ means: 
The use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall 
in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 
14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:  
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion 
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof;  
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State 
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;  
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and 
air fleets of another State;  
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State 
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement;  
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(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against 
a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.477 
Under Article 8bis (1) ‘crime of aggression’ means: 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act 
of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations.478 
These definitions of ‘act of aggression’ and ‘crime of aggression’ have raised some contentious 
issues regarding the nature and the circumstances of use of force when ‘act of aggression’ can 
be treated as a ‘crime of aggression’. Although the ICC’s definition of ‘act of aggression’ draws 
heavily on the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution, the latter never included all types of use 
of force in repugnant to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as act of aggression.479 On the contrary, 
the ICC’s definition of ‘act of aggression’ included any violation of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter as act of aggression without any scrutiny from the Security Council.480 However, such 
scrutiny is recognised by the 1974 General Assembly resolution. As a result, ICC’s definition 
of ‘act of aggression’ includes every violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.481 
Each use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter can be an act of aggression but 
the question is, whether such act can be prosecuted as ‘crime of aggression’. ICC’s ‘crime of 
aggression’ by its terms is a leadership crime; the defendant must hold a position by which he 
or she ‘effectively … exercise[s] control over or … direct[s] the political or military action of 
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a State’.482 The language adopted excludes non-governmental actors, such as persons leading 
a terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda, leaders of an insurgency, or industrialists in a country even 
if they have substantial involvement in and influence upon governmental conduct.483 As a 
result, any state which is harbouring a terrorist group to initiate an act of aggression against 
another state cannot be prosecuted for crime of aggression according to ICC’s definition. This 
position eventually conflicts with the law of state responsibility which makes every state 
responsible for use of force or act of aggression committed by non-state actors from its 
territory.484 In these circumstances, the ICC definition is incompatible with the law of state 
responsibility as far as prosecution for ‘crime of aggression’ is concerned.  
In addition, the ICC’s definition of ‘crime of aggression’ has provided for a new requirement, 
which is ‘manifest violation of the UN Charter’.485 However, this requirement of ‘manifest 
violation’ is not found in the UN Charter or in the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution.486 
Determining the existence of a ‘manifest violation of the Charter’ requires findings with respect 
to each of the three elements identified in the definition of the crime: character, gravity, and 
scale.487  If the ‘manifest violation’ standard is interpreted in this way, there may be few 
prosecutions for crimes of aggression before the ICC since aggression of that scale very rarely 
happens.488 Similarly, the non-prosecution of cases under such a high standard might have the 
unfortunate effect of sub silentio condoning lesser uses of force.489 On the contrary, a low 
standard for what constitutes crime of aggression could end up deterring low levels of 
undesirable coercion, but it might also inhibit lawful uses of force that help to keep aggressors 
in check.490 In these circumstances, it is necessary to determine the dividing line between 
permissible force and impermissible aggression.  
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6.4.2.1 Permissible acts of aggression 
The general prohibition of use of force is a peremptory norm of Public international law.491 
Therefore, any use of force which is not allowed within the exceptions provided by the UN 
Charter and customary international law is likely to lack the necessary degree of legitimacy.492 
However, all extra-Charter uses of force are not illegitimate due the nature and extent of such 
uses of force.493 For example, pre-emptive self-defence and humanitarian intervention. Uses of 
force in these contexts are claimed to be legitimate based on ‘just war’ theory.494 ‘Just war’ 
theory has provided the valuable support for legitimate pre-emptive use of force in self-
defence.495 In addition, customary international law has provided the platform in adapting the 
Charter framework to legitimate such defensive force in pre-emption. 496  As a result, the 
question of permissibility of use of force, in the context of crime of aggression, is narrowed 
down to humanitarian intervention.  
Humanitarian intervention has been the state practice for centuries and represents customary 
international law.497  States have intervened to protect the ‘natural rights’ of other states’ 
subjects, or to protect their own subjects from abuse in a foreign land.498 However, following 
the atrocities and tragedies occurred before and during World War II, the prohibition of use of 
force was adopted by the UN Charter in order to promote peace. But this prohibition to use 
force has not explicitly provided on the consequences of such use of force to prevent human 
rights abuses and humanitarian crises.499 As the international community gets further away 
from the memories of World War II and faces more modern tragedies, support for humanitarian 
intervention grows to secure justice. 500  Moreover, humanitarian intervention could be a 
potential tool to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity which the Rome 
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Statute criminalises. State practices have also appeared to have favoured humanitarian 
intervention, at least in clearly non-pre-textual cases, such as in Bosnia and Rwanda.501 
Use of force by a terrorist group can be an ‘act of aggression’ but has not been categorised as 
a ‘crime of aggression’ under the ICC’s definition.502 As a result, terrorist groups are not 
subject to prosecution for crime of aggression. This is a dilemma as ‘breach of international 
law on state responsibility’ has not been made subject to criminal responsibility in the ICC’s 
definition of ‘crime of aggression’. However, such use of force by a terrorist group can be 
reconciled with the law of state responsibility. This is because, the law of state responsibility 
holds the state responsible for aggressive use of force by a terrorist group from its territory.503 
As use of force in self-defence is permissible under Article 51 of the UN Charter against an 
‘armed attack’ by a terrorist group,504  use of force by terrorist groups can be effectively 
defended even where ICC’s definition of aggression excluded such use of force as a crime. 
It is worth pointing out that ‘crime of aggression’ is a political crime in contrast to ‘genocide’, 
which is a crime against humanity, or war crime, which is inexcusable.505 The political nature 
of the crime makes the leadership of one state responsible for ‘crime of aggression’ when any 
harm is committed against the territorial independence and sovereignty of another state.506 On 
the other hand, the 1974 General Assembly definition of aggression focuses on state 
responsibility for aggression and not on individual criminal responsibility.507 Furthermore, the 
International Law Commission recognised state responsibility for aggression in Article 19 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility.508 
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The historical record and the weight of authority demonstrate that, within the jus ad bellum 
‘aggression’ is any serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force.509 A violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a prima facie act of aggression.510 Acts serious enough to 
trigger the Article 51 self-defence will constitute aggression.511 The jus ad bellum, established 
by the UN Charter and customary international law, does not recognise individual criminal 
responsibility for crime of aggression. However, the ICC definition does so recognise but by 
creating different definition than that found in the jus ad bellum. In these circumstances, the 
legitimacy of prosecutions for crime of aggression under the ICC definition is under scrutiny 
especially when such definition is not supported by either jus ad bellum or customary 
international law. Moreover, as aggression is a political crime the decision to use force is 
political and should be subject to political sanction, such as by the Security Council, rather than 
criminal ones.512  
6.4.3 The compatibility of crime of aggression with Islamic international law 
on the use of force 
Islamic international law does not specifically impose criminal responsibility for use of force 
in aggression.513 However, any aggressive use of force, irrespective of its character, scale and 
gravity, is prohibited in Islamic international law.514 On the occurrence of aggressive use of 
force, Islamic international law provides for defensive use of force in response to such 
aggression and this is compatible with the Charter framework. In addition, humanitarian 
intervention is permitted in Islamic international law to save persecuted people from tyranny 
and oppression. However, such use of force is not permitted in the Charter framework but in 
customary international law. Therefore, Islamic international law is compatible with customary 
international law in this respect.  
The legitimacy of use of force, in Islamic international law, is depended on the right authority 
and just cause to use force.515 As a result, legitimate extraterritorial recourse to force is the 
authority of a ruler or government but not any non-state actor or terrorist group, and this is 
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because a ruler or government has the right authority to make decision on recourse to force.516 
In addition, the ‘just cause’ of use of force is determined by ‘jihad’ which is the basis of use of 
force in Islamic international law.517 As extraterritorial use of force under the banner of ‘jihad’ 
is a collective duty under Islamic international law, the ruler or government must satisfy that 
such use of force is legitimate. In other words, the ruler or government must provide the basis 
for use of force before calling for jihad and such basis must be consistent with Shari‘a.518 
As jihad is a collective responsibility, Islamic international law does not recognise individual 
criminal responsibility for aggression even when the call for jihad has been illegitimate, for 
instance when the ruler called for jihad for material gain which is opposed to Shari‘a. For 
example, call for jihad by Saddam Hussain for continued support in the invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. 519  As a result, Islamic international law does not recognise individual criminal 
responsibility for aggression. Therefore, if a leader of a Muslim state is prosecuted for crime 
of aggression then he can question the legitimacy of such prosecution on the basis that the use 
of force was in accordance with Islamic international law and hence legitimate. In these 
circumstances, Muslim majority states may not be inclined to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC 
for prosecution of crime of aggression or send a notice of reservation to reflect that ‘in case of 
any inconsistency between Shari‘a law and the ICC Statute then the former shall prevail’. This 
course of action is consistent with jus cogens as it does not provide for individual criminal 
responsibility for aggression.  
However, aggression is specifically prohibited in Islamic international law and aggressive use 
of force triggers right of self-defence even when such aggressive use of force is not to the extent 
of an ‘armed attack’. This situation promotes justice as when a Muslim state uses defensive 
force against any aggressor state the former can claim legitimacy of using such force on the 
basis of Islamic international law. The same is true of a Muslim state using force to end 
humanitarian crises in another state. Although the ruler or government claims legitimacy of 
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such use of force in Islamic international law, the assessment for using force is made by the 
ruler or government based on political considerations, namely national interest, safeguarding 
or restoring other people’s fundamental rights or action the necessity of international order and 
stability decision, rather than legal. Where political considerations are the key elements for 
decision-making on use of force, the responsibility for such decision-making should be subject 
to political sanction by regional or international organisation rather than criminal. As a result, 
the ICC definition of aggression lacks legitimacy because both Public international law and 
Islamic international law do not provide for a criminal responsibility for aggression.  
6.5 The role of treaties in the complementation process 
Islamic international law on the use of force and its approach to treaty obligations may be 
drawn on to uphold the notion of peaceful and amicable relations between the members of UN 
which include not only Muslim states but also other countries which are not ruled by Islamic 
law.520 Muslim nations’ propensity for territorial plurality and peaceable conduct has been 
borne out by their institution of regular treaty relations with non-Muslim States with which 
Islamic polities have in practice rejected to have been in an unmitigated state of hostilities on 
account of religious differences. 521  It is in this context that entering into bilateral and 
multilateral treaties can be one of the effective ways to accommodate conflicting legal systems 
in an international level to agree on conduct of use force.522  
However, treaties themselves could be conflicting to each other. For example, a treaty between 
two countries made an agreement not to use force against each other is likely to be in 
contravention of a multilateral treaty which required its member states to take immediate 
collective action by using force against the country against which collective measures have 
been authorised by an international institution established by such treaty, for instance the 
Security Council. Likewise, a treaty between country A and country B for not to use force 
against each other, similar agreement between country B and C, and between country C and A 
are unlikely to come into conflict with each other as all the parties agreed to abstain from using 
force. On the contrary, if country A and country B agrees on not to use force against each other 
but country B and C agreed the same and also that they will collectively defend any external 
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attack in their country. However, country A and country C are not in such contractual obligation. 
In this setting, if country A uses force against country C then country B cannot offer help to 
country C for being contractually obliged to not to use force against country A. In this scenario, 
B is represented as a Muslim country which is obliged by a bilateral treaty with another country, 
which is country A, that the former must not use force against the latter and vice versa.523 
Country B is, however, can notify the other party, which is country A, about termination of the 
treaty and then recourse to force against it if the latter is responsible for violation of the treaty 
provisions.524 This is the position of Islamic international law which binds the parties to a treaty 
even if when use of force by any of the parties of the treaty is necessary to protect serious 
catastrophe.525  
On the contrary, Public international law has developed hierarchy in the status of treaties. Any 
treaty or its provision can supersede others on the basis of its status. For example, a peremptory 
norm of international law on the use of force, such as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, can 
supersede any conflicting provisions in a bilateral treaty. The status of peremptory norms of a 
treaty has been recognised by the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). 526  For example, the Preamble to the 1969 VCLT refers to ‘the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter’, and Article 30(1) makes the rules on successive 
treaties on the same matter ‘subject to Article 103 of the Charter’. 527  Article 52 further 
stipulates that ‘a treaty is void if concluded by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter’.528 1986 VCLT includes analogous 
cross-references; most significantly, Article 30 establishes that ‘in the event of a conflict 
between obligations under the Charter …and obligations under a treaty, the obligations under 
the Charter shall prevail’.529 As a result, Article 103 has been incorporated into general treaty 
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law.530 This has put Public international law in a more advantageous position especially for the 
development of the treaty law on the different status and effect of the treaty provisions.531  
On the other hand, Islamic international law established the binding nature of the treaty but not 
developed its dynamic characteristics, particularly the peremptory nature of treaty provisions, 
except that any treaty provisions opposed to the Shari‘a is void. As a result, there is a gap in 
Islamic international law when the treaty provision is neither in accordance with nor opposed 
to Shari‘a. For example, where the terms of a treaty between Muslims and non-Muslim states 
are not specifically set out in the Shari ‘a. This gap can be filled by Public international law 
through its application of hierarchical characteristic of treaty validating conventions, such as 
Vienna Conventions, in the overall application of Islamic international law in relation to 
treaties. For example, Where the Shari‘a does not state any specified term for contractual 
relationship it is possible to enter into such contractual relationship without specifying the time 
limit and subject to the provision for termination by notice.532 This arrangement is likely to 
promote the stability of the treaty law of Islam by maintaining a parallel system with the Public 
international law.  
However, due to the nature of such conduct, which is using armed forces, the consequences of 
breach of any of the conducts prohibited by a treaty has to be enforceable by an international 
body. In the absence of any such body at the international level, can the victim state which has 
suffered from the breach recourse to force? If yes, then it would be in violation of the 
prohibition of use of inter-state force as provided in the UN Charter which is a peremptory 
norm of international law.533 Islamic international law permits use of force against the party 
which are responsible for breaking a peace treaty treacherously or by recourse to aggression.534 
As a result in Islamic international law any state, against which a peace treaty is breached 
treacherously or by recourse to aggressive use of force, has an automatic right to use force 
against any state which is responsible for breaching such treaty.535 However, such use of force 
requires a hefty burden of proof from the Claimant, such as the requirement to prove that a 
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peace treaty has been broken by treachery or aggression is on the Claimant and the standard is 
beyond reasonable doubt and this position makes such use of force very difficult to exercise.536 
Seen in this way, Islamic international law promotes ‘justice’537 but Public international law 
promotes ‘peace’.538 In this conflict between justice and peace, which is a grey hole of Public 
international law, both Islamic international law and Public international law can complement 
each other through their respective law of treaties.  
The scope of Islamic international law is not contingent upon bilateral agreements between the 
nations but unilateral obligations of Muslims to the rest of the world.539 Therefore, it is not 
primarily a system based on consent but a system based on principles of Islamic religion and 
morality.540 As a result, Islamic international law can complement Public international law 
where it has been questioned that consent is the basis of legal obligation where such consent is 
not directly given by those who are to take the consequences. However, when a treaty or 
agreement had been concluded between and among Muslims and non-Muslims, the parties 
involved were to observe the relevant terms on a reciprocal basis, in congruence with the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.541 In this way, Islamic international law recognises treaty 
obligation based on state consent in the one hand, and renewal of such consent to overcome 
the legitimacy-deficits of the remote decision making process by international organisations in 
the other.  
Conclusion 
In chapter 5, legitimacy has been analysed as a descriptive theory of international law on the 
use of force. However, this theory has to take seriously the empirical realities that hinder its 
applicability in practice because, if it does not then it will provide principles which are not 
politically feasible and these principles will therefore fail to be action-guiding. 542  This 
argument of non-ideal theorists is similar to that of realists and expansionists of the use of force 
in self-defence.543 Ideal theorists, on the other hand, argue that allowing political feasibility 
                                                          
536 Ibid, 136. 
537 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press 1966) 10. 
538 Joel H. Westra, International Law and the Use of Armed Force (Routledge 2007) 10. 
539 Majid Khadduri, ‘Islam and the Modern Law of Nations’ (1956) 50 American Journal of International Law 
358.  
540 Onder Bakircioglu, Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law (Routledge 2014) 
52. 
541 See section 3.2.2.2 of chapter 3. 
542 C. Farrelly, Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation’ (2007) 55 Political Studies 844.  
543 See section 2.3 of chapter 2. 
251 
 
this central role in justifying principles of justice will lead to non-ideal theorists endorsing 
injustice.544 For example, theorists operating with this political feasibility constraint in the 21st 
Century have endorsed extra-Charter use of force to a much extended extent under the banner 
of self-defence because of the political infeasibility at the time of abolishing it.545  
The twin horns of this dilemma, which is the charges of ‘political irrelevance’ and ‘adaptive 
preference formation’ respectively, are highly relevant to the theoretical debate on the justice 
and legitimacy of international law.546 One solution to the dilemma could be to hold that a 
theory of justice should either only contain non-deal principles or ideal principles.547 However, 
such solution is likely to be subject to criticisms due to the fact that, both ideal and non-ideal 
principles are not exclusively sufficient to respond to such criticisms.548 Hence, the natural 
response to this is to try and develop a complementary understanding which contains both ideal 
and non-ideal principles. 549  In this response, both principles can form into a common 
understanding of shared or preferred values without ignoring the practical realities of adopting 
such values.550  
The prohibition of use of force in Public international law invokes the positivist aspect of 
sovereignty whereas the introduction of extra-consensual arguments such as justice as human 
rights invokes the aspects of natural law. However, each line of argument can substitute the 
other or they can mutually recombined. Hence, one may refer to justice of keeping promises or 
to the order which adherence to article 2(4) brings but also to the justice of adjusting the rule 
when circumstances change. Concerning the latter, separation of law from state action suffers 
from ‘the problem of normative source’, that is the inability to determine the content of the 
rule.551 On the other hand, fusion of law with practice suffers from the problem of legitimacy. 
In these circumstances, a distinction may be made between two different traditions which 
adopted very different approaches to use of force, the ‘theological’ or ‘scholastic’ tradition 
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which forbade, pre-emption, and the ‘humanist’ or ‘oratorical’ tradition which permitted it.552 
Both Public international law and Islamic international law recognise legitimate recourse to 
force in pre-emption in response to imminent threat of force. Hence, both these systems 
represent ‘humanist’ or ‘oratorical’ tradition, and accordingly can legitimately be compatible 
with each other. 
Despite the fact that this concept of legitimacy is contained in different systems of law, namely 
Public international law and Islamic international law, which are conflicting to each other in 
terms of origins and applications, their essential characteristics comply with the pluralistic 
nature of such law. Consequently, the law derived from the different sources and legal systems 
that are not constrained within a single community but different communities of the world. 
They have legitimacy within their respective communities but higher degree of such legitimacy 
is achieved when outside their respective communities, which is at the inter-state level. The 
modus vivendi that existed between Muslim and non-Muslim powers in the earlier periods show 
that a balanced and equitable relationship can only come about once Islamic values are 
understood and accommodated in the international political order.553 According to one Modern 
Muslim scholar the relationship between Muslim and other nations is based on how the other 
nations perceive Islam.554  
As Margaret Davies rightly observed: 
Clearly the increasing prominence of international law and human rights play a 
significant role in creating a legally plural environment on the global scale – after all, 
the relationship between international and domestic law immediately creates (at least) 
a duality of law across the entire globe, while human right is a global normative 
discourse which enters into local normative patterns in many distinct ways.555 
A judicial space for scrutinising use of force can also be created as soon as pluralistic legal 
framework is achieved through adequate legal theory between different states, both weak and 
strong. However, before that both Public international law and Islamic international law need 
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to operate in plural fashion so that the necessary degree of legitimacy, such as descriptive 
legitimacy, can be secured. This is because, operating in plural fashion is an essential pre-
requisite to global justice and enduring peace.  
This chapter finally concludes that, use of force in Public international law and Islamic 
international can complement each other when it comes to internal conflict, such as rebellion, 
and extraterritorial conflict, such as humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive use of force in 
self-defence. The process of complementation is necessary to overcome the legitimacy deficits 
of these two systems and secure a pluralistic international law. This process of 
complementation would not only remove the conceptual conflicts between these two systems 
but also any misunderstanding of the jus ad bellum provisions. The process of complementation 
can be completed and continued by adopting the conception of ‘legal pluralism’ together with 
application of the general provisions of the law of treaties of Public international law and 
Islamic international law.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion of the Thesis 
 
Overall in this thesis, the use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law 
has been dealt with by exploring the interface of facts, rules, ideas, challenges, assessing their 
significance and elucidating the interrelations between theory and practice. The focus of this 
research has been the legitimacy of the facts, rules, ideas, challenges and the potential of these 
two systems to be compatible where there are conflicting provisions on the use of force. 
Legitimacy has been approached from the perspectives of index and descriptive legitimacy in 
order to scrutinise the essential elements of the components of legitimacy to its higher degree 
and take a step closer to justice. In addition, this thesis has examined the potential of 
conjunctive theory, which is legal pluralism, to play a vital role in the complementation process 
between Public international law and Islamic international law.  
After setting out the introductory matters in chapter 1, this thesis advanced its study to examine 
the legal status of international law on the use of force. In chapter 2, the legal status of use of 
force has been examined by scrutinising the UN Charter provisions for use of force, customary 
international law in relation to use of force and the challenges posed on the Charter framework. 
This examination has furthered the inquiry into the origins of current international system from 
the context of colonialism which revealed the predominantly Western origin of Public 
international law on the use of force.  The Western origins of international law turned out to be 
the main legitimacy deficit for its self-description of itself as universal, objective, and neutral. 
This claim of purported universality and accordingly legitimacy of Public international law 
prompted for an analysis of the debate between cultural relativism and universality from the 
perspective of expansion of use of force beyond the proscriptions of the UN Charter. The study, 
in chapter 2, reached to the conclusion that, the challenges are threatening the effectiveness of 
the Charter system in the one hand and questioning the legitimacy of extra-Charter use of force 
on the other. This conclusion required engagement with further study to find out the extent of 
legitimacy deficits of use of force in Public international law from the perspectives of the 
current legal framework as well as the challenges posed.  
While researching to discover the extent of legitimacy deficits of Public international law on 
the use of force, it has come to the attention of the researcher that it is necessary to examine 
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the legitimacy of Islamic international law as well. This is because Islamic international law is 
not free from challenges and legitimacy deficits. As a result, the study examined use of force 
provisions of Islamic international law, in chapter 3. This chapter studied the sources of use of 
force in Islamic international law, namely the Qur’an and Sunna. It also studied the meanings 
and significances of the controversial term, which triggers use of force in Islamic law, which 
is jihad. The study revealed that, although Islamic international law has a strong source-
oriented legitimacy, this system has been subject to serious influx from non-divine sources, 
and as a result there has been controversial interpretation of the Shari‘a from the perspective 
of use of force which eventually transformed the meaning of jihad to invoke hostility and an 
all-out war against non-Muslims. These findings furthered the study to discover the extent of 
the legitimacy deficits of Islamic international law on the use of force.  
After establishing the position that both Public international law and Islamic international law 
suffer from legitimacy deficits, the study furthers to discover the extent of such legitimacy 
deficits. However, in the process of conducting the research the researcher has realised that, as 
Islamic international law is the development of jurists and exegetes it is necessary to examine 
its development and see how the source-oriented legitimacy has been faded through the course 
of time. This examination has taken the researcher to the classification of armed conflict in 
Islamic international law. It has been then discovered that, unlike Public international law 
Islamic international law does not categorise armed conflict. Instead, this system equally treats 
non-international and international armed conflicts. It has also been discovered that this system 
promotes substantive justice right from the domestic level up till to the international level, even 
if it is at the expense of peace. The focal point of this setting of Islamic law is not only to 
promote justice but also to provide effective control of use of force at the domestic level, and 
to prevent escalation of armed conflict to a large scale at the international level. As a result, 
Islamic law of rebellion has been the subject matter of study in chapter 4. This chapter discovers 
that, Islamic law of rebellion is much more advanced than Public international law as the former 
recognises the right of rebellion and the treatment of rebels whereas the latter does not 
effectively deal with rebellion.  
At this stage, the research findings have been limited to the nature of legitimacy of use of force 
in Public international law and Islamic international law. But the first research question 
required to find out the extent of the legitimacy of such use of force. In order to find the extent 
of legitimacy and its deficits the study advances, in chapter 5, to test the legitimacy deficits of 
both these systems by application of the appropriate tests of legitimacy. Index legitimacy and 
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legitimacy in the descriptive sense have been applied to both the uses of force provisions 
examined in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Having examined the legitimacy of Public international law 
and Islamic international law, it has been concluded that use of force in both systems are subject 
to critical legitimacy deficits. As a result, the study advances to find out how the legitimacy 
deficits could be overcome, which is the second question of the thesis. The research findings 
on this point recommend that, the process legitimacy deficit of Public international law could 
be overcome by reforming the decision-making process at the Security Council and by 
regionalising the system. In terms of Islamic international law, the legitimacy deficits could be 
overcome by limiting the interpretation of use of force provisions by qualified people only, 
such as Mujtahids.  
Overcoming the legitimacy deficits of Public international law and Islamic international law 
left the thesis in a position where the two conflicting systems are lying separately in incomplete 
state due to the prevalent legitimacy deficits. This is because despite figuring out the ways to 
overcome the legitimacy deficits of these two legal systems, the conflict between them remains. 
For example, despite carrying out the reform of the Security Council and limiting interpretation 
by qualified people only the effectiveness of these legal systems does not improve to deal with 
the challenges of modern world, namely threat of use of force by terrorists and other non-state 
armed actors operating in Muslim states who are claiming legitimacy of terrorism and 
asymmetrical use of force on the ground that Public international law is illegitimate due to its 
rejection to include Islamic international law which has the potential to promote justice and 
peace at the same time. This claim of legitimacy by terrorist groups prompted for further study 
on overcoming the legitimacy deficits of Public international law.  
The study, in chapter 5, concluded that, legal pluralism is an integral part the development of 
a compatible legal framework particularly at the international level where compliance of law 
is based on descriptive legitimacy as perceived by the subjects. Legal pluralism has been found 
to be a valuable characteristic of international legal framework which is prone to remove the 
political barrier, and promote peace and justice. Whereas this chapter has focused on the 
benefits of legal pluralism in overcoming the legitimacy deficits of Public international law, it 
has been acknowledged that pluralism itself cannot overcome the main legitimacy deficit, 
which is its own sense of deriving its own legitimacy from its purported universality. In order 
to overcome this main legitimacy deficit of Public international law, this chapter concluded 
that the cultural relativist approach can potentially overcome the barrier by adopting diverse 
cultural and religious values, namely Islamic international law which is originated from Islamic 
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religious values. This is because, legal pluralism requires these different and competing values 
to be recognised in the development of Public international law on the use of force. In this way, 
legal pluralism could overcome its descriptive legitimacy by promoting the notions of 
multipolarity and inclusiveness.  
Chapter 6, eventually, dealt with the third question of the thesis, which is whether use of force 
in Public international law and Islamic international law can be compatible. This chapter 
examines the compatibility of use of force between Public international law and Islamic 
international law. The examination concludes on the finding that compatibility between these 
two systems is possible because both these systems have potentials which can promote 
effective legal framework at the international level. For example, Public international law 
promotes peace and Islamic international law promotes substantive justice. However, in the 
modern world where there are diverse claims of legitimacy of use of force it is necessary to 
promote both peace and justice at the same time. Therefore, if these two legal systems could 
complement each other, both enduring peace and substantive justice could be promoted. 
However, peace and justice often conflicts with each other and hence it is necessary to apply 
the right process of complementation in order to make these legal systems compatibles.  
In this process of complementation, it has been acknowledged that the status and effectiveness 
of the law on use of force have been subject to criticisms from the perspectives of both rule-
oriented and practice-oriented arguments. In order to avoid the perpetuation of this dilemma, 
this thesis has adopted a complementary framework of international law on the use of force 
where other legal system, such as Islamic international law, is considered by appraising the 
different variables, policies, their interrelations and weight in certain context. Thus, this thesis 
tried to discover the conformity of Public international law and Islamic international law in the 
common parlance of use of force by detecting the areas of discord in the theoretical ‘legitimacy’ 
analysis and transforming the format of that theoretical analysis through application of a matrix 
which contains theoretical (legal pluralism), legal (treaties) and pragmatic (regionalisation) 
components.  
The linkage between Public international law and Islamic international law is the universality 
of both these systems where both are referring to the sources and the former is referring to, 
particularly, the application. Use of force at the international level has been subject to 
challenges and suffering from legitimacy deficits from the perspectives of both Public 
international law and Islamic international law. The modern world had made a demand for 
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legitimacy of use of force and that demand must be met by promoting international legal 
framework in plural fashion. This is because, there is no place for hegemony and monopoly by 
the powerful states at the international level due to their lack of legitimate authority to 
manipulate international law on the use of force by political and military power.  
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